CADE signs agreement on investigation of international cartel in the pharmaceutical market

On 13 September, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) signed a cease and desist agreement with Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals and an individual in the administrative proceeding that analyses an alleged cartel in the supply chain and sale of pharmaceutical products used in antispasmodic medications (scopolamine N-butylbromide or SNBB), which have possible effects in Brazil. 

After the Tribunal's decision, the pharmaceutical company pleaded guilty to anticompetitive conduct and committed to pay BRL 23 million as a financial contribution to the Fund for De Facto Joint Rights. In addition, the individual pledged to pay BRL 55 thousand to the Fund for De Facto Joint Rights and cooperate with CADE's investigation.  The pharmaceutical company must also cease any investigated conduct as well as adopt preventive measures to stop any antitrust violations.

Following the cease and desist agreement signature, the administrative proceeding is suspended. The Tribunal of CADE will evaluate the case to make sure the obligations have been met in the final decision.

Alexandre Cordeiro, president of CADE, said, "The proposal complies with the legal and statutory requirements by signing the cease and desist agreement. Namely, the cessation  of the practice,  the contribution to the Fund for De Facto Joint Rights, the establishment of the fine in case of non-compliance with the obligations undertaken, and the cooperation with the investigations". 

Investigation

In November 2021, the Office of the Superintendent General launched an administrative proceeding against seven companies and eleven individuals for an alleged cartel. The conduct affected mainly the supply chain and sales of scopolamine N-butylbromide (SNBB).

According to the investigations, the anticompetitive conducts occurred from the beginning of the 90s to at least 2019. In the proceeding, there is evidence that the companies involved established anticompetitive agreements to define the volume of the production and sales of SNBB, such as price-rigging, creation of artificial entry barriers, and protection of territories, or preferred customers. The exchange of competitively sensitive information and the monitoring between the companies reinforced these practices.

The case is currently under the analysis of the Office of the Superintendent General.