Intervenção do Brasil (em inglês) no debate geral da I Sessão do Comitê Preparatório da XI Conferência de Exame do TNP (Viena, 31/7 a 12/8)

1^st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023

General Debate

Statement by the Delegation of Brazil

Delivered by H.E. Flávio Soares Damico, Ambassador,

Special Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Allow me to begin by congratulating you, Ambassador Viinanen, for your election as chairman of the I Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11^th Review conference of the NPT. Please count with Brazil’s full support. My delegation fully associates itself with the statement by the delegation of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition and wishes to make the following comments in its national capacity.

Mr. Chairman,

In the lead-up to this first session of the PrepCom, it became increasingly evident that perceptions on the 10th Review Conference differed widely. Surprisingly, some chose to bask in the cold comfort of assigning the second consecutive failure of an NPT Review Conference exclusively to external circumstances and to the prevailing deteriorated international scenario. Emphasizing exogenous circumstances may provide a modicum of solace. But this is not good enough. We owe it to ourselves to be frank and candid about the prevailing situation of the NPT regime, if we really care about it. Having joined the regime belatedly and only after very careful consideration, Brazil does care. The continued inability of the NPT regime to fulfill its most fundamental objective - the complete elimination of nuclear weapons – or even to take further meaningful steps towards it, jeopardizes its credibility and legitimacy and compromises its future.

At its inception, the NPT was very far from assured success. Its many shortcomings and evident structural imbalances stood out. And yet, over time the NPT consolidated itself as the "cornerstone" of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and gathered near-universal participation. States Parties, both nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), perceived that the Treaty accrued to their security. Even though this security dividend was apportioned in an uneven and unbalanced way, it provided a net positive.

Since the last successful review conference, in 2010, as the memories of the Treaty’s indefinite extension faded, a palpable turn for the worse set in, as complacency towards nuclear disarmament imposed itself.  Security benefits derived by the NNWS from participation in the Treaty dwindled markedly. Negative security assurances remain in precarious legal ground. Not surprisingly, positive military guarantees are now avidly sought out, be it through participation in nuclear military alliances or through so-called "nuclear sharing" arrangements, in obvious contradiction with Articles I and II of the NPT.

To stem and reverse these trends, NPT States Parties must firstly recommit to the “acquis” of prior commitments on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Further concrete actions are urgently required. In the short term, the most promising ones are measures to improve transparency and accountability regarding Article VI obligations and previous RevCon commitments.

These will be Brazil’s paramount priorities for the next review cycle. We shall pursue these objectives together with our partners of the "New Agenda Coalition" (NAC), which celebrates this year the 25th anniversary of its establishment.

Mr. Chairman,

In 2010, echoing the NPT’s first preambular paragraph - its chief purpose and moral compass - States Parties reiterated their deep concern over the humanitarian consequences resulting from any use of nuclear weapons. Since then, research on the various immediate and long-term impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing has underscored the relevance of the issue, which provides a necessary foundation for discussions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This debate needs to be furthered during the next review cycle.

Mr. Chairman,

Undoubtedly, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been the most important development in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime in decades. Brazil played a key role in its negotiation and adoption and remains fully committed to the Treaty and its objectives, while its ratification process is underway.

The TPNW is fully compatible with the NPT, as both treaties complement and strengthen each other. The TPNW provides a tangible contribution to the international security environment, by raising the moral threshold against any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Now, this is more required than ever. Nevertheless, the TPNW continues to be needlessly antagonized. Although the Treaty provides for a legal and comprehensive prohibition of atomic weapons, we reiterate that nothing in it stands in the way for the realization of nuclear disarmament objectives, including through “gradual approaches”.

Mr. Chairman,

Turning now to the second pillar, my delegation reiterates the importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally. While the robustness and effectiveness of the NPT verification regime must be celebrated, we should not lose sight of the fact that its implementation is burdensome financially, technically and politically. Moreover, it is also lopsided, borne almost exclusively by non-nuclear-weapon States.

NNWS have also contributed decisively to the non-proliferation regime through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. By creating the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a permanently inhabited area, States from Latin America and the Caribbean have set an example in this regard. Similar points were made yesterday in the statement of OPANAL’s Secretary-General. Another decisive contribution from our region was the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), an innovative and effective verification and safeguards arrangement recognized as exemplary by the UN General Assembly by consensus.

Proposals geared towards aggravating the already profound imbalance between disarmament and non-proliferation obligations are the wrong medicine for the ailments of the regime. Altering the voluntary nature of the Additional Protocol or elevating it to the level of standard for the verification of non-proliferation obligations provided for in Article III of the NPT is not the way forward.

The AP's voluntary nature has been reiterated by resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA on a yearly basis since its approval by the Board of Governors. Within the NPT, the final document of the 2010 Review Conference noted ‘it is the sovereign decision of any state to conclude an additional protocol’.

Mr. Chairman,

Regarding the third pillar, my delegation regrets that more than five decades since the entry into force of the NPT, technologies and capabilities for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remain concentrated in a few countries.

In this regard, Brazil reiterates its support for strengthening the IAEA's promotional activities, through the provision of sufficient, guaranteed, and predictable resources to adequately respond to the growing needs of Member States, particularly least developed countries (LDCs).

The next review cycle should not fail to recognize the need for promoting ownership by recipient countries – a United Nations system-wide tenet for technical cooperation – of programs under the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), and the need to ensure broad and equitable access to the benefits of nuclear energy for sustainable development and to promote the well-being of our populations.

Mr. Chairman,

As to naval nuclear propulsion, my delegation recalls and reaffirms the elements of the working paper circulated by Brazil during the 10th Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.71).

Nothing in the NPT precludes the development of naval nuclear propulsion. Furthermore, such activities are explicitly characterized as non-proscribed by all comprehensive safeguards agreements. Naval nuclear propulsion is, therefore, a peaceful use of nuclear energy. Consequently, no preconditions for the exercise of this right by non-nuclear-weapon States should be countenanced, beyond the obligations established by the IAEA safeguards regime.

Article 13 of the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC) provides the legal basis for the verification of nuclear material to be used in naval propulsion. Accordingly, Brazil and the IAEA should adopt an arrangement for special procedures for that purpose.

Such procedures will be a set of specific verification methods that should enable the Agency to continue to provide assurances of non-diversion of nuclear material, while protecting sensitive technological and operational parameters related to Brazil’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine.

Since December 2021, Brazil and the Secretariat of the IAEA have been engaged in technical discussions on the development of these special procedures.

In pursuing the legitimate goal of naval nuclear propulsion, Brazil is committed to transparency and open engagement with the IAEA, ensuring the Agency´s ability to fulfil its statutory non-proliferation mandate, as well as to keeping IAEA Member States informed about relevant developments.

Mr. Chairman,

After two consecutive review cycles that failed to deliver concrete results, we must avoid a repetition of unhelpful dynamics and recommit to the preservation of the regime. Our discussions during last week’s working group on the strengths and shortcomings of the structure of the NPT review cycle were positive; nevertheless, its results were, alas, underwhelming. We are disappointed but not discouraged. My delegation will continue to work constructively to align the NPT to other international regimes in terms of inclusivity, ownership, accountability, compliance and effectiveness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.