Intervenção do Brasil (em inglês) no debate sob o Pilar I- Desarmamento Nuclear, na I Sessão do Comitê Preparatório da XI Conferência de Exame do TNP (Viena, 31/7 a 12/8)

1^st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023

Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament

Statement by the Delegation of Brazil

Delivered by H.E. Flávio Soares Damico, Ambassador, 

Special Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament

Thank you. 

As was the case in the General Debate, my delegation associates itself fully with the statement delivered by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) under Cluster 1 and the following remarks will be made in our national capacity. 

Mr. Chairman, 

The issues under this cluster are the conduit for the realization of the Treaty’s ultimate objective – the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They form the core of the NPT, the pillar on which the regime rests. And yet, it has become clear that pillar 1 has, regrettably, been reduced to a bundle of undelivered promises. Some have been broken, others are being reneged upon and, the remaining ones have simply been forgotten. We wonder how much further weakening this pillar – and the Treaty as a whole – is capable of withstanding.

Mr. Chairman,

Time and again nuclear-weapon States and their apologists affirm that the implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments cannot take place in a deteriorated security scenario such as the one we find ourselves in. 

As High Representative Nakamitsu stated during the general debate, this is a “chicken-or-egg” scenario, one which condemns us to a sterile debate about what should take precedence.

 We are not naïve to the point of denying that the security environment has a bearing on disarmament. But disarmament – and expressions of willingness to engage towards that goal – shapes and alters said environment, by breeding confidence and good will. In brief, we are all equipped with agency and, therefore, capable, up to a certain extent, to change the course of events. Inevitably, some more than others, such as in the case of Nuclear Weapon States. They are not passive agenda-takers, they are agenda-makers.

It is not without trepidation that I say that there is a pressing need to return to the Cold War understanding that the core of the nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation regime must be insulated from the geostrategic disputes among States Parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States and their allies.

Mr. Chairman, 

Characterizing what constitutes a “responsible” or an “irresponsible” nuclear weapon state is a disconcerting undertaking at best. 

During the 1960’s, one of the most distinguished Brazilian diplomats described the NPT as a condominium in which five members believed they were endowed with what he termed as “the monopoly of responsibility”. In a nutshell, only the Five had hands safe enough to control the massive destructive power unleashed by nuclear weapons. It is time to revisit this concept and the numbers. It is not Five, it is not even Three, it is Zero.  

Responsibility is not binary, neither are behaviors and rhetoric. Nuclear deterrence doctrines, even the most defensive in nature, always rest upon a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is just like a chain reaction: all that is needed is an irresponsible neutron to ignite it and no moderators to exercise control.

Moreover, egregious behaviors, like resorting to nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion or blackmail, constitute an extremely grave violation of the Charter and a threat to the international community. Likewise, aggressive nuclear rhetoric is unacceptable, by anyone, anytime and under any circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a powerful response to this state of affairs. Its adoption, entry into force and ongoing consolidation constitute a forceful response to those who might be tempted to use the NPT as a justification for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. With the TPNW, the overwhelming majority of the international community expressed the firm belief that nuclear weapons are abhorrent and that any use or threat of use would be met with widespread condemnation, thus strengthening the nuclear taboo.

Mr. Chairman, 

Brazil welcomes discussions on possible nuclear risk reduction measures, which have been part of the New Agenda Coalition toolbox of recommendations since its inception in 1998. Nevertheless, nuclear risk reduction is far from being a substitute for disarmament, and, as such, should not be construed as a demonstration of compliance with Article VI. 

Mr. Chairman, 

The unadopted draft outcome document of the last Review Conference was a product of its time and circumstances. Although a good starting point for the next review cycle, it still falls well short of the significant progress we need. We must go beyond the reaffirmation of past commitments, and supplement it with measures aimed at their immediate implementation and further reinforcement. 

In this regard, we invite partners to examine the proposals put forward by the NAC in its working paper, some of which were echoed by the UN Secretary General in Action 1 of his policy brief  “A new agenda for peace”. 

Mr. Chairman,

Together with our New Agenda Coalition partners, Brazil has been advocating for embedding mechanisms of transparency and accountability into the NPT review process. This is not a revolutionary idea: not only it fulfills Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan but also aligns the NPT with more modern treaties. Since nuclear-weapon States often claim to be fulfilling their obligations under Article VI, transparency will provide them with an opportunity to demonstrate that unequivocally. Furthermore, it will provide a modicum of reciprocity to the efforts of non-nuclear weapon States, which, as good international citizens, have been holding their end of the “grand bargain” consistently for the past 50 years. 

It is our sincere hope that we agree on measures to reinforce transparency and accountability already during the current review cycle. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.