Discurso do Representante Permanente, Embaixador Ronaldo Costa Filho, em reunião do Conselho de Segurança no formato Fórmula Arria sobre o tema "Clima, Paz e Segurança: Oportunidades para a arquitetura de paz e segurança da ONU" - 29 de novembro de 2022 (texto em inglês)

Statement By The Permanent Representative Of Brazil, H.E. Ronaldo Costa Filho
Arria Formula Meeting On “Climate, Peace And Security: Opportunities For The Un Peace And Security Architecture”
November 29, 2022

Mr. Chair,

At the outset, allow me to thank the distinguished briefers for providing their remarks and insights on this important subject.

A couple of weeks ago, at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, we reached a breakthrough agreement, with the consideration, for the first time, of matters relating to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. New important initiatives were also announced at the occasion and should be stressed, such as the Global Shield against Climate Risks and the UNSG's initiative on Early Warnings for All.

Yet, at COP27 the Parties again reiterated the serious concern that the goal of developed countries to mobilize USD 100 billion per year by 2020 has still not been met. The Parties also urged the developed countries to meet this goal, as well as to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building for adaptation.

Needless to say, means of implementation to enhance adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability to climate change are the urgent need of the hour for developing countries to address any potential indirect impacts of climate factors in situations of vulnerability in specific contexts.

In this sense, while we are here today to once again discuss climate and security, I take this opportunity to once again, and before talking about any conflict dealt by the Security Council, to stressthe urgent need for all developed countries to fulfill the long overdue climate finance commitments under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. We do think this is the very first step that must be taken before discussing the Security Council’s agenda.

Mr. Chair,

With reference to the concept note circulated by the proponents of this informal meeting, I must emphasize, first of all, that what seems to be the basic assumption of this debate – that is, the idea of building on previous discussions to further advance the encroachment of the Security Council into the climate change agenda - is not consensual among member states.

I also noticed that the concept note makes reference to recent IPCC findings concerning risks and vulnerabilities to climate change. Allow me to further elaborate on the key messages of the contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC, as per the summary for policymakers:

 - Not only are non-climatic factors the dominant drivers of existing intrastate conflicts – as correctly acknowledged in the concept note -, but even in some assessed regions where extreme weather and climate events – and I quote the report – “have had a small, adverse impact on the length, severity or frequency of intrastate violent conflicts, the statistical association is weak”. This is from paragraph B.1.7 of the SPM.

- The same report states that “Vulnerability to climate change is higher in locations with poverty, governance challenges and limited access to basic services and resources”, and also that “Present development challenges causing high vulnerability are influenced by historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism”. This is paragraph B.2.4.

- The same report stresses that “Compared to other socioeconomic factors the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak”. This is also verbatim from the same IPCC report.

Although this is how express references to climate and violent conflicts are presented in the most recent IPCC findings on the matter, the concept note to this debate makes the following statement in its introduction: “The effects of climate change influence the success of all our peace efforts”. I wonder how we may adequately work in the Security Council based on assumptions that clearly deviate from the evidence based conclusions made by the most competent body for the science related to climate change.

I wonder, once again, what is the influence of climate change on the current situation in Ukraine – to give just one telling example. In this sense, it seems to me that some important caveats on this important matter – to say the least – are missing, leading us to wrong conclusions about the best way forward according to the IPCC.

Mr. Chair,

Let me again reiterate Brazil’s commitment to addressing the root causes of climate change and its adverse impacts on our societies, as well as our engagement to the multilateral climate change regime. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, thus requiring an effective response of the international community.

In this sense, as I already had the opportunity to highlight in the recent past, while the Security Council, when performing its functions in peacekeeping missions, may and should contribute by supporting efforts of host countries on the ground, at their request, to increase local resilience and build capacities, this does not mean that the Council has or should have a mandate to thematically address climate change. Neither would it be appropriate to suggest some sort of systemic encroachment of the climate agenda by the UN Peace and security architecture.

Brazil fails to see why the references, in the concept note, to the need to put in place systems to better prepare countries to address future climate hazards should be conflated with a discussion on peace and security, inasmuch as mechanisms under the climate change regime could and should be mobilized to effectively address the matter under the development pillar of the United Nations.

It may be tempting for some countries to try and incorporate new items such as climate into the Security Council agenda, so as to put the theme under the umbrella of a UN body capable of producing legally binding decisions. It was not to address such issues, however, that States voluntarily agreed on limiting their own sovereign rights by ceding responsibility to the Security Council.

It is also a matter of concern for Brazil that developed countries do not seem to be as keen on fulfilling their climate finance commitments under the UNFCCC as they are on insisting on addressing these issues within the Security Council. We hear much talk of prevention, but do not see the recognition that the best way to avoid the risk of climate change aggravating conflict situations is by fully complying with commitments to finance adaptation in developing countries. This insistence only reinforces the perception that some countries want to deviate the attention from clear implementation gaps in the climate change regime, particularly in the provision of support for developing countries by developed countries.

In our view, what is mostly needed are concrete steps towards new, additional and enhanced means of implementation for developing countries, including financing, technology transfer and capacity-building. Proper fora, tools and mechanisms for mobilizing and providing these resources already exist within the UNFCCC and the wider UN system, and none of them requires the direct involvement of the Security Council.

I thank you.