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


*Bicentenário*

DA INDEPENDÊNCIA DO BRASIL

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## THE TRAILS OF AN INDEPENDENT BRAZIL: 1822-2022

The Escola Superior de Guerra Magazine, committed to revealing Brazil during the dawn of independence until its maturation as a democratic state of law, launches an issue dedicated to the impressions of academics from the School and other institutions that talk with it about these 200 years of advances and setbacks that make up our panel as an autonomous, sovereign country, free to think and act. In the form of forums, each thematic group put together articles whose subjects present our identity traits as a Nation capable of housing a multiple people and endowed with belonging in a continental territory.

Difficult was the mission of contemplating, in an edition formed by five forums, two centuries of *Armed Forces, Culture and Society in the Centenary of Independence; Geopolitics, Borders and Sovereignty of Brazil in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; Independence of Brazil, Modern Art Week and Portuguese Language as the identity statements of the Nation; Human Rights: 200 years of advances and setbacks; The path of Public Administration and Defense in Brazil* - and cross-cutting issues to those proposed by the forums.

The works that translate the country and its people are substantive. These so-called interpreters of Brazil and of the Brazilians, ovated or criticized, are read, reread, reviewed, re-signified and are the starting point of other writings whose images of the past, of the present and, perhaps, of the future are looked at in tandem.

In the schedule of Independence, we highlight movements that preceded the Proclamation of Independence and that accelerated the September 7, 1822 - decrees such as that of August 13 and September 2, 1822, both calling for the separation of Brazil from Portugal and signed by Maria Leopoldina, strategist, urged the head of state and the Princess Regent acting in the absence of her husband D. Pedro I, who tried to pacify political pending in various points of the territory.

The anniversary of the bicentenary of Independence is a special moment to summon Brazilian society to celebrate the ephemeris and to think about Brazil: planning the future course, acclimatizing the right course to the current time and passing to clean structural problems that afflict our people from the beginning. It is a symbolic and propitious date for reflecting and sketching Brazil that is about to come, a new dawn in which the country will be the protagonist of its history.

Indeed, in these 200 years of Brazil's independence, the great challenge of the homeland strategist is creating a national development project that is truly autochthonous and capable of harmonizing, on the one hand, free enterprise and the world opening up of trade and, on the other, the dignity of the human person and the constitutional feeling of justice.

September 2022 - Brazilian Independence Bicentennial

**Lieutenant General ADILSON CARLOS KATIBE**  
Commandant of Escola Superior de Guerra

## LETTER FROM THE EDITOR IN CHIEF

The Argentine sociologist Elizabeth Jelín (2002) once wrote that the round anniversaries of historical events constitute privileged moments in which the past becomes present, and in which public commemorative rituals construct and reconstruct memories, historiographies and feelings about who we are, where we came from and where we are going.

Round date signals moments when different actors express, interpret, signify and confront - whether at the local, regional, national, and even international level - feelings of collectivity and belonging to something greater than us. The round dates are symbolic moments that materialize what the French philosopher Ernest Renan called “daily plebiscites” necessary for the construction of the nation (RENAN, 1882).

The Bicentennial of Independence is on the schedule of this year and on the guideline of the *Escola Superior de Guerra*, which presents readers with five thematic forums that lead to reflection on the historical event of the Proclamation of the Independence of Brazil (1822), on the celebrations of the Centenary (1922) and on the threads that intertwine other events that occurred over the 200 years.

Inaugurating the bicentennial magazine, the *Armed Forces, culture and society in the centenary of Independence* forum gives us four productions that stimulate reflections on Brazilian history, having as their object themes that run through the symbols of the nation, military images and the political-cultural universe of the First Republic, with an emphasis on the movement of lieutenants. With the gaze launched on the military universe and related themes, six authors experienced in academic productions linked to the scope of the forum were invited. It is this select list of researchers, in order of presentation of the articles, Janylle de Almeida Ferreira, Wilson de Oliveira Neto, Francisco Alves César Ferraz, Fernando Silva Rodrigues, Andriete Cancelier and the guest editor Eduardo Rizzatti. Addressing the past experience and the record of national history, the authors raise questions and concerns about the national memory, military identity, symbolism, culture and politics of a country under construction, leading the reader to think critically about the role of the military in this journey.

In the thematic axis *Geopolitics, Borders and Sovereignty of Brazil in the 21st century*, the authors Guilherme Sandoval and Paulo Visentini seek to outline the fundamental bases of a possible National Security Strategy for Brazil, including the

Eastern Flank of the Strategic Environment of the Country. It is in this context that, under the aegis of the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of our Independence, it is urgent for the country's strategist to formulate the Great Strategy of Brazil, whose categorical imperative is to position the country among the five greatest powers of the planet. To do so, starting from the special condition of a great nation territorially satisfied with its external frontiers, it is incumbent on Brazil to build its development project on the basis of the resilience and expansion of its strategic centers, here envisioned as the players of the triple helix of technological innovation, encompassing companies, universities and the government itself. That is, the idea of a strategic nucleus projects the image of all those autonomous economic-financial-technological segments capable of participating effectively in international competition, inserting the country into the major global chains of production, knowledge and value.

The third forum, *Independence of Brazil, Modern Art Week and Portuguese Language*, as identity statements of the Nation traces the open paths of the Independence of Brazil from 1822 until 2022. The first article, by Lourdes Belchior and Mary Del Priore, deals with the importance of Maria Leopoldina - Archduchess of Austria, the first wife of Emperor D. Pedro I and Empress Consort of Brazil (1822-1826) - an empowered woman who enchanted Brazilian subjects since her arrival in Rio de Janeiro, assimilated the spirit of Brazilianness and encouraged D. Pedro I to remain in Brazil and proclaim our Independence. The second article, by Maria Célia Barbosa Reis da Silva, deals with the decoloniality of our arts: the break with previous models influenced by Eurocentrism and the search for our cultural roots emanating from the people, who have the traditions, and the meaning of ethnic multiplicity, "macunaimica", rich in our country. All this instinct for nationality — the acquiescence of the coexistence of the old with the modern, the incorporation and the relevance of the values coming from different social layers — was contemplated by various artistic and literary manifestations at the Modern Art Week, in February 1922, during the centenary of Independence. Concluding the speech of the forum, Luiz Antônio Senna talks about the National Portuguese Language, modified by speech and enriched with accents and vocabularies coming from all regions of Brazil and from the peoples that intertwined in our territory and that left linguistic residues in our daily life.

The fourth forum entitled *Human Rights: 200 years of advances and setbacks* sheds light on the steps and steps taken by manifestations of protection of individual freedoms and equal access to minimum living conditions, such as housing,

education, work, food and the safeguarding of rights to all religions, as established in our 1891 Constitution, Chapter I, Article 5, paragraph VI. There are three articles that raise questions about the security of rights in Brazil. Fernanda Duarte, Rafael Iorio and Ronaldo Lucas bring to debate, in the first article, the constitutionalism and the Independence of Brazil from a juridical-historical perspective, highlighting the obstacles of the transition of the colonial regime to Brazilian society. The second academic reflection, developed by Lara Denise Góes da Costa and Paulo M. D'Ávila Filho, shows new perspectives of understanding the social pleas of the minority and the cultural values integrated with the normative dimension of Human Rights. The last article, by Ana Luiza da Gama e Souza, presents the challenges of food security in Brazil through socioeconomic analysis and provides a balance between the global dynamics of the concentration of the input market and the regulatory advances and setbacks in Brazil.

The last forum entitled *The path of Public Administration and Defense in Brazil* outlines the path of public administration by means of three models: patrimonial, bureaucratic and managerial. The articles in this segment contain reflections on the bicentenary of Independence. Frederico Lustosa da Costa outlines a brief panorama of the transformations that the Brazilian state and public administration underwent in the early years of its formation, delimiting three moments: Brazil as a colony, the United Kingdom and independent Brazil. Paulo Roberto Motta, in the second article, reflects how the globalized and connected world, marked by speed and instantaneity, has affected the separation of people's private and professional lives. New technologies create new challenges for public management. In the closing article, Jacintho Maia Neto contextualizes the management in the Defense sector in the needs claimed by society of our time: support in the area of public security, assistance in natural disasters, supporting major events and tackling endemics/pandemics such as dengue and COVID-19. The Escola Superior de Guerra, through its academic magazine, dedicates the number 80, volume 37, to this year's relevant celebration: the Bicentenary of the Independence of Brazil.

The publication of this issue was able to count on the collaboration of researchers from the faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra, who were invited to organize thematic forums in accordance with their areas of activity, in collaboration with researchers from other research and teaching institutions. The forums cover several topics: History of Brazil, Geopolitics, National Culture, formulation of Public Policies on Human Rights and Public Administration of Defense. In common, the

proposal of thinking Brazil in this Bicentenary, celebrating advances, recognizing debts with the past, and identifying proposals that point to the potential of a nation that intends to be the “Country of the Future”.

Good reading, everyone!

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## ARMED FORCES, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE CENTENARY OF INDEPENDENCE

In Brazil, the turn to the 1920s was marked by an era of transformation. The mass immigration in the previous decades, the growing industrialization and the phenomenon of intense urbanization, notably in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, changed the face of the country, ushering in an era that was beginning under the unfolding sign of the European Great War, consecrated by historiography as the First World War (1914-1918), and the nefarious consequences of the Spanish Flu. These were times of notable changes in customs, in labor relations, of the growth of the urban middle class and of the workers and stage of recurrent political crises.

The set of transformations was most evident in the big cities. In contrast, it shocked the backwardness of a country with millions of illiterates, serious public health problems, the persistence of social relations going back to the slave period and the political predominance of old oligarchies taking turns in power. In the Brazilian export agenda, coffee was still predominant. The feeling of vertigo of those who looked at the country as a whole was inevitable, as if experiencing a feeling of acceleration of time in the metropolises and the frustration with the slow pace of change in the municipalities and scattered villages in the vastness of Brazil's countryside.

Where was the military in that context? First-time protagonists at the time of the advent of the Republic, they were not expected to retreat to their barracks and await the consequences of the period. In *Forças Armadas e Política no Brasil* (The Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil), José Murilo de Carvalho, when addressing the role of the military in the national life in times of the Old Republic, cites passage from the editorial of *A Defesa Nacional*, of October 1913, which, diverging from his colleagues in uniform who advocated of strictly professional posture, stated: "The Army needs to be equipped for its conservative and stabilizing role in the marching social elements and be prepared to correct internal disruptions, so common in the tumultuous life of forming societies." (2005, p. 41).

As Carvalho evidenced, the editorial's content contrasted with the professional soldier's ideology, defended by the Young Turk generation, who were precisely the magazine's founders. These soldiers were so called in a provocative tone, alluding to the reformist Turkish military led by Marshal Mustafa Kemal. In this group were officers coming from traineeships in European armies, with a special emphasis on Germany, and other soldiers to remain on the land of their country, all brought together by the enthusiasm of the proposal for the modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces. Many of the Brazilian "Turks" advocated not only professionalization, but also welcomed the idea of a citizen soldier, assuming as their legitimacy the possibility of military



intervention in politics. When looking at the editorial in retrospect, it can be taken as a prelude to the troubled times to unfold at the turn of the decade.

The result of the Great War was the rearrangement of political forces in the old continent, affecting the world's geopolitical order and the organization of the military forces. In the military field, the employment of new technologies heralded a new generation of weapons changing the means by which the state makes use of so-called controlled violence. The predominant mechanization and the growing role of air power have impacted industrial demands, with strong reflections on the dynamics of capital and on the way of life and social organization of many nations. Once the German Empire was won, Brazilian preferences fell upon the victors, and the French Military Mission (1920-1940) was hired to implement the desired reform in the instruction of the national army.

Under the sign of an era of change, the year 1922 was a peculiar one, characterized by the centennial celebrations of Independence, and it was a paradigmatic character because it concentrated events that were converted into landmarks of an era. If the great salons and expositions were filled with pomp and celebration, there were those who thought critically about the direction of the nation. In São Paulo, the Week of Modern Art took place, marking a turning point in the national arts, with proposals to offend certain aesthetic coyness. In the barracks, the questioning of the elections of 1922 promoted a climate of exaltation, stirring up tempers and evidencing divisions between the officialdom.

The novelty was the manifestation of subaltern sectors, with the predominance of lieutenants and captains in the leadership of the course of pronouncements throughout the 1920s, with emphasis on the uprising of the Escola Militar de Realengo and the Fort of Copacabana, with 1922, the São Paulo Revolt of 1924 and the formation of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column (1925-1927), having as one of the movement's staples the adoption of secret ballots, the creation of the electoral justice and the removal of the old oligarchies of the oligarchies of power. Still in the field of politics, on March 25, 1922, the Communist Party of Brazil was founded, later named the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), self-titled Brazilian Section of the Communist International, attracting not a few sympathizers and many aggressive opponents to identify in the members of the "PARTIDÃO" agents guided by a foreign power. The culmination of this era can be identified in the Revolution of 1930, inaugurating the Vargas Era, revealing itself as a true watershed. Many of the "lieutenants" would be political actors who set the course for the following years, not rarely acting in opposing camps. From what has been said up until now, can one glimpse how it is possible to understand the period without poring over the history of the Brazilian military, its symbols and political expressions?

With this scenario in mind, the forum “Armed Forces, culture and society in the centenary of Independence”, from the Magazine of Escola Superior de Guerra, invites the reader to appreciate four productions that address themes dedicated to stimulating debate about the history and symbols of the nation, having as main focus the first decades of the Republic and themes related to the military universe to communicate with centenary and the bicentenary of Independence.

The articles section of the forum is opened by Jamylle de Almeida Ferreira, with the text between the narrator of the image and those of the story: the picture “*A Pátria*” and the flag of Brazil Republic, addressing the relationship between the making of the republican flag and the representation offered by the work of Pedro Bruno. The author discusses the symbolic content of the painting and unveils investigative possibilities regarding the characters portrayed, addressing issues related to the construction of national identity, the underlying iconographic discourse, and questioning occultations and mystifications in a text articulated with reflections on the flag as a symbol and the painting as a political representation.

Wilson de Oliveira Neto and Francisco Alves César Ferraz offer us the article *Two centuries of images and stories: notes on iconography in the cultural heritage of Brazilian military origin*. The authors present us with an examination of photography as a heritage asset, proposing a reflection on its meanings and expressions, leading us through an examination of the images and the debate about the fact that photography is far from being a reliable record of the past, since, as a historical source, it is subject to diverse uses, revealing specific notions of memory and history, and even silences and manipulations.

The following article, by Fernando Silva Rodrigues, entitled *Lieutenantism in the Military School of Realengo*, brings to the agenda the movement whose name was consecrated by the pioneering work of Virgílio Santa Rosa, The sense of lieutenantism, of 1933. The author discusses a fundamental theme for understanding the tensions experienced in the process of professional modernization of the Brazilian Army in the first half of the twentieth century, covering the reorganization of the teaching model adopted in the Military Schools and the relationship of teaching with the political revolts inaugurated in 1922.

Adriete Cancelier and Eduardo Rizzatti Salomão close the forum with the article *The 18 Men of Fort Copacabana: history and place of memory*. The text is dedicated to interrogating interpretations of the context that triggered the military rebellion assumed to be the genesis of lieutenantism and its conversion into a memory. The authors return to issues such as the representativeness of the movement and the uses and abuses of the memorialist construction of the episode, consecrated as a symbol of a generation of military personnel, thus bringing to the debate one of the most striking political gestures of 1922.

The texts presented here stimulate us to think about which parents occupied our past and the role of the military in this journey, making us reflect on the present and conjecture tomorrow. There are so many questions and worries. Within the editorial boundaries of this forum, it is expected that the lines and lines of his articles will stimulate debate on these issues. To all, good reading!

Eduardo Rizzatti Salomão  
Guest Editor

## BETWEEN THE NARRATOR OF THE IMAGE AND THOSE OF HISTORY: the picture “A Pátria” and the first flag of Brazil Republic

Jamylle de Almeida Ferreira\*

### ABSTRACT

In commemorating the bicentenary of independence, we propose a reflection that touches upon the question of the process of constitution of national identity. The object is the polemical representation of the confection of the flag of Republican Brazil as an imagetic sign in the work *A Pátria*, of 1919. Although the author of the painting did not commit to a personalistic and quantitative representation, the scene became known as the making of the first example of the Republican flag by the wife and daughters of Benjamin Constant. However, different from what the constructed and manipulated social memory points out, the first flag of Republican Brazil was embroidered by Flora Simas de Carvalho, who would have passed through life in anonymity, had it not been for this accomplishment. The work of art allows itself to be interpreted within certain limits established by the author. Apart from those that are evidenced in it, what do those that are forgotten represent?

**Keywords:** First Flag of Republican Brazil; National Identity; Social Memory.

*ENTRE O NARRADOR DA IMAGEM E OS DA HISTÓRIA: o quadro “A Pátria” e a primeira bandeira do Brasil República*

### RESUMO

*Ao comemorarmos o bicentenário da independência, propomos uma reflexão que toca a questão do processo de constituição da identidade nacional. O objeto é a polêmica representação da confecção da bandeira do Brasil Republicano como signo imagético na obra *A Pátria*, de 1919. Apesar de o autor do quadro não se comprometer com uma representação personalista e quantitativa, a cena ficou conhecida como a confecção do primeiro exemplar da bandeira republicana pela esposa e filhas de Benjamin Constant. Entretanto, diferente do que aponta a memória social construída e manipulada, a primeira bandeira do Brasil Republicano foi bordada por Flora Simas de Carvalho, que teria passado pela vida no anonimato, não fosse esse feito. A obra de arte se permite interpretar dentro de certos*

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*limites estabelecidos pelo autor. Para além dos que nela são evidenciados, o que representam os que são esquecidos?*

*Palavras-chave: Primeira Bandeira do Brasil Republicano; Identidade Nacional; Memória Social.*

*ENTRE EL NARRADOR DE LA IMAGEN Y LOS DE LA HISTORIA: la pintura “A Pátria”  
y la primera bandera de lo Brasil República*

**RESUMEN**

*Al conmemorar el bicentenario de la independencia, proponemos una reflexión sobre la cuestión del proceso de establecimiento de la identidad nacional. El objeto es la representación polémica de la construcción de la bandera del Brasil republicano como signo de imagen en la obra A Pátria, de 1919. A pesar de que el autor de la pintura no se comprometió con una representación personalista y cuantitativa, la escena se hizo conocida como la primera copia de la bandera republicana por la esposa y las hijas de Benjamin Constant. Sin embargo, a diferencia de lo que se señala en la memoria social construida y manipulada, la primera bandera del Brasil republicano se vio envuelta en la Flora Simas de Carvalho, que habría pasado su vida en el anonimato, de no haberse hecho esto. La obra de arte permite interpretarse dentro de ciertos límites establecidos por el autor. Aparte de los que se destacan en él, ¿cuáles son los olvidados?*

*Palabras clave: Primera bandera del Brasil republicano; identidad nacional; memoria social.*

**1 INTRODUCTION**

This year, when we celebrate 200 years of Brazilian Independence, it is interesting to revive issues that revolve around the elements that have contributed to being a people, even with such diversity and an enormous territory.

National symbols and their representations play a prominent role in this sense, since they play an important role in the formation of social memory and Brazilian identity, contributing to what Hobsbawm and Ranger (1984) call the invention of tradition.

Thus, we selected an earlier historical event that was part of the process that led us to independence: the Proclamation of the Republic, 1889. We propose to address the relationship established between the making of the first flag of Brazil, our most important national symbol, and the work *A Pátria*, composition in oil on canvas, painted in 1919 by Pedro Bruno - an academic painter of the time -, permanently exhibited in the Museum of the Republic, in the capital of Rio de Janeiro and frequently emblazoned in history textbooks.

By transmitting a message, works of art reach cognition, promoting a sense.

The imagetic signs carry indicial, iconic and symbolic meanings. According to Citelli (2007), they produce values, precepts, ideas and thus integrate into the realm of ideologies, forming a dependency relationship between these elements and inducing understanding of implicit meanings.

The work translates a time, the processes that that society was going through, the information that the painter had access to, reaches the symbolic plane (representative, figurative) and has an objective associated with the construction of the national identity. This process depends on many factors:

The construction of identities takes advantage of the raw material provided by history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory and personal fantasies, by the apparatuses of power and revelations of a religious nature. However, all these materials are processed by individuals, social groups and societies, who organize their meaning in function of social trends and cultural projects rooted in their social structure as well as in their time/space vision. (CASTELLS, 2002, p. 23).

National symbols are linked to this process of building and strengthening the identity of a people. In his work, the author of the painting uses the most important of them: the National Flag.

Iconographic discourse, appropriated by various interpreters, contributes to forming our representations as a nation. But to what extent does it correspond to reality? The answer will depend on who the word is being given to, who the story's narrators are.

Identity, as a process, tends to mark certain symbolic boundaries determined by the goals of those who construct it, whether for those included in it or excluded from it. The State is primarily responsible for conducting this process, in the case of national identity. Therefore, as we will see, the picture is not dissociated from the political and social context of the time.

## **2 THE PERSONIFICATION OF THE BRAZILIAN REPUBLIC: THE MARIANNES OF THE HOME**

The association between the making of the first National Republican Flag and the scene reproduced in the painting *A Pátria*, painted by Pedro Bruno in 1919, is common. This painting is part of the Permanent Exhibition of the Museum of the Republic, located in Rio de Janeiro.

Full of symbolism and subliminal messages, it depicts a scene in which there are five women, accompanied by four children, in the interior of a house, embroidering a republican flag. Some of them divide their time between child

care and embroidery, domestic activities considered at the time to be exclusively female.

**Figure 1 – The painting “A Pátria”**



**Source:** Pedro Bruno (1919). Oil on canvas. Museu da República. Rio de Janeiro.

About the scene, we have:

[...] the scene takes place inside a residence, in the late nineteenth century, in pre-industrial times, and the **women**, doors in, embroider and sew our greatest national symbol; **one of them breastfeeds a baby** (representation of the republic that is born). On the wall, in the background, half of other details, is the portrait of Deodoro; Tiradentes is represented in a picture posted on the wall with his last moment (in a shirt and with the gallows next to it); on the table is the image of the Immaculate Conception, and the children are in the middle of the studio. With his head on a pillow, a boy plays with the star; another **girl, tenderly clings to the flag under construction, and discreetly, in the left corner, there is an elderly man, almost imperceptible in the shadow, representing the**

**monarchical past to be forgotten; traditionally this figure is interpreted as being the family of Benjamin Constant, who, in a table posted on the table, is in uniform at the time of the Paraguayan War.** As we can see, the canvas (1.90 X 2.78 meters) is full of many symbolisms and depicts in an allegorical way the "positivist construction of the Republic" from the family and the exploitation of the hope of new generations (symbolized in the children) in a country of the future. (On "*A Pátria*", by Pedro Bruno. Available at: [www.patriamineira.com.br](http://www.patriamineira.com.br). Accessed on 03 Jan. 2020). (emphasis added).

The sense of the use of female allegory to represent the republic goes back to ancient Rome when it was associated with freedom. As a result of the French Revolution and the abolition of the monarchy, from 1792 onwards, the feminine allegory came to represent, in the French imagination, the republic. Later, in the period preceding the Third Republic, in opposition to Napoleon III's Empire, it became popularized in the figure of Marianne. According to Carvalho (1990, p. 78), "Marianne went on to personify the Republic, unifying previous forms of representation".

But, if in France the female figure is associated with struggles, freedom, the ideals of revolution, the republic and the homeland, in opposition to the male monarchy, in which the nation is represented by the figure of the king himself; in Brazil, where the eventual heir to the throne was a woman, the female allegory should be used with caution by the republicans, as observed by Carvalho (1990, p.79), since this particular situation did not allow for total opposition between the empire and the republic. "Empowering" the female figure could be an obstacle to the institution of the republican regime.

Regarding this impasse, about the Brazilian republicans of French orientation, Carvalho (1990, p.78-79) states that "they were, admittedly, at a small disadvantage compared to the French [...]. But the disadvantage was diminished by the attempt to annul the figure of Isabel, showing her as a simple pawn in the hands of the Count D'Eu."

Still, according to Carvalho (1990, p. 57), the promotion of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca as a war hero was subsequent to his participation in the proclamation of the Republic, showing that he was part of the process of mythification of his figure.

As the painting *A Pátria* was painted twenty years after the proclamation, the official portrait of Deodoro, hung on the wall, already carries the intention of marking it as one of the symbols of the struggle for the survival of the Brazilian Nation, alongside Tiradentes and Benjamin Constant, because the construction of the national identity passes for its heroes and martyrs: for the fatherland some win and others give their own lives. A conservative republic was born, painted as maternal, protective, safe, but submissive and hopeful. It is a republic made not



by revolutionary women, but from the domestic environment, which denotes the simplicity of the Brazilian popular house, as opposed to the splendor of the time of the Empire. The social contribution of women did not reach the political sphere of power, being restricted to the role of wives, mothers, housewives.

Already in the image below, one can observe a woman with a command attitude towards a greater cause, liberty, by which she carries in her right hand the tricolor flag and in her left a rifle with silent bayonet and is not intimidated in the midst of the dead or with her bare chest.

**Figure 2 – The painting “A liberdade guiando o povo”**



**Source:** Eugène Delacroix (1830). Oil on canvas. Museu do Louvre, Paris

While this feminine allegory shows a more outrageous attitude, in the previous one we have an attitude of resignation and submission of women in relation to destiny. They use their sensitivity in home-based activities, such as caring for the family, the house, embroidering, sewing. They are fragile and support each other. Your children represent the future. But who are the women represented on the scene?

The publication endorsed by the Benjamin Constant House Museum makes the direct association between the accomplishment and the scene supposedly represented in the painting *A Pátria*, as if necessarily had been reproduced the making of the first flag of Brazil. “The wife and daughters of Benjamin Constant embroidered what would be considered the first flag in fabric with the idea of Décio Villares and Teixeira Mendes”. (QUEIROZ, CARRILHO; LOPES, 2015, p. 43-44).

However, this feat is disputed with florist Flora Simas de Carvalho, better known as Dona Yayá, a 16-year-old girl who worked at Rua do Ouvidor, near the center of the country’s political events at the time.

Lacombe and Calmon (1988, n.p.) guarantee that the manual work would have been carried out by her: “The first National Flag, flying at 12 o’clock on November

19, 1889, the date of its official adoption, was embroidered by Mrs. Flora Simas de Carvalho, in cotton cloth, with solemnity in the Chamber of Rio de Janeiro”.

Only a third version, that of Coimbra (1972, p. 317), mentions both matriarchs: Dona Yayá would indeed have embroidered not only the first, but also the second flag and others would have been embroidered by the daughters and wife of Benjamin Constant:

The first republican flag was embroidered by D. Flora Simas de Carvalho, in cotton cloth, and the second by the same lady, in silk, having been raised solemnly in the City Hall of Rio de Janeiro, according to some, on the day of its official adoption. The flags executed by Benjamin Constant's family and intended for the Military and Superior Schools of War are particularly remembered, at which time letters were exchanged from part to part.

According to Corrêa (2019, p.29)<sup>1</sup>, “[...] *It is known that in 1890 Benjamin Constant's wife and daughters embroidered two national flags that were handed out as a gift to the Escola Superior de Guerra and the Escola Militar da Praia Vermelha, Army higher education institutions*”.

It is undeniable, according to Carvalho (1990, p. 36), the relationship between Benjamin Constant and those schools:

Everyone agrees to recognize its influence over the military schools (the Praia Vermelha and the Escola Superior de Guerra, established in 1889, with its headquarters in São Cristóvão). There is no doubt about his republican beliefs either, but there are serious disagreements as to the importance of his performance on November 15.

The author of the painting never confirmed that he portrayed Benjamin Constant's family at the scene. However, by associating the painting and the flag embroidered by them, the exhibitions in the Republic Museum disseminated information that extrapolated reality.

The article in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper *Última Hora*, published on November 26, 1964, denotes this: “The Visitor finds on the ground the Ministerial Salon, where Getúlio last met with his ministry. Two beautiful paintings make up the decoration: the first with the Benjamin Constant family embroidering the first Brazilian flag”.

1 “Escola Superior de Guerra was created in 1889 (see Decree No. 10.203, of March 9, 1889). The Military Schools (Praia Vermelha) and Superior de Guerra (São Cristóvão) comprised the military higher education (officer training) of the Army, being responsible for teaching the courses of Infantry and Cavalry and Artillery, Engineering and General Staff respectively. They were unified in 1898, going on to be called Escola Militar do Brasil, which existed until 1905, according to Rodrigues (2016). Do not confuse the Escola Superior de Guerra in question, proper to the Army, with the one that was created in 1949 and exists until the present day, seeking to promote integration between civilians and the military of the three forces to identify and propose solutions to Brazilian problems.”

For Corrêa (2019, p.54), “[...] Considering that the flags embroidered by Benjamin Constant’s daughters were handed over to military schools in May 1890, it can be said that they were not the first known examples of the republican national pavilion, as they say”. The flag belonging to the museum’s collection is not one of the embroidered for the establishment of the republic, in the previous year (one provisional and the other definitive), attributed to Dona Yayá. Additionally, Corrêa (2019, p.54) ponders in relation to the definitive (positivist) flag, embroidered for November 19, 1989: “there are reports that the pioneerism of this sewing fell to the Pernambuco Flora Simas de Carvalho, who at the time was 18 years old<sup>2</sup> and a certain notoriety as a brothel in the federal capital, where she worked as a florist in Rua do Ouvidor”.

Both the pioneering of the feat and the protagonism of the scene, represented in the painting *A Pátria*, are disputed between the two matriarchs<sup>3</sup>, as we shall see below.

### **3 THE PROTAGONISM AND PIONEERING IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL MEMORY**

The association between the making of the first Brazilian flag and the painting *A Pátria* is so instantaneous that during an interview conducted with Dona Yayá’s granddaughter, Mrs. Lucy Vasconcellos Chaves, 97 years old, when we showed her the picture of the painting, reference was immediately made to Dona Yayá and sisters, according to her, represented in the scene: “Grandma there embroidering and it looks like her sisters. She besides doing the household things...” (Interview granted on Oct. 18, 2016).

The article, entitled “*Bordou os dois Primeiros Pavilhões da República*” (*She embroidered the two first flags of the Republic*), in the newspaper O Globo, of April 17, 1958, in addition to the narrative on the making of the two flags, details that “in the making of the two historic flags she was assisted by two sisters equally skilled and knowledgeable in the craft. A rich record because it is Dona Yayá herself, confirming in life their participation in the making of the flags.

One possible way to unveil the scene depicted in the painting is to follow Mrs. Lucy and check the family correspondence of each matriarch.

### **4 THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE MATRIARCHS AND THE SCENE OF THE TABLE A PÁTRIA**

#### **4.1 THE FAMILY OF DONA YAYÁ**

Flora Simas de Carvalho (1873-1963) was the daughter of Francisca Romana de Simas and Manoel Inácio de Simas<sup>4</sup>. His mother died when he was still a child.

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2 According to Dona Yayá herself she was 16 and not 18 years old when she embroidered the flag.

3 These are two women who are considered strong because at some point in their lives they had to take over the family.

4 Draft resolution 81/2015 quoted above also points out that Mr. Simas, father of Dona Yayá was military, but some news in later newspapers about Dona Yayá characterized him as a photographer. He is supposed to have taken up a second profession

**Figure 2 – Dona Yayá in her youth**



**Source:** Family collection, provided by granddaughter Iza in 2018. Rio de Janeiro, date not informed.

According to descendant accounts, she was the eldest of six children, hence the title of matriarch of the family. However, genealogical records indicate that she had two sisters and three brothers and was older than Antonio Francisco.

In the painting *A Pátria* are represented five women, some already mothers, and four children and the family of Dona Yayá was composed of only three women. Even before considering that she herself, at the time a teenager of 16 years, does not find a match in the image, she asks: who would be the other two women, among them one who appears to be older, since the mother of Dona Yayá had already died? What about the children, considering that two of their siblings were older and only the youngest was around 11 years old? Are they nephews? This doesn't add up.

The work hardly represented the deed of Dona Yayá, since at the time the picture was painted, in 1919, thirty years later, she was already living in Imbuhy,

married to the local fishermen leader, breathing the community, involved with its practices and with reduced contact with the outside world, so much so that, although in 1912 information was disclosed in the newspapers about the polemic of the making of the first Republican National Flag, not a line was written even telling its version.

Furthermore, she had no political prestige, nor maintained any relationship with the republican heroes who were being shaped to compose an “official history” and build the national identity, remained anonymous, isolated in a Fishermen’s Village, fulfilling other roles. But the reality of Benjamin Constant’s widow was very different. She did fit into a profile that it would be worthwhile to represent so that, in a way, her husband could be honored as one of the idealizers of the republic.

#### 4.2 MADAM MARIA JOAQUINA’ FAMILY

The couple Benjamin Constant and his wife, Maria Joaquina Botelho de Magalhães, had a total of eight children, five girls and three boys, but not all of them reached adulthood. Of the three sons, Benjamin Constant Filho was the only one who did not die in early childhood, but lived only 30 years.

The older woman in the scene appears older than Maria Joaquina’s. Let’s suppose that the exaggeration, expressed in the gray hair, wanted to make evident the difference in age between her, who in May 1890, at the age of 42, was already a grandmother, and the other four women, who were to be her daughters, Aldina, who was 26 years old; Adozinda, between 23 and 24; Alcida, 21 and Bernardina, 17 years old. Aldina and Adozinda already had children, so it may be that they were composing the scene, reinforcing even more, the roles traditionally attributed to the female genre.

According to a genealogical survey, Aldina had a total of five children, already had two boys, one at the age of six and the other at the age of five, and her daughter Edith, aged eight months, whom she supposedly breastfeeds.

On the treadmill extended on the floor, lying down, playing with a star, there is a second baby who looks a little bit older than the first who is being breastfed. Probably Álvaro Joaquim de Oliveira Filho, aged 2 years and 11 months, the second youngest of Maria Joaquina’s grandchildren.

We can assume that the third child identified at the scene, and apparently a little larger than the other two babies mentioned, is Adozindo Magalhães de Oliveira, the eldest son of Adozinda, 4 years old, in his arms.

Alcida and Bernardina had 11 and 10 children respectively, according to information from the museum’s website and Benjamin Constant house. However, we haven’t found records of all of them. Apparently, at the time they had not given birth to any babies. By elimination, the two women without children would be them, but it is not possible to identify them.

Although the author's description reveals that the fourth and final child positioned in its center would be a boy, she appears to be a girl embracing the national pavilion. It could be Aracy, the youngest daughter of Benjamin Constant and Maria Joaquina, who was born in 1882, would have been 8 years old.

## 5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The disputes between the matriarchs range from material to symbolic, passing through politics, and are not dissociated from power.

Between the Proclamation of the Republic of 1889, when the social scenario changes, and the celebrations of the Centenary of the Independence of Brazil, in 1922, *there is an articulation for the construction of the national identity*. In the meantime we have the confection of the four republican flags by the two matriarchs (1889, 1890), without establishing any contact; the conception of the allegory *A Pátria*, which guaranteed Pedro Bruno to win the 26th General Exhibition of Belas Artes, in 1919, having been awarded with a trip abroad for improvement; and the institutionalization of the first museums dedicated to history in Brazil.

Two were the Republican flags embroidered by Dona Yayá in 1889: the first was made in cotton for the day of the Proclamation of the Republic itself, probably a version of the provisional flag of the Republic; the second, described as more laborious, was made in silk, it was a version of the current National flag, officialized four days later, with solemnity in the Chamber of Rio de Janeiro.

Although the Benjamin Constant Museum and House claimed that the first Republican Flag was embroidered by Benjamin Constant's wife and daughters, they only presented it to the former Superior School of War and the Red Beach Military School the following year.

However, the painting *A Pátria*, by Pedro Bruno, different from what relatives of Dona Yayá say, seems rather to represent the wife and daughters of Benjamin Constant embroidering one of the flags that donated to the Escola Superior de Guerra and Escola Militar da Praia Vermelha in 1890 and not to Dona Yayá and sisters embroidering the first flag of Brazil, in 1889. However, in recognizing its pioneering spirit, we seek to value the participation of the people in the proclamation of the republic by the only possible way, that of work. And, with this, to give some visibility to those who were on the fringes of the political events that marked the country's history or that, in some manner, were hidden.

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## TWO CENTURIES OF IMAGES AND STORIES: notes on iconography in the cultural heritage of Brazilian military origin

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### ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to discuss, in a preliminary way, the cultural heritage of Brazilian military origin. To do so, the authors conceptualized and contextualized the notion of military heritage and examined an example of asset; photographs.

**Keywords:** Cultural heritage of military origin; photographs; Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB).

*DOIS SÉCULOS DE IMAGENS E HISTÓRIAS: notas sobre a iconografia no patrimônio cultural de origem militar brasileiro*

### RESUMO

*O objetivo deste artigo é discutir, de forma preliminar, o patrimônio cultural de origem militar brasileiro. Para isso, os autores conceituaram e contextualizaram a noção de patrimônio militar e examinaram um exemplo de bem patrimonial, as fotografias.*

*Palavras-chave: Patrimônio cultural de origem militar; fotografias; Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB).*

*DOS SIGLOS DE IMÁGENES E HISTORIAS: notas sobre iconografía del patrimonio cultural de origen militar brasileño*

### RESUMEN

*El propósito de este artículo es discutir, de manera preliminar, el patrimonio cultural de origen militar brasileño. Para ello, los autores conceptualizaron y contextualizaron la noción de patrimonio militar y examinaron bien un ejemplo de propiedad, las fotografías.*

*Palabras clave: Patrimonio cultural de origen militar; fotografías; Fuerza Expedicionaria Brasileña (FEB).*

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

We are celebrating the bicentenary of Independence. As is well known among historians and other scholars of the past, ephemerides are opportune moments for various reflections on various aspects of the past evoked by the commemoration itself.

A full dish for Military History, understood in this article as a thematic domain of History, in that the Brazilian historical course is intimately related to armed conflicts and military institutions. This is obvious, for example, if we take into account that part of the national historical heritage has military origins.

Portugal's own process of political emancipation occurred, in part, through the force of arms, as historian Adler Homer Fonseca de Castro (2021) states. The fruit of the specific circumstances of the time of the Empire (1822 - 1889), an official memory and history crystallized in which the transition between Cologne and the National State occurred in a peaceful manner and with strong ties of continuity between past and present. However, Castro (2021, p. 14) is categorical: "What we would like to point out is the need to remember that *there was a war, which was longer than Brazilian participation in the Second World War*".

The purpose of this article is to reflect, even briefly, on the patrimonial dimensions of this past of wars and other forms of armed conflict fought over two centuries of history, inside and outside Brazil. To this end, a small fraction of the cultural heritage of military origin of an imaged nature will be addressed, especially photographic, under the custody of archives, libraries, memorials, museums and even private ones, whose preservation and study contribute to the understanding of yesterday's and today's Brazils. After all, as Caio Boschi teaches (2004, p. 11), "knowledge of the past, not being in itself history, before illuminating the future, must provide men to live their present better".

## 2 THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF MILITARY ORIGIN

Also known as *military heritage*, that consists of a specific category of cultural heritage consisting of material and immaterial assets related to military activities in times of peace or war, both in the past and the present.

"Military heritage consists of all monuments/memorials and commemorative items, the study of which enables us to analyze the processes by which we pass on knowledge about and an awareness of, our wartime past", explains Patrick Roques (2022, p. 1).

In Brazil, the origins of the patrimonialization of goods of military origin are located in the Vargas Era (1930-1945), whose State policy was aimed at the construction of a national identity of Catholic and Portuguese roots, which date

back to the colonial era. Through a teleological narrative, the churches and the forts would represent the vestiges of a historical embryo, whose Vargas Era Brazil was its offspring. At the same time, it is important to note that during this period the armed forces, in particular the Army, consolidated themselves as institutions of national scope, being important political forces, whose demands and views influenced the state policies of the time.

At the international level, research and safeguarding of cultural heritage of military origin is guided by the International Scientific Committee on Fortifications and Military Heritage (ICOFORT). International Scientific Committee on Fortifications and Military Heritage, one of the committees belonging to ICOMOS/UNESCO, created in 2005 and whose multidisciplinary composition develops work in several countries, including Brazil (ICOFORT, 2022).

In spite of the emphasis given to the built goods, like the fortifications, the scope of the cultural heritage of military origin goes beyond and covers other items, like the visual images and the photographs.

### **3 VISUAL IMAGES AND PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY HERITAGE**

“The images belong to the universe of the oldest vestiges of human life that have reached us”, explains Paulo Knauss (2006, p. 98). For military history, the historian’s statement can be seen in various ways, for example, through the high reliefs that make up Trajan’s Column, erected in the ancient Forum of Trajan in Rome. Or, even more remotely, on the Palette of Narmer, on whose rear face was depicted Pharaoh Narmer liquidating an enemy, in a representation of the process of unification of ancient Egypt. It is estimated that this iconographic document is located between 3200 and 3100 BC. (CASSON, 1969).

Peter Burke (2017) agrees with Knauss’s statement (2006), as he understands that images are historical evidence, whose uses by historians have gained traction over the past four decades, as part of the process of broadening the themes, problems, and approaches of history. If, decades ago, the studies involving visual images were limited to the History of Art, this situation changed completely, and iconographic sources were problematized and analyzed by several domains of History, among which was Military History.

Generally speaking, there is a large repertoire of visual sources available to scholars of military history. In Brazil, for example, images about battles, fortifications and people-at-arms have been produced and put into circulation since the Colony, like the images produced by European artists such as Debret and Rugendas. Closer to the present, the planks painted by José Wash Rodrigues can be cited, brought together in the work “Uniforms of the Brazilian Army”, published in 1922, in the context of the first centenary of Independence, with texts written and organized by Gustavo Barroso.

Taken together, these and other visual images are references to Brazilian military memory and history to this day. Goods that mobilize civilians and military personnel, the uses of which vary according to the various historical contexts through which Brazil passed during two centuries as a national state. Goods that reinforce the notion of an imagined community, an expression linked to Benedict Anderson (2008) in his study on the invention of nations and national states.

### 3.1 THE “PLACE” OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Although its optical fundamentals have been known for centuries, photography, as a physical and chemical process of image fixation, appeared only in the middle of the 19th century, in Europe. However, photographer and historian Boris Kossov (2006) reveals that the isolated discovery of photography by Hercule Florence occurred in Brazil in parallel.

Photography is something commonplace in daily life. Especially after the popularization of digital photography, through mobile telephony devices, tablets and other devices. Pictures are taken and images are circulated on a wide range of subjects, made in a wide range of circumstances.

However, at the time of its appearance, photography was an invention that caused a great socio cultural impact, which influenced the arts, sciences, communications and even sociabilities, like the portrait, about which Solange Ferraz de Lima and Vânia Carneiro de Carvalho (2009, p. 31) state that:

Glued in rigid papers of various formats, the photographic portrait circulated among the relatives replacing absences, suggesting marriage proposals, informing and guaranteeing the reproduction of rituals of passage [...], presenting new members, documenting changes of the family social body with the passage of time and actively registering their unity.

For the Military History, photography represented a practical and symbolic innovation in that it allowed for new forms of registration, study and planning of military operations, as well as publicity of the wars between public opinion, as can be seen in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, in which images and audiovisual are important means of mobilizing international public opinion. Or, in a more remote way, it is possible to measure the impact of the introduction of photography in the wars by way of the work of Andre Toral (2001) on the iconography of the Paraguayan War (1864 - 1870), of which the photos are part.

Photography was introduced in Brazil during the 1800s, in the context of the Second Reign (1840-1889). For those who study Brazilian military history,

there is at hand a huge photographic heritage accumulated since then, which is kept in the custody of historical archives, libraries, museums and even private collections.

However, photographs are far from being reliable records of the past, if that is possible, because, like other types of historical documents, photographic images were produced and preserved as historical sources in specific contexts and with specific notions of memory and history. Especially when safeguarded in public archives, be they civil or military, like the Army Historical Archives (AHEx). After all, as Jacques Le Goff (1996, p. 426): “To become masters of memory and forgetfulness is one of the great concerns of the classes, of the groups, of the individuals who dominated and dominate the historical societies”. With regard to these power relations linked to memory, the author also states that: “The forgetfulness and silences of history are revealing of these mechanisms of manipulation of collective memory” (LE GOFF, 1996, p. 426).

### **3.1.1 An example: the photographs of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force - FEB**

Between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, FEB personnel participated in war operations on the Italian front, with a total of 25,334 men, mostly young, recruited in the cities of the Southeast and South regions of Brazil (MAXIMIANO, 2010).

The Brazilian military experience in the theater of operations of Italy, between 1944 and 1945, produced an immeasurable and varied quantity of historical documents of origins and with distinct characteristics, like the internal bulletins and the “combat parts” written by the FEB officers, the letters exchanged between the expeditionaries and their relatives in Brazil, or the diaries that the combatants kept during the period in which they served in Italy. Since the end of the 1940s, this material has served as a source for various types of publications, among subjects from magazines, memoirs or academic works, such as Master’s Dissertations and Doctoral Theses (FERRAZ, 2015).

From its departure to Italy to its return from Brazil, the FEB was exhaustively photographed. Between 1944 and 1945, journalistic, official, and private photographs were taken, many of which were used in newspapers and magazines, according to Wilson de Oliveira Neto (2020).

Part of this photographic documentation was made in Italy by the expeditionaries themselves with their portable cameras, in studios or by

ambulant photographers during their leave from the front or after the end of the conflict, in the context of waiting for shipment to Brazil.

**Figure 1 - FEB graduates during a visit to the Vatican, June 1945**



**Source:** Anonymous, 1945. Figure 1 is an example of a photographic source about the FEB. It is a private photograph, in sepia tones, developed on Ferrania photographic paper, in postcard format (8 x 13 cm), something common at the time. It was probably taken by a traveling photographer, who took advantage of the end of the war in Europe to offer his services to Allied soldiers who, during their leave, were visiting the Holy See.

In front of São Pedro's Square, isolated by an improvised wooden "wall", in which posters of "do not exceed" were fixed, two Brazilian graduates were photographed, from left to right, a 3rd Sergeant and a Corporal. The 3rd Sergeant, marked with an "x", is called José Egipto Pereira Barbosa Lima, from the FEB Personnel Warehouse. He embarked for Italy on 8 February 1945, being part of the 5th Echelon, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ibá Jobim Meireles. He landed in Naples on 22 February. He returned to Brazil in October 1941<sup>1</sup>. Both wear Type A walking uniforms, made in shades of green (CASTELLO BRANCO, 1960; MAXIMIANO and BONALUME NETO, 2011).

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1 The data on the 3rd Sgt Lima was collected in the "FEB List", a spreadsheet with data on the FEB, compiled by the team of AHEx and available for download in social networks and other spaces of the internet.

On the back of the photograph, the following handwritten notes were made at different times and by different persons: "Rome, June 2, 1945. To Aunt Geny and cousins Gabriel, Jandira and Nilinha, I offer this souvenir of a visit to the Eternal City. Joseph." It is a dedication written by the 3rd Sergeant Lima.

Below it, the second handwritten annotation, perhaps made by the addressee, "Aunt Geny": "Photograph taken in São Pedro's Square, with the background of the Cathedral of the same name. José do Egipto Pereira Barbosa Lima, son of Cap. Luiz Barbosa Lima and de Amarina [?] Pereira Barbosa de Lima".

#### **4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The portrait of 3rd sergeant Lima and the Corporal next to him represents a type of photograph common in photographic collections about the FEB belonging to individuals or companies: images taken far from the combat fronts, many of which are records of visits to places of cultural, historical and religious value for a certain notion of civilization, recurrent in the allied propaganda broadcast during World War II. Italy would be the great "repository" of this heritage, which was at risk of looting and plundering by the Germans, as it is possible to consider through the narrative of Lynn Nicholas (1996).

However, the importance of this kind of image does not stop there. It serves as a support for a family memory about the experience of a loved one in the Italian Campaign to the point that, not to forget, handwritten notes were made, reinforcing the visual information present in the portrait itself.

This and many other images are part of an important military heritage that, in the context of the bicentenary of Independence, help historians and other scholars to understand the Brazils of yesterday and today.

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## THE LIEUTENANTISM AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL OF REALENGO

Fernando Silva Rodrigues\*

### ABSTRACT

The approach taken in this essay seeks to reveal some tensions in the process of professional modernization of the Brazilian Army in the first half of the 20th century, especially those revealed with the movement of military students in 1922. The focus of the research is in the field of the Social History of the Military to the extent that it inquires about the influence of the constant reorganization of the model of education adopted in the Schools of Officer Training and its relationship with the political revolts of the period. Reform of the regulations and internal rules governing the Ground Force is a measure that is shaping the military as political actors and aims, above all, to consolidate the institution within the republican regime; however, rather than training professionals in the Armed Forces, it was strong enough to form military personnel engaged in the political process and in the power struggle.

**Keywords:** Lieutenantism; Military School; Realengo; Brazilian Army.

### O TENENTISMO NA ESCOLA MILITAR DO REALENGO

#### RESUMO

*A abordagem empreendida neste ensaio busca revelar algumas tensões do processo de modernização profissional do Exército brasileiro na primeira metade do século XX, principalmente as reveladas com o movimento dos estudantes militares em 1922. O enfoque da investigação se situa no campo da História Social dos Militares na medida em que indaga sobre a influência da constante reorganização do modelo de ensino adotado nas Escolas de Formação de Oficiais e sua relação com as revoltas políticas do período. A reforma dos regulamentos e das normas internas que regem a Força Terrestre é uma medida que vai moldando os militares como atores políticos e visa, sobretudo, à consolidação da instituição dentro do regime republicano; no entanto, mais do que formar profissionais das Armas, foi forte o suficiente para formar militares engajados no processo político e na disputa de poder.*

*Palavras-chave:* Tenentismo; Escola Militar; Realengo; Exército Brasileiro.

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## **EL TENENTISMO EN LA ESCUELA MILITAR DEL REALENGO**

### **RESUMEN**

*El enfoque adoptado en este ensayo busca revelar algunas tensiones del proceso de modernización profesional del ejército brasileño en la primera mitad del siglo XX, principalmente las reveladas con el movimiento de estudiantes militares en 1922. La investigación se centra en el campo de la Historia Social del Ejército, en la investigación sobre la influencia de la constante reorganización del modelo docente adoptado en las Escuelas Oficiales de Formación y su relación con las revueltas políticas de la época. La reforma del reglamento y las normas internas que rigen la fuerza terrestre es una medida que moldea a los militares como agentes políticos y tiene por objeto, sobre todo, consolidar la institución en el régimen republicano; sin embargo, en lugar de capacitar a los profesionales de las armas, era lo suficientemente fuerte para formar personal militar que participaba en el proceso político y en la lucha por el poder.*

*Palabras clave: Tenentismo; Escuela Militar; Realengo; Ejército Brasileño.*

### **1 INTRODUCTION**

The first years of the republic in Brazil are marked by political instability and by the dispute between centralism and federalism. The first Republican Constitution of 1891 was enshrined with the establishment of a federative liberal republic with broad autonomy for the states. However, the 1920s will mark the period of transition to the centralism of the 1930s, with prominence for the year 1922, and its successive events that changed the Brazilian political and cultural panorama. In this sense, events such as the Week of Modern Art, the Creation of the Brazilian Communist Party, the commemoration of the Centenary of Brazilian Independence, and the Lieutenatism Movement (1922-1927) played an important role in the process of erosion of the political system of the First Republic that ended in 1930, with the Revolution led by Getúlio Vargas. Historically, the crisis of the 1920s made possible the subversion of order and military intervention in the political process, with an attack on federalism and the oligarchic system.

In this context, the formation of the officers of the Brazilian Army in the first half of the 20th century and the institution itself became an important part in the policy of configuration and consolidation of the Republican State, in which the Army played a role of the first magnitude. The army conformed to the image of the state, assuring republican aspirations. Modernization in military education, seeking the best professional qualification of the Corps of Officers, achieved mainly with the action of national and foreign military missions, transformed these officers into interventionist political actors.

The changes in the Army's education system must be contextualized in accordance with the historical and political moments that the Brazilian State was going through during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. It is worth remembering that, in this period, there is the question of the communist movement and the lieutenancy movement that, in a way, interfered with the construction of the authoritarian State of Vargas throughout the 1930s and 1940s.

To support this study, it was necessary to adopt an empirical procedure whose documentary survey favored several sources, namely: individual processes for entry into the Military School, school bulletins, regulations that organized the functioning of military education, internal institutional documents, personal collections, articles of military magazines, books and articles of memory of the Institution. The analysis of the *corpus* of documents made it possible to identify that the teaching models and the demands of the military in the changes of regulations were in harmony with each historical moment lived through.

## **2 THE INDIGENOUS MISSION AND THE MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY EDUCATION**

The unfolding of the First World War was an essential moment to work on the problem of modernizing military education. According to the Army High Command, there was a need to place the instruction in the Military School in Realengo (1913-1944), in the same mold as the military instruction of the most developed countries of Europe. According to Marshal Odylio Denys (1985, p. 15), were important figures in the initiatives of the transformations occurred the following military generals: Generals José Caetano de Faria, Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar, Bento Ribeiro, Tasso Fragoso; and captains Joaquim de Souza Reis Neto, Bertholdo Klinger, Genserico de Basconcelos, Epaminondas de Lima e Silva, Brasílio Taborda, Sílio Portela, Estevão Leitão de Carvalho and Euclides Oliveira Figueiredo; besides civilians like the Baron of Rio Branco<sup>1</sup>, Olavo Bilac and Pandiá Calógeras.

Pandiá Calógeras was Minister of War, from 1919 to 1922, in the government of President Epitácio Pessoa and, despite being a civilian, was known in the country as one of the main connoisseurs of the military problems in Brazil, such as the lack of blankets, uniforms, barracks, transportation and late payments. He was responsible for the reorganization of the Army in 1921, approved by Decree 15,235, of December 31. The main points of this reorganization were: 1) better structuring of the large units; 2) creation within the divisions of the special combat and aviation units; 3) increase of appropriations for automatic weapons and artillery pieces; 4) construction of several barracks and purchase order of automatic weapons, mountain cannons,

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1 According to historiography, this favorable context to military issues had as its main center the incentive given by the actions of the Baron of Rio Branco, when Minister of Foreign Affairs (1902 - 1912), who insisted that Brazil could only project itself internationally from strong military institutions (TREVISAN, 1993; 2011).

and Mountain Artillery; 5) and increasing the Army's peacetime strength. Indeed, Pandiá Calógeras consolidated the numerical and spatial expansion of the military institutions with this ambitious program of construction between 1920 and 1921, the largest program of its kind before the administration of General Eurico Gaspar Durante, during the New State. He began the construction of 56 new barracks in 49 different locations in Brazil, besides renovating and expanding 45 others in 41 places.

In 1918, one of the main steps was taken to unleash the renewal of military education at the Military School located in Realengo. The Minister of War, General Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar, opened a selection process for the instructor staff at that School, whose main criterion should be a recognized ability to be an instructor, according to the German model. This group of instructors, which became known as "The Indigenous Mission", began their work outside the School in the second half of 1918, and in practice in 1919 took over the entire military education structure of the Army. The Mission's work was finalized in 1922, because of the serious political crisis that Brazil experienced with the Lieutenatism Movement, which resulted in the rebellion of the students in the officer training course.

The name of the mission may be related to the attempt to legitimize a group of national instructors in favor of the establishment of a military culture of Brazil's own, in spite of having as its ideological basis learning in the German Army, which helped in the construction of a new culture that tried to impose itself in the Institution.

The first class of instructors approved by public examination and appointed to the School was made up of the following officers (Official Gazette, 1918, p. 14384): 1st Lieutenant Eduardo Guedes Alcoforado, 1st Lieutenant Newton de Andrade Cavalcanti, 1st Lieutenant Demerval Peixoto, 1st Lieutenant João Barbosa Leite, 2nd Lieutenant Odylio Denys of the Infantry Army; Captain Euclides de Oliveira Figueiredo (former trainee in the German Army), 1st Lieutenant Renato Paquet, 1st Lieutenant Orosimbo Martins Pereira of the Cavalry Army; Captain Epaminondas de Lima e Silva (former trainee in the German Army), 1st Lieutenant Luiz Correa Lima, 1st Lieutenant Mario Ary Pires, of the Artillery Army; and 1st Lieutenant José Bentes Monteiro, 1st Lieutenant Arthur Joaquim Panfiro, 1st Lieutenant Mario Ary Pires, of the Engineering Army.

However, I could not avoid a deeper analysis of Leonardo Trevisan's statement (1993, p. 304) that all former trainees of the German Army and his most direct disciples participated in the first competition for instructors, and thereafter dominated the teaching staff of that Military Education Institution. Looking at the nominal ratio above of the first class of instructors appointed to the Military School, it appears that of the sixteen officers who trained in the German Army, only two of them are present on the shortlist. In the following statement, it is attested that no former trainee in the German Army is present on the list.

From the information obtained in the article by Marshal Odylio Denys, in *A Defesa Nacional* Magazine, the number of people selected in the first class of instructors was not sufficient to fill the clear ones existing in the School, which

occurred during the period marked by the years from 1919 to 1922. In the following list, I record the names of other officers who were selected to exercise the function of instructors: Captain Outubrino Pinto Nogueira, 1st Lieutenant José Luiz de Moraes, 1st Lieutenant Mario Travassos Penedo Pedras, 1st Lieutenant Henrique Duffles Teixeira Lott, 1st Lieutenant Victor César da Cunha Cruz, 1st Lieutenant Olimpio Falconiere da Cunha, 1st Lieutenant Filomeno Brandão, 1st Lieutenant Joaquim Vieira de Melo, 1st Lieutenant Onofre Muniz Gomes de Lima, 1st Lieutenant Tristão de Alencar Araripe, 1st Lieutenant Cyro Espírito Santo Cardoso, 1st Lieutenant Illydio Rômulo Colônia, 1st Lieutenant Arlindo Murity da Cunha Menezes, of the Infantry Army; Captain Milton de Freitas Almeida, 1st Lieutenant Gomes de Paiva, 1st Lieutenant Brasiliano Americano Freire, 1st Lieutenant Aristoteles de Souza Dantas, of the Cavalry Army; Captain Eduardo Pfeil, Captain Pompeu Horácio da Costa, 1st Lieutenant Álvaro Fiúza de Castro, 1st Lieutenant José Agostinho dos Santos, of the Artillery Army; and Captain Othon de Oliveira Santos, 1st Lieutenant Luiz Procópio de Souza Pinto, 1st Lieutenant Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora, 1st Lieutenant Edmundo de Macedo Soares, of the Engineering Army.

In 1919, the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, Division General Bento Manoel Ribeiro Carneiro Monteiro, received the presentation of the first group of instructors with the following speech:

For the first time, this EME was involved in the selection of Military School Instructors and it was my sole concern to serve the practical teaching of future Officers, as should have been done long ago. I therefore participate in the success that you have achieved and I hope that all difficulties will be overcome, because you do not lack competence and I hope that you will find all the material and moral assistance that you need for the performance of your mission. It's pretty hard, but there's no reason for it to fade. Your recruitment followed the most dignified processes; for selection in such cases, constituting the widest door to enter that educational establishment, or was the concept more or less generalized among our comrades, concept firmly established in the arduous and assiduous work of the troop. Many distinguished Officers have passed through the Military School as Instructors and, even now, some of them leave, but it is fair to say that never has the Military School's Teacher Corps reached the degree of homogeneity that it today assumes with great hope for professional education.

It is not too much to remind you of the influence that moral instruction and discipline cemented by example will have in the Military School, although you are perfectly familiar with the safest processes for training good soldiers. I very much expect your efforts in the Military School and therefore I congratulate it and the Army on your appointments. (DENYS, 1985, p. 16).

At that moment, the Army High Command opened the door of the Military School for an important step in the modernization of the teaching and organization of the Army. The new instructors had the function of disseminating, generalizing, unifying and consolidating military instruction in the Army, through increasing and definitive efficiency, which should be accompanied by constant progress in the art of war in the most developed countries of the world. With this action, they tried to give more value to the military personnel of the Troop Corps.

It is also interesting to analyze what homogeneity was sought with the entry of these new instructors into the Military School. Perhaps the homogeneity of the former trainees of the German Army from 1910 to 1912. According to the text of Odylío Denys (DENYS, 1985, p. 17), the name “Indigenous Mission” was given as a consequence of the proximity of the arrival of the French Military Mission, contextualized by the selection of national officers to make up the staff of instructors of the Military School. These instructors managed the teaching models of the former trainees of the German Army, seeking to bring to the Military School the innovations that occurred in Europe, more directed towards practical than theoretical teachings. We can say that the instructors of the “Indigenous Mission”, unwittingly, opened up space for the advancement of the knowledge of the French Military Mission in the School, in 1924.

### **3 THE REBEL MOVEMENT OF LIEUTENANTS IN THE MILITARY SCHOOL OF REALENGO**

The early 1920s, besides witnessing the various changes that would occur in the Military School, represented a moment of political crisis in Brazilian history. Arthur da Silva Bernardes, after a troubled political campaign in the context of the emergence of the so-called “false letters”, supposedly written by him to Raul Soares insulting Hermes da Fonseca, was elected and recognized President of the Republic in replacement of Epitácio Pessoa. To prevent its swearing in, on July 5, 1922, the Military School, the Fort Copacabana in the Garrison of Rio de Janeiro, the Garrison of Niterói and the Garrison of Campo Grande in Mato Grosso, inaugurated the revolutionary cycle known as the Lieutenatism Movement. In spite of all this, Arthur Bernardes took office on November 15, 1922, a little more than two months after the great festivals in commemoration of the centenary of the independence of Brazil.

The involvement of students and some instructors from the Military School in the Lieutenatism Movement occurred between July 5 and 7, 1922. The events of those dates can be observed in more detail in Hélio Silva’s book, “1922: Sangue na Areia de Copacabana (*Blood on the Copacabana’s Sand*)”. The author uses a methodical and linear narrative in the transcription of the facts to the reader, and uses news from the press as a documentary basis for the construction of his work (SILVA, 2004, p. 153).

According to Marshal Denys, everything indicates that the disciplinary rigidity of the Indigenous Mission and the military education with a more practical than theoretical model in the Military School were not enough obstacles for its students to take part in the events of July 5, 1922, to demonstrate all their discontent with the changes that occurred in the School and in teaching. But it seems that this discourse is inconsistent because of the various government reactions taken against the students and instructors of the School. Disciplinarily, the reaction of the Army command was energetic, expelling all students involved in the event.

The Minister of War declared that, in the face of the inquiry (BRAZIL, 1922) opened about the events on July 5, 1922, in which the Military School was involved, the Government had decided to immediately disconnect, for the sake of discipline, 256 (two hundred and fifty-six) students involved and who remained imprisoned; 333 (three hundred and thirty-three) students who were distributed by the units of the various military regions to be disconnected from the active service of the Army; and 58 (fifty-eight) remaining mentioned who were released. There was also, the removal of the commander of the School, General Monteiro de Barros by inertia in the face of the events that occurred (BRAZIL, 1922)<sup>2</sup> and of all instructors who had a link with the Indigenous Mission.

According to military historian Rafael Roesler, after reading the work of Hélio Silva, the conspiracy began in the home of Colonel João Maria Xavier de Brito Júnior, commander of the Realengo Cartridge Factory on the night of the fourth to the fifth of July, with the presence of several students and instructors from the Military School. The commander of the Factory had the support of lieutenants Odylio Denys, Ciro do Espírito Santo Cardoso, Vitor César da Cunha Cruz, Roberto Carneiro de Mendonça, Ilídio Rômulo Colônia, Aristoteles de Souza Dantas, Eugênio Ewerton Pinto, Brasileiro Americano Freire, Juarez Távora, Edmundo de Macedo Soares, and Arlindo Maurity da Cunha (ROESLER, 2015, p. 137).

The event continued with the attempted arrest of General Monteiro de Barros, commander of the school who reacted to a confrontation with the students, fled to the Military Village and later to his residence in order to await the final unfolding of the facts. At the School, most of the students and some instructors were waiting to be prepared to go into combat and to define their mission in this rebellion. They occupied bridges and nearby roads in the Realengo region, with the aim of preventing the movement of legal troops that could come from the Military Village.

In the Military Village, attempts to get the troops belonging to the barracks that made up the 1st Infantry Division were unsuccessful, as Colonel Szefredo dos Passos, commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment arrested some suspected officers who landed at the Military Village Railway Station in Deodoro. Other officers were

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2 The Minister of War declared that Lieutenant Colonel Álvaro Guilherme Mariante had militarily occupied the Military School, assuming its command on the morning of 5 July 1922, due to the rebellion of the students of that establishment

arrested at the Officers' Training School, the 1st Engineering Battalion and the Railway Company, which later led to the demobilization of the event in the Military Village and made it difficult to maintain the rebel actions in Realengo.

The students of the Military School of Realengo held a single combat against the legal troops of the 1st Infantry Division, on July 5, confrontation occurred in the hill Monte Alegre located between Realengo, Magalhães Bastos and the Military Village. As a result of the facts occurred the death of the student Feodorval Xavier Leal and the injury of another student. After this fight Colonel Xavier de Brito, head of the revolutionary column, decided to withdraw with the students and instructors to the Military School in order to await the final results of the insurrection. On the same day, Xavier de Brito, the students and rebel instructors surrendered without resistance to the occupation force formed by legal troops of the government. As a result of the large numbers, the students of the Military School were trapped in the barracks in Realengo during the days of the insurrections.

What became clear in this study was that the intense repression of the students, of some instructors and of the commander of the Military School decreed the end of the Indigenous Mission. This facilitated acceptance of the presence at the School of the French Military Mission in 1924. An interesting point in this case was that, analyzing the list of those prosecuted (BRASIL, 1922b), carried out and monitored by the Department of Personnel of War, according to the situation of each military for participation in the military movement of 1922, it was found the presence of some instructors who were part of the Indigenous Mission in the Military School in the period from 1919 to 1922, as verified below:

**Table 1 – Nominal List of Officials Pronounced by the events of 1922, who were part of the “Indigenous Mission”, specifying their situation at the time**

Order number	Rank	Name	Situation
01	1º Lieutenant	Odílio Denys	Free in Pádua
02	1º Lieutenant	Arlindo Maurity da Cunha Menezes	Deserted
03	1º Lieutenant	Braziliano Americano Freire	Deserted
04	1º Lieutenant	Illydio Rômulo Colônia	Free in RJ
05	1º Lieutenant	Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora	Deserted
06	1º Lieutenant	Cyro do Espírito Santo Cardoso	Free in S. J. Del Rei
07	1º Lieutenant	Aristóteles de Souza Dantas	Free in RJ
08	1º Lieutenant	Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva	Deserted

**Source:** THE AUTHOR, 2022.



#### 4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In this sense, it can be understood that the formation of the officers of the Brazilian Army in the first half of the 20th century and the institution itself came to be an important part in the policy of configuration and consolidation of the Republican State, in which the Army played an important role in this process. The army conformed to the image of the state, assuring republican aspirations. Modernization in military education, seeking the best professional qualification of the Corps of Officers, turned these officers into political actors.

In spite of the intensification of the renovations in the Army in the first two decades of the 20th century, in 1922 there were military uprisings in some barracks in Rio de Janeiro, Mato Grosso and the Realengo Military School, which gave signs that the model of teaching proposed with the Indigenous Mission did not correspond to the interests as to the professional training of the officers, that is, the removal of these military personnel from politics. The 1920s represent the moment of a new and intense political crisis in the history of Brazil. As in other moments of political instability, the Lieutenantism Movement in the Military School was vigorously repressed by the Minister of War.

With the Uprising of 1922, the state of siege was decreed and the military who participated in the rebellions were subjected to strict repression by the Brazilian authorities. Between 1922 and 1930, these officers who participated in the uprisings during the Lieutenantism Movement were the targets of several military inquiries, criminal court cases, arrests, exiles, in addition to internal persecutions with transfers to distant and unhealthy places, when they returned to be part of the permanent staff of the Brazilian Army, by virtue of a judicial action against the government for lack of evidence or for the proof of innocence, or by the impeachment of a *habeas corpus* to answer the process in freedom. The insurrections also allowed the creation of a military-rebel identity due to the exiles, persecutions, articulations and resistance forming an active leadership in the Revolution of 1930.

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## THE 18 MEN OF COPACABANA FORT: history and place of memory

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### ABSTRACT

The article is about the revolt of Fort Copacabana in 1922, consecrated by Brazilian historiography as the “18 men of the Fort”. The text questions the interpretations about the context that triggered the rebellion and evaluates the narrative of the episode, its political content, and its conversion into a place of memory.

**Keywords:** 18 men of Fort Copacabana; lieutenantism; Place of memory.

*OS 18 DO FORTE DE COPACABANA: história e lugar de memória*

### RESUMO

*O artigo tem por objeto a revolta do Forte de Copacabana de 1922, consagrada pela historiografia brasileira como os “18 do Forte”. O texto interroga as interpretações sobre o contexto que desencadeou a rebelião e aprecia a narrativa do episódio, o conteúdo político e a sua conversão em lugar de memória.*

*Palavras-chave: 18 do Forte de Copacabana; Tenentismo; Lugar de memória.*

*18 DEL FUERTE DE COPACABANA: historia y lugar de la memoria*

### RESUMEN

*El artículo tiene como objeto la revuelta del Fuerte de Copacabana de 1922, consagrada en la historiografía brasileña como el “18 del Fuerte”. El texto cuestiona las interpretaciones del contexto que desencadenó la rebelión y aprecia la narrativa del episodio, el contenido político y su conversión en memoria.*

*Palabras clave: 18 del Fuerte de Copacabana; Tenentismo; Plaza de la Memoria.*

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Among past events, there are those who add meanings to extrapolate their historical context by covering themselves with the sacredness conferred by devotion

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to characters and events commemorated, reenacted and presented, constituting, in the definition of Pierre Nora (1993), “places of memory”.

From the history of the Old Republic, the revolt of the 18 men of the Fort of Copacabana consecrated itself in the role of singular event, marking the opposition to the inauguration of Arthur Bernardes and the beginnings of the lieutenant movement. After 100 years of these events, we are led to reflect on the past of experience and the paths followed in consolidating the national political memory.

With the 18 men of the Fort as its object, this article addresses the historical context of the unrest that triggered the rebellion and questions the paths that led to a romantic interpretation of the episode, running through its political content and its conversion in place of memory. It is a preliminary text, based on the qualitative examination of bibliographic-documentary references. The motivation of the text is guided by the purpose of bringing the 18 men of the Fort to the current scene, when the celebrations of the bicentenary of the Independence of Brazil approach, recognizing in it one of the most marked episodes of 1922 when the Centenary was celebrated.

## **2 THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF 1922**

At the time of the 1922 elections, the nominated pact for the governors’ policy, conceived during the presidency of Campos Sales, had already given clear signs of exhaustion. The unstable formation of political alliances would worsen in the following years, putting in question the alliance of “coffee with milk”, to unite precariously São Paulo and Minas Gerais in alternation in power (FERREIRA; PINTO, 2021). In this context, every four years, at the time of the elections, the regional conflicts extrapolated, constituting an environment of grave instability threatening the presidential succession.

To deal with the state disputes, in the government of Marshal Hermes da Fonseca, the so-called policy of governors was adopted, promoting the interference of the federal executive in the states, in order to support allies. This interference occurred precisely in the entities of the federation where the oligarchies were less capable of reacting to the federal military machine. In the government of Epitácio Pessoa, the alliance between Minas Gerais and São Paulo was breathtaking.

In 1920, Hermes da Fonseca had returned to Brazil after a spell in Europe. Without well disguising political ambitions, the Marshal alarmed the regional oligarchies in the face of the enthusiasm of many soldiers with the possibility of his candidacy. Rehearsing his return to the political scene, Hermes da Fonseca was elected to preside over the Military Club. Between nods and misses, the opposition’s preference fell upon Nilo Peçanha for Catete, a civilian candidate who had greater sympathies among the political leaders and military commanders.

In times of the end of World War I, the transformations in the Brazilian

social composition led to the growing interest of the new urban middle class in politics. This sector of society, as Boris Fausto observed, “tended to support figures and movements that raised the banner of an authentic liberalism”, advocating “a government capable of putting into practice the norms of the Constitution and of the laws of the country, transforming the oligarchic Republic into a liberal Republic”. (FAUSTO, 2002, p. 305). In the troubled political climate of the 1920s, the situation in the states was marked by “coronelism”, the fruit of the federative pact to give greater powers to the governors, sustaining an archaic bargaining game to have as its largest bargaining chip the vote. Dissatisfaction was growing, above all, among the urban middle classes, which included the younger officers, eager for changes that would attend to their desires for political representation and reorganization of the Brazilian state (CARVALHO, 2005).

The state oligarchies of second rank, eager to take over the federal executive, also questioned the results of the elections, but the reasons for these questionings were different from those that demanded clean elections, since the opponents resorted to the same expedient to contaminate the results of the polls (CARONE, 1971). Favorable to Nilo Peçanha, the states of Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia and Pernambuco united, supporting the opposition candidacy to constitute the so-called Republican Reaction, attracting sympathies and the direct engagement of many military and middle classes (PRESTES, 1993).

The agitation was growing. During the course of the campaign, inflammatory speeches were heard in the public square, with officials actively participating, propaganda against the government candidate. From this unrest came military gifts from the Army and Navy, including general officers in active campaigns in favor of Nilo Peçanha (CARONE, 1971; SODRÉ, 1979).

Without deviating from the program, the result of the counting of the votes was in favor of the situationist group, the former governor of Minas Gerais Artur Bernardes being in power. In several barracks, the mood was one of dissatisfaction, especially fed in the face of the episode of false letters attributed to the candidate. The letters, to be circulated in the second half of 1921, had their content published in full by the *Correio da Manhã* newspaper, in an issue of October 11, raising the spirits and provoking exalted proclamations that entered 1922. In the letters, Hermes da Fonseca was called “sergeant without composure” and “scoundrel”, hurling insults to the Club and the military class (CARONE, 1971, p. 338-9).

Regardless of a careful examination, the letters were evaluated as true by an expressive portion of the members of the Military Club. The brio of many members of the Army was wounded, recognizing that the content of the missives emphasized the disrespect and demeaning treatment reserved to the class by none other than the next President of the Republic.

The reaction of many of the offended officers reflected not only dissatisfaction with the outcome of the electoral contest, the fruit of mistrust over a system marked

by fraud, but a desire for change in the country's conduct. As a particularly corporate aspect, the complaints of uniformed men also echoed old resentments caused by the discredit of the career and the inattentive treatment given by some civil leaders to the affairs of the barracks, in spite of the then Minister of War, Pandiá Calógeras, strove to modernize the Armed Forces and meet many of the general staff's demands (CARVALHO, 2005).

### **3 THE 18 MEN OF THE FORT**

On June 7, 1922, the National Congress sanctioned the proclamation of Bernardes as President of the Republic. The opposition was plotting to embarrass the inauguration, scheduled for November 15, while some military considered supporting the deposition of Epitácio Pessoa, relying on sparse sympathies from dissidents of the regional oligarchies and sectors of the urban population. The atmosphere was one of frank agitation in the Military Club, with heated clashes between younger military men accusing their superiors of conniving with the dismissals of the government and, thus, condoning with the political game to perpetuate old alliances in power.

The breach of decorum, revealing a climate of exaltation to inflate the rupture of discipline and disrespect for hierarchy was ongoing. The minutes of the session of the Military Club, dated June 24, 1922, record the debate surrounding the false letters and accusations of every order, revealing irreconcilable divisions among the officers. Lieutenant Gwaier de Azevedo, with Lieutenant Siqueira Campos at his side, urged a government to confront the Army's reputation: "How long will we suffer such great ignominies? Let us unite and have the applause of the whole nation, all more or less wounded by perfidy, by ineptitude... (Protests - Very well!) by the arrogance of a cretin, infamous and despotic President." (SODRÉ, 1979, p. 205).

The government of Epitácio Pessoa was defended by General Setembrino de Carvalho and Colonel Tertuliano Potiguara, both pointed out by Gwaier as protagonists of alleged crimes, among other accusations leveled against other government officials (SODRÉ, 1979). At the end of the session, the highly praised official said that they were on the verge of the revolution, closing the register that depicted the climate of indiscipline fueled by an environment devoted to political battles. Appreciating the events, it is evident that Lieutenant Gwaier's words should not be recognized as isolated, but as reverberating the echo of the dissatisfactions of many officers to the political situation and recognizing as accommodating or even unworthy of credit some of their hierarchical superiors. The climate of exaltation grew when the federal government used Army troops to intervene politically in Pernambuco. The protest launched by the Military Club provoked the reaction of Catete, for this counting on the support of military

chiefs. It was decided to close the Club, using the law of 1921 aimed at curbing harmful or contrary associations to society, which was seen as another affront to the military (FAUSTO, 2002). Marshal Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca, appointed leader of the protest movement, was arrested for 24 hours. Whether or not they were properly scheduled for a barracks, the closing of the Club and the arrest of the old marshal effectively led to the reaction being triggered.

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, then capital of the Republic, July 5, 1922, dawned with the roar of the cannons of the garrison of the artillery battery of Fort Copacabana. The news from the day before about the preparations for an uprising led by army and navy officers was confirmed. From Military Village in the Rio suburb, to Praia Vermelha in the southern zone, there were reports of the rebellion. The march of the Military School of Realengo and the uprising of barracks of the Military Village ended quickly stifled. It remained under the hands of the rebels the garrison of Fort Copacabana, commanded by Captain Euclides Hermes da Fonseca, son of the marshal, having at his side lieutenants Siqueira Campos, Eduardo Gomes, Newton Prado and other military who would go down in history as the members of the "18 men of the fort".

In the short revolt, extending from the 5th to the evening of 6 July, the rebels gave vent to the attempt to confront Epitácio Pessoa, firing at garrisons loyal to the government. The reaction would soon be to pour over the fort, from the Santa Cruz Fortress, heavy artillery. The siege closed, giving the ultimatum: surrender or massacre. Answering the call, Captain Hermes went to the Minister of War to deal with the demands for surrender of the rebels, being thus lured into a trap and imprisoned. An obstacle to the final assault on the battery of Fort Copacabana was removed, saving the President of the Republic from embarrassment if the marshal's son died in the action, which still retained such prestige among the officers.


Siqueira Campos assumed the leadership of the rebellion, already embezzled by the consent of the withdrawal of those who chose to lay down their arms and save their lives. Among the remnants avenged a truly suicidal idea: to march to meet the troops loyal to the government brandishing weapons on Atlantis Avenue. The gesture was dramatic, being marked by a ceremony of lowering the national flag, on July 6, when 29 pieces of the national symbol were torn up and distributed (HISTÓRIA, 1972).

The group left the fort in the middle of the afternoon, willing to sacrifice. In the turmoil of events, with threats looming on all sides, there was dispersal, leaving in the end between 11 to 15 military personnel to march resolutely against the federal forces (DONATO, 1996). Marking the sympathy that the movement provoked, he was joined by the civilian Octavio Augusto da Cunha Corrêa, a gaucho resident in Paris and on holiday in Rio de Janeiro. Corrêa received from the hands of Lieutenant Newton Prado a carbine, forming the iconic front of the march immortalized by



photographer Zenóbio Rodrigo Couto, from the magazine *O Malho*. At the head of the composition were Eduardo Gomes, Mário Carpenter, Newton Prado (by hand pistol), Octavio Corrêa and the soldier Pedro Ferreira de Melo.

**Figure 1 – The March of the 18 from Fort Copacabana, July 6, 1922**



**Source:** ACERVO O GLOBO, 2017. Photo by Zenóbio Rodrigo Couto.<sup>1</sup>

Facing the loyalist troops, the exchange of fire began, culminating in the massacre of Copacabana beach. Between gunfire and the bayonet advance, the rebels succumbed one after another, killed in the sand or later in agony in the hospital. The fateful event was survived by lieutenants Siqueira Campos, one of the most outstanding leaders of the lieutenants movement and who died in an air crash in the icy waters of the Rio da Prata in the prelude to the Revolution of 1930, and Eduardo Gomes, who would arrive at the rank of Brigadier of the Air Force and run, on more than one occasion, for the office of President of the Republic.

#### **4 PLACE OF MEMORY, PLACE OF POLITICS**

Heeding the whimsical national memory, the march of the July 6, 1922 rebels went down in history as the “18 men of the Fort”, constituting a symbolic reference to the daring of young men who agreed to sacrifice their lives for a cause

<sup>1</sup> Available at: <https://atlas.fgv.br/marcos/tenentismo/mapas/marcha-dos-18-do-forte-de-copacabana-e-o-rio-de-july-5-1922>. Accessed 15/04/2022

still in its infancy. What would have provoked such an apparently foolish decision? The scenario leads us to believe that, beyond any speculation about the political persuasion that the ongoing sacrifice would have repercussions in the following years, constituting martyrdom in the name of the movement, there is an all too human component in this adventure: the rebelliousness of a youth wanting to make its voice count, in an act typical of the romantics.

The previous appreciation may be perceived as too sympathetic to a gesture surrounded by foolishness, but this is not the intention of the authors of this text. What we wish to emphasize is that the history of societies is not made up only of supposedly rational calculations on the part of organized political movements or of economic transformations, wars, and revolutions. There is no “bare” history, because personal feelings, identification with a class and its anguishes, the contesting impulse, the taste for adventure, and the desire to participate in something perceived as larger than life itself all weigh in the balance of the actions that transform an era.

In the days preceding the uprising at Fort Copacabana, signs were given that they would be able to count on the participation of older leaders. Faced with the disorganization of the movement or even the ability to mobilize troops loyal to the government, the possible support of colonels and general officers sprayed. Once the fight broke out, the lieutenants and their commanders were left to their own devices by those unwilling to bear the costs of a fruitless rebellion (CARVALHO, 2005).

In the following years, high-ranking military personnel would be sought to formally assume the leadership of the movement in order to give it support, as occurred in São Paulo in 1924, when they relied on General Isidoro Dias Lopes. This, however, did not mean strict subordination in political terms, so that the lieutenants would take up the defense of their own purposes and move forward in their attempt to challenge power. As the composition of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column (1925-1927) demonstrates, there would be characterized by the manifestation of young officers in the initial posts of the career, no longer constituting a pronouncement dependent on or attached to the top of the hierarchy (CARVALHO, 2005).

Today, the revolt of the 18 of Copacabana Fort is remembered as a heroic event and counts, to favor its preservation, with the maintenance of the old military site where the events were unleashed, a place integrated into the Army Historical Museum, corresponding to the definition that are places of memory temples, museums, libraries, pantheons, statues, but also dates and commemorative events to integrate festive rituals dedicated to updating the memory of the nation (NORA, 1993).

If the battery has lost its operational purpose, in terms of shore artillery garrisoning for action in combat, the Krupp cannons, today silenced, are part of a

set of architecturally valuable work, preserving the charm of the panoramic view of Copacabana Beach and the Atlantic, bathing the beaches of Rio. Celebrated and re-updated, the revolt culminating in the fateful gesture of July 6, 1922 was staged in 1976, marking the renewal of the symbolic value of the memory of Tenentism for the history of the Brazilian Army.

**Figure 2 – The 18 from Fort in 1976**



Source: ACERVO O GLOBO, 2017.

The biography of Siqueira Campos and other members of the lieutenants movement were praised as references for heroes of a rebellious youth (HISTÓRIA, 1972), from which emerged unique characters portraying a generation of military personnel marking national politics until the mid-1960s. It should be noted that the former lieutenants would be reinstated in the Army and promoted, occupying positions of prominent figures in the New State regime and the regime inaugurated in 1964.

Another noteworthy aspect is to recognize that the same institution that celebrates the memory of the revolt of the 18 men of the fort, an episode that marked the defiance of the constituted power and defied hierarchy and military discipline, is the one that praises the biography of legalist officers and opponents of the tenants of 1922, such as the renowned generals Setembrino de Carvalho and Tertuliano Potiguara, as evidenced by the publication *História do Exército Brasileiro* (1972). Is this a contradiction? One can conclude that if several lieutenants had not risen to power during the Revolution of 1930, and had not survived politically until the 1960s, conquering high positions in the military hierarchy and in politics, the

paths of the Army's memorial construction would probably have been different. It is not improper to think that the accomplishment of the 18 men of the fort would be remembered with less enthusiasm, or even discouraged from being commemorated, since a place of memory is also a place of politics.

## **5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Looking at the developments of the lieutenant movement of the 1920s, to have in the revolt of the 18 men of the Fort its primordial symbol, it is recognized that its composition encompassed military of various graduations and initial posts of the career, also adding civilians, so that it was not an exclusive movement of lieutenants or captains.

Why would the Army, in those troubled times, attract so many desires of the classes longing for changes in the political sphere? Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco had observed that, in the absence of political parties able to bring together the dissatisfied, "the Army - or the revolutionary part of it - constitutes a kind of renovating political party, which, not being able to act by the vote, allied itself with the defeated and discontented civil factions to guide by the arms" (PRESTES, 1993, p. 77). Arinos interprets a context of low political representativeness, in times of transformations of the urban social composition to demand new ways of expressing class yearnings.

The group's agenda emphasized the purpose of moralizing politics, with the adoption of the effectively secret ballot, the creation of electoral justice, and proposed to overthrow the oligarchies then in power, an agenda that would attract sympathy and the adhesion of middle extracts from society to the movement. This statement, in our view, cannot be received as automatically identifying lieutenants as representatives of the urban middle class anxieties, being more certain that they represented their own corporate agenda and interests. As for the workers and other popular sectors, there would be no serious outline of a union of purposes, so that tenentism effectively divorced demands from lower-extraction social classes (FAUSTO, 2002).

Regarding the political definition, Anita Leocádia Prestes (1993) well expressed being too limited to the perception to want to place the movement on the right or left of the political spectrum. The "lieutenants" were progressive in their terms, patriots certainly, sympathetic some to Anglo-Saxon liberalism, admirers of European society and even there were those interested in socialism, but it would be improper to label a movement of character, above all, military, where the values were put in very different terms from the great ideologies that would assert themselves in Brazil in the following years. After the movement itself ended, its members, in the course of the decade of the 1930s, went to opposite political camps. The movement of 1924, during the lieutenants rebellion promoted

in São Paulo, to the mutinies in several barracks, especially those in Rio Grande do Sul, would lead to the formation of the alliance that resulted in the constitution of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column that, even after dispersed in Bolivian exile, would preserve the capacity of mobilization, arousing sympathies to unite civilians and military. The government of Bernardes would keep the country in a regime of true exception, arresting opponents and disaffections, availing itself of the device of state siege. The unrest continued until the Revolution of 1930 to overthrow Washington Luís, supported by many lieutenants to add to the forces mobilized by Oswaldo Aranha in support of Getúlio Vargas.

The Revolution of 1930 was not the product of an expression of the movement of lieutenants, but of him it would be used. To the former lieutenants Juarez Távora and Cordeiro de Farias, among others, it was interesting that the movement welcomed many of the reclames of the Column (CAMARGO; GÓES, 2001). Others would recognize in the adhesion of former comrades to Vargas an irreconcilable contradiction, especially Captain Luís Carlos Prestes, who soon became the main leader of the Brazilian communist movement (PRESTES, 1993).

Regarding the legacy of the lieutenant movement, no longer in its original sense, it is opportune to observe the actions of Vargas's Minister of War, General Goés Monteiro, to push forward the vision that would accompany the military in the following years. Goés would formulate the bases of the interventionism assumed by the institution, now returning to thinking out the policy made by the summit, with the premise of "doing the politics of the Army and not the politics in the Army". (CARVALHO, 2005, p. 42). José Murilo de Carvalho acknowledged that Góes Monteiro launched the "ideology of moderating power" that would mark the New State and beyond, expressing a combination of tenentist interventionism with the reform of the structural transformations applied in the military organism (CARVALHO, 2005, p. 42).

The times were different and the raptures of the lieutenants of the 18 of the Fort would remain in the national memory as a feat of the era, valuing the bravery and the boldness of comrades in arms. The political gesture of 1922 would serve as a reference to justify the phase of conflict of later years and would be exploited at the flavor of the moment, sometimes conveniently ignoring lessons of an era in which political divisions taken inside the Army promoted ruptures to threaten the integrity of the Armed Forces, illustrating that memory is "open to the dialectic of remembrance and forgetfulness, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to all uses and manipulations". (NORA, 1993, p. 9)

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**BICENTENARY OF INDEPENDENCE:  
geopolitics, borders and sovereignty of Brazil in the 21st century**

On September 7, 2022, Brazil celebrates 200 years of the condition of sovereign political entity, dissociated from Portugal and with a life of its own in the context of civilized nations, although it already enjoyed a privileged position, mainly from 1808 with the arrival of the royal family due to the threat of the Napoleonic troops.

In fact, since the 17th century, Brazil was already not only the largest, but also the richest colony in the Portuguese kingdom, a fact that evidently contributed greatly to its unity. However, as João Batista Magalhães points out, our historians, notably Varnhagen, point out the divergent tendencies, manifested in various regions of the country, hesitant to accept the separation of Portugal from a government established in Rio de Janeiro. He considers, in fact, that it was the native aristocracy that in the second decade of the Empire chose the retention in modified form of the mechanism that was transplanted from Portugal during the interregnum between a colonial and independent nation. In this process, the decentralizing influences that resulted in the decentralization of Hispanic America were suspended and Brazilian unity preserved. (MAGALHÃES, 2002, p. 30).

Thus, it has to be recognized that the formation of national unity has passed through three periods, well defined: the colonial phase of our history; the period of the transplantation to Brazil of the Portuguese court with the formidable effects resulting from the Government of D. João VI and the period that covers the first two decades after the proclamation of Independence. (MAGALHÃES, 2002, p. 25).

And it was starting from this unique condition in the history of the nations that Brazil has been projecting itself over these 200 years as a great territorially satisfied nation, with legal frontiers already consolidated, desiring, therefore, to preserve them, without any pretension of territorial expansion. In fact, the border is deserving of studies and concepts that have aroused a variety of opinions. Ratzel, for example, an adherent of the concept of "living organism state", considers the frontier to be the epidermis of the social body, which as such expands, reflows, stabilizes, or even disappears with the death of the body. (MATTOS, 2011, p. 15-16).

Please note that the fact that Brazil is a great territorially satisfied nation, with legal borders already well consolidated, mainly after its expansion towards the west and now, only wishing to preserve them, without any pretension of territorial expansion, does not mean to say that it must disregard the new concept of vital space (*lebensraum of the postmodern era*) that brings, at its core, cyclical movements that revolve around a single axis of expansion, which is: the conquest of markets and minds.

It is therefore urgent to commemorate the 200th anniversary of Brazil's independence, bringing to academic reflection the great challenges and perspectives

of the country's international insertion, within a complex geopolitical scenario, captained by this new one the concept of *lebensraum*, which revolutionizes the idea of traditional borders.

Thus, in times of postmodern statehood, here envisioned as the post-Cold War era, the conquest of markets and minds becomes the cornerstone of the planetary power of the Western powers, which materializes from the opening up of world trade and, in its wake, the relativization of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the deregulation of national economies, notably of the less developed countries of late modernity of the Global South.

It is in this diapason that General Carlos de Meira Mattos already showed that the shape of a territory, as well as its size and position (geodesic, neighborhood, maritime access, topographic nature), has a close relationship with its exploitation by man, favoring or hindering the application of political power in benefit of the State. For example, the exploration and establishment of a developed society in the Mississippi valley required less human effort than achieving similar results in the Amazon valley; this degree of difficulty would exist even if the dynamic faculties of the inhabitants were the same. (MATTOS, 2011, p. 19).

From everything we see, therefore, the scientific gap involving the concepts of geopolitics, sovereignty and borders, now already in its postmodern dimension that projects itself to the conquest of markets and minds. Thus, it is important to highlight that the condition of the sovereign entity that emerged with the separation of the monarchies of Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro faces new challenges in times of post-modern statehood.

And it is starting from this condition of a free and sovereign nation that Brazil should project itself for the next 200 years, occupying its due place in the reconfiguration of the international order. To this end, it is urgent to devise a Grand National Development Strategy, along the lines of the US National Security Strategy (NSS).

The celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the Independence of Brazil must demand from the country's strategist the formulation of a National Security Strategy of Brazil, capable of realizing the categorical imperative of Brazilian geopolitics, which is to figure among the five greatest powers of the planet, above all in this complex context, governed by the dispute of markets and minds around the globe.

Thinking about the epistemological meeting between the National Security Strategy and the existing strategic centers of a given country is the touchstone that can boost its national development and, in its wake, the achievement of the fundamental objectives provided for in the 1988 Constitution, including the eradication of poverty and social and regional inequalities.

Brazilian strategic centers mean all those autonomous economic-financial-technological segments capable of participating effectively in international competition. In other words, the strategic centers are companies, universities and



the government, whose coordinated actions make up the triple helix of technological innovation. Among the companies in this category are Petrobras, Embraer, Defense Industrial Base, AmBev, Braskem, WEG, Banco do Brasil, BNDES, Naval and Aeronautical Industries, Vale do Rio Doce, Eletrobras, National Contractors and Agro-Industry.

Consequently, in order to draw up this Great Strategy of Brazil for the 21st Century, it is necessary to examine the different models of the National Security Strategy, notably that of the United States. With this, it will be possible to outline the theoretical bases of a possible Great Strategy for Brazil, engendered from its four major geopolitical archetypes, which position Brazil as an energy, food, aquifer and environmental (green) superpower.

In turn, Professor Visentini points out that, at the time of Brazil's independence in 1822, the South Atlantic and the West African Coast were vital for national security, but later lost relevance. However, some time ago the analysis of Brazil's Strategic Surroundings began to consider the configuration of an eastern flank, made up of the South Atlantic Ocean, as well as the West African coast. That is why this text intends to examine the extroversion of the Brazilian economy, the identification of off-shore natural resources and the growing presence of extra-regional players in the areas of the South Atlantic and the West African Coast. It is important to investigate the Chinese, American and British presence in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS).

Indeed, for Visentini, the growing development of Asia and the BRICS and the rapid increase in population (from Africa to South Asia), as well as the global consumption of goods and food, have an immediate impact on the reordering of international flows and the race for natural resources. In relation to this last point, the oceans represent an area of growing importance, with oil/gas, minerals and fishing, as well as military relevance, within a framework of geopolitical redefinition.

In short, this is the thematic spectrum that the intention is to analyze.

Guilherme Sandoval Góes  
Guest Editor

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## 200 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE: in search of a National Security Strategy for Brazil

Guilherme Sandoval Góes\*

### ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the importance of formulating a National Security Strategy for Brazil, along the lines of the *National Security Strategy* of the United States of America (USA), in order to realize its categorical imperative, which positions our country among the five greatest powers on the planet. In fact, the international projection of a country is inexorably linked to the improvement of its National Security Strategy, that is to say, its Grand Strategy, which projects its development in all fields of national power. In this sense, it is colliding to demonstrate that the fundamental basis of Brazil's National Security Strategy should be the expansion of its strategic centers, here envisioned as the autonomous economic-technological segments capable of participating effectively in international competition. This means that the formulation of the Great Strategy of Brazil cannot give up the triple helix of technological innovation, which encompasses companies, universities and the government itself. One cannot therefore confuse the idea of "strategic centers" with the much proclaimed "national champions", associated with systemic corruption in Brazil.

**Keywords:** National Security Strategy; Strategic Nucleus; Geopolitics of Brazil.

*200 ANOS DE INDEPENDÊNCIA: em busca de uma Estratégia de Segurança Nacional para o Brasil*

### RESUMO

*O presente artigo pretende analisar a importância da formulação de uma Estratégia de Segurança Nacional para o Brasil, nos moldes da National Security Strategy dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA), de modo a realizar o seu imperativo categórico, que posiciona o nosso País entre as cinco maiores potências do planeta. Com efeito, a projeção internacional de um país perpassa, inexoravelmente, pelo aprimoramento da sua Estratégia de Segurança Nacional, ou seja, da sua Grande*

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*Estratégia que projeta o seu desenvolvimento em todos os campos do poder nacional. Nesse sentido, colima-se demonstrar que a base fundante da Estratégia de Segurança Nacional do Brasil deve ser a expansão dos seus núcleos estratégicos, aqui vislumbrados como os segmentos econômico-tecnológicos autônomos capazes de participar eficazmente da competição internacional. Isto significa dizer que a formulação da Grande Estratégia do Brasil não pode abrir mão da tríplice hélice da inovação tecnológica, que engloba as empresas, as universidades e o próprio governo. Não se pode confundir, portanto, a ideia de “núcleos estratégicos” com os tão propalados “campeões nacionais”, associados à corrupção sistêmica no Brasil. Palavras-chave: Estratégia de Segurança Nacional; Núcleo Estratégico; Geopolítica do Brasil.*

*200 AÑOS DE INDEPENDENCIA: en busca de una estrategia de seguridad nacional para Brasil*

#### RESUMEN

*Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la importancia de formular una Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional para el Brasil, en el sentido de la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad de los Estados Unidos de América, para hacer realidad su imperativo categórico, que sitúa a nuestro país entre las cinco mayores potencias del mundo. De hecho, la proyección internacional de un país está inexorablemente impregnada por la mejora de su Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad, es decir, su Gran Estrategia, que proyecta su desarrollo en todos los ámbitos del poder nacional. En este sentido, vale la pena demostrar que la base fundamental de la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional del Brasil debe ser la ampliación de sus núcleos estratégicos, considerados aquí como los segmentos autónomos económicos y tecnológicos capaces de participar eficazmente en la competencia internacional. Esto significa que la formulación de la Gran Estrategia de Brasil no puede renunciar a la triple hélice de la innovación tecnológica, que incluye a empresas, universidades y al propio gobierno. Por lo tanto, no se puede confundir la idea de “núcleo estratégico” con los muy publicitados “campeones nacionales”, asociados con la corrupción sistémica en Brasil.*

*Palabras clave: Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional; Núcleo Estratégico; La geopolítica de Brasil.*

#### 1 INTRODUCTION

The Bicentenary of the Independence of Brazil projects the image of evolution of a grandiose event that began on September 7, 1822 and whose outcome made possible the definitive consolidation of the country as a national state itself, now already under the aegis of the Westphalian model of sovereign state.

In fact, relying on the three essential elements of the modern State (delineated territory, people as the set of individuals with Brazilian nationality and undivided sovereignty in the hands of the Emperor), Brazil leaves the state of colonial dependence, but under the influx of foci of resistance.

In this last sense, it has to be recognized that the war was bloody, hence the need to revise the myth of the independence granted in peace, whose thesis of inaccuracy gained predominance within the official historiography in favor of the imperial family itself, as the historian José Honório Rodrigues rightly points out:

Independence was not an unwavering victory, as it has always been claimed in Brazilian history. It was diminished to value the work of the House of Braganza, to obscure the role of the Brazilians, to favor Luso-Brazilian congruence. Nor was it a municipal war, wounded only in the outskirts of Salvador, or in villages in Maranhão and Piauí, or only in Belém do Pará. The war was bloody, especially in Bahia and Maranhão. (RODRIGUES, 2002, p. 35).

Thus, it is important to point out that the condition of a sovereign political entity, dissociated from Portugal and with a life of its own in the context of independent nations only arises with the separation of the monarchies of Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.

And it was from this unique condition in the history of the nations that Brazil has been projecting itself over these 200 years as a great territorially satisfied nation, with legal borders already consolidated, desiring, therefore, to preserve them, without any pretension of territorial expansion (MATTOS, 2011, p. 16).

However, in contemporary times, one must recognize the idea of geopolitical postmodernity, which brings in its bulge a new concept of vital space (*lebensraum*), which is the conquest of markets and minds. It is no longer a question of the classic concept of *lebensraum* coupled with the conquest of territories, on the contrary, what is important now is to gain geo-political muscle to conquer new markets, which are opening up on a planetary scale. Thus, between the globalization of the economy and the relativization of the concept of the absolute sovereignty of the States, postmodernity stands out, within a multinucleated mosaic, which puts in confrontation liberal democracy and social democracy, as well as the geopolitical tension between the West and the East.

Consequently, thinking strategically Brazil within this postmodern scenario of high complexity, headed by the dispute of markets and minds, demands from the strategist country a certain strategic sophistication, which materializes in the idea of the economic and commercial expansion of the large multinational companies of the dominant powers. As Bercovici rightly points out (2007, p. 66), it is a higher stage of the idea of national borders, which goes beyond the physical

space of classical geopolitics to achieve economic dominance, which does not take place in stable and determined territories and places, but in the volatile spaces of the markets.

It is therefore necessary to reflect on this new post-modern international order, which loses the predominant feature of the Cold War, what is the application of the principle of necessary geopolitical alignment, which applied for more than 40 years, that is, from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Indeed, it was the principle of the necessary geopolitical alignment that ensured, for all these years, the high degree of geopolitical stability of the Cold War, in which the countries of the global periphery should choose which of the two great superpowers would align geopolitically: the United States or the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

It is in this tone that the drastic change of the new post-modern world order is affirmed, which is born precisely from the repeal of this principle of necessary geopolitical alignment. In other words, this means to say that the collapse of one of the two world superpowers has created a new archetype of global power relations, very distinct from its predecessors, which are the Eurocentric order and the bipolar order.

Now we can see the Neo-Darwinian globalization, sponsored by the worldwide opening of trade, relativization of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, the legal reduction of the State and the search for international competitiveness.

Such a worldview allows us to represent, without academic zotism, what truly represents neoliberal globalization and post-1989 geopolitics, which together begin to form the great global chains of value.

In fact, globalization and geopolitics are Siamese sisters, who present themselves as vectors of the projection of power of the hegemonic powers over the Global South (the idea of geopolitics as the relationship between power and space), which, making use of the enlargement of the links between the peoples of the world through all forms of exchange (neoliberal globalization), strengthen each time their processes of international insertion.

In this sense, Parag Khanna points out:

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1 It cannot be denied that the present post-modern era is completely distinct from the previous international order based on two great centers of power with equivalence in all fields of national power (political, military, economic, psychosocial and technological). In the previous Cold War paradigm, there was great strategic predictability due to the principle of necessary geopolitical alignment. It is worth making it explicit: the system of international forces it was driven by the dispute between two major centers with complete economic, geopolitical and military correspondence. There was therefore full parity in all fields of national power. The power of attraction of the two superpowers was complete in itself. The other nations were limited to observing the principle of necessary geopolitical alignment, that is, to choose which of the two superpowers would prospect themselves (GÓES; MASSERA, 2015, p. 50-51).

Half a century later, a leather-covered example from the first edition of Toynbee's narrative was my safest guide when I began to travel the world to investigate the interaction between two world historical forces that he perceived intuitively, without even naming them: geopolitics and globalization. Geopolitics is the relationship between power and space. Globalization refers to the broadening and deepening of the links between the peoples of the world through all forms of exchange. (KHANNA, 2008, p. 9-10).

It is for all of this that the main objective of this article is to outline the fundamental bases of a National Security Strategy for Brazil in the face of a complex post-modern world scenario, which presents itself under the influxes of the reorganization of global chains of production, knowledge and value.

With such a kind of intellect in mind, it becomes easier to understand the importance of analyzing the structures of different National Security Strategies (Grand Strategy) in comparative perspective, notably the American model. Clearly, the comparative studies allow us to trace those theoretical elements that should govern the formulation of a National Security Strategy for Brazil, defending here the thesis that such a strategy should be traced in the sense of achieving the fundamental objectives laid down in Article 3, paragraphs I to IV, of the CRFB/88.<sup>2</sup>

Here is the core of the Great Democratic Strategy of the Brazilian State: to build - from national development - a free, just and supportive society, without poverty and marginalization and without social and regional inequalities.

The following questions are therefore to be answered: to what extent does the formulation or absence of a National Security Strategy, here seen as the Great Strategy, impact the international projection of our country within the contemporary international context? What would be the fundamental foundations of a National Security Strategy for the coming decades (2040 Scenarios)?

There are no correct answers to such questions and neither the belief in apodictic truths, and it is certain to reaffirm the need for a confrontation of ideas, hence the relevance of the multidisciplinary epistemic approach (geopolitics, law, economics etc.), which contemplates the great categorical imperative of the geopolitics of the Brazilian State, which is to "be among the first five powers of planet Earth". In that symbolic year of 2022 which will mark the Bicentenary of the independent Brazil, the country's strategist should reflect on the next decades, and it should be his task to unveil the main seeds of the future of world geopolitics that will impact the project of power of the Brazilian nation.

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2 The fundamental objectives of the Brazilian State are, according to Article 3, Sections I to IV, of the CRFB/88: building a free, just and solidarity society; guaranteeing national development; eradicating poverty and marginalization and reducing social and regional inequalities and promoting the good of all, without prejudice to origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of discrimination. (BRASIL, 2022, p. 4).

It is for all of this that the present article has the pretension of examining the scientific connections that shift to the centrality of a possible Strategy for National Security of Brazil the idea-force of expansion of its strategic nuclei, here envisioned as being those components of the triple helix of technological innovation (companies, universities and government) that generate the development of the State in all the fields of national power.

In essence, the strategic core can here be defined as being the set of autonomous economic-technological segments capable of participating effectively in international competition. In this sense, the question is simple: can a country with more than 200 million inhabitants give up its strategic technological-industrial nucleus, transforming itself into a mere service society, exporting primary products, without added value? (GÓES, 2020, p. 110).

Thus, strategic nuclei mean all those actors, entities, companies or segments, private or state, whether economic, commercial, technological, academic, scientific, financial, regulatory / regulatory or industrial, provided that they are able to participate effectively in international competition under the influxes of global chains of production, knowledge and value, with or without investment by the Brazilian State.

It is therefore urgent for the Brazilian strategist to formulate a National Security Strategy, which can articulate the elements of the National Power, transforming potential power into real power and projecting the Country in concert of nations, notably from its four major founding geopolitical archetypes, which position Brazil as an energy superpower, a food superpower, an aquifer and environmental superpower (green superpower) (GÓES, 2020, p. 126).

Finally, this is the thematic spectrum of this article.

## **2 THE DEBATE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

Before analyzing the fundamental bases of a possible National Security Strategy for Brazil, this article intends to investigate the intrinsic rationality of some strategies, notably the American archetypes called *National Security Strategy* (NSS), so as to understand them the meaning to better organize them systematically, thus developing a comparative picture with Brazilian reality.

Such a kind of conceptual analysis in comparative perspective is relevant, as it gives rise to scientifically made criticisms of our own high-level policy and strategy documents. It is even believed that the international projection of a country permeates, inexorably, by the improvement of its National Security Strategy, here envisioned as the Great Strategy, which positions the country in the geopolitical context of the sovereign and civilized nations.

In this sense, evaluating the post-World War II international context is the same thing as identifying the reflections of the United States' NSS in relation to

the rest of the world, such is in essence the genesis of its construction. Indeed, the US NSS, since the end of the Eurocentric world in 1945, transcends the scope of their simple nationality to project themselves over other countries, thus shaping the world geopolitical order.<sup>3</sup>

In the United States, the idea of a National Security Strategy emerged as a requirement of Section 603 of the celebrated Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*), obliging the President of the Republic to present the United States National Security Strategy to Congress. In this sense, it is the very letter of Clinton's NSS that highlights:

This report, presented in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, draws up a National Security Strategy for this new world era and builds on the unrivaled forces of the United States. Focusing on new threats and opportunities, its core objectives are:

- increase U.S. security with military forces ready to fight and win with effective representation abroad;
- strengthen America's economic revitalization;
- promoting democracy abroad.

For the past three years, my administration has worked diligently to pursue such goals. This report presents the National Security Strategy that guided all this effort. It is based on the belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1996, p. i).<sup>4</sup>

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3 Indeed, the structures of the US National Security Strategy directly impact the reconfiguration of the world order, as they always focus on the maintenance of American world hegemony. This perspective will only change after the 2008 crisis, when in which American strategies will begin to be questioned by the revisionist powers, especially China and Russia. It is in this sense that it can be noted that Obama's National Security Strategy was already conceived in the clamor of this 2008 crisis, that is, it was already conceived within a Spykmanian centripetal worldview of China with the purpose of resuming the world leadership lost by the United States, as its own strategic name indicates: National Strategy of Nation Renewal and Global Leadership. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2010).

4 This report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, elaborates a national security strategy that is tailored for this new era and builds upon America's unmatched strengths. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are: To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad. To bolster America's economic revitalization. To promote democracy abroad. Over the past three years, my Administration has worked diligently to pursue these goals. This national security strategy report presents the strategy that has guided this effort. It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1996, p. i).



Thus, the idea of a National Security Strategy was meant to be the guiding document for achieving the United States' goals, objectives, and global interests. It is therefore a Great Unifying Strategy for national development and for the international projection of the United States, and there is no longer any significant difference between domestic policy and foreign policy.

Basic on the NSS of Clinton's Engagement and Enlargement, it is possible to see that the American model transcends the simple scope of national defense to transform itself, in truth, into a Grand Strategy of global power, which incorporates in its content the worldwide projection of the American economy (To bolster America's economic revitalization), the aggrandizement of liberal democracy around the planet (To promote democracy abroad) and the unstoppable maintenance of its military hegemony, maintaining, from the 1994-Bottom-Up Review, the capacity to win two wars in the same time (To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad).

As a consequence, the scholar of the American NSS has the academic duty of pointing out a capital point of scrutiny and that is the joining of the triple helix of world hegemony with the triple helix of innovation.

The triple helix of world hegemony has always featured in the various U.S. NSSs over time, from the Bush Father Doctrine to the Biden Doctrine, truthfully depicting the American worldview that its world leadership must be exercised from these three major goals: a) to ensure the economic prosperity of American society; b) to promote the expansion of democracy around the world; and c) to strengthen the security of the U.S. state.

Thus, the unipolar military power of the US guarantees the stability of the globalized world, which in turn is the primary factor for both the prosperity of its economy and the broadening of its axis of influence in the quest for the universalization of liberal democracy. Henry Kissinger points out that:

The United States has contributed significantly to this development. The **American military** provided a security shield for the rest of the world, whether its beneficiaries asked for it or not. Under the umbrella of an essentially **unilateral** American military guarantee, much of the developed world joined this system of alliances; developing countries were protected against a threat they sometimes did not recognize, let alone admit. A **global economy** has developed, and for it the United States has contributed funding, markets and a wide variety of innovations. The period from 1948, perhaps, until the turn of the century marked a fleeting moment in human history when it was possible to speak of an **incipient global order made up of a combination of American idealism** and the traditional

components of the balance of power. (KISSINGER, 2015, p. 364)  
(our griffins).

On the other hand, the triple helix of innovation, encompassing companies, universities and the government, projects the idea that the successive interactions of these three entities should progressively converge towards the attainment of the three objectives of national security that make up the triple helix of American world hegemony.

Note, with due scientific acuity, that the joining of these two triple helices (technological innovation and world hegemony) indicates that the current position of global leadership of the United States in the international context is only sustained by its respective leadership in the field of technological innovation and vice versa.

Incidentally, American technological hegemony is still the direct fruit of its gigantic military budget, which makes possible the effective action of companies, universities and government entities - here envisioned as strategic nucleuses of the American State - generating innovation in all fields of national power.

Biden's own NSS Interim highlights the importance of maintaining its scientific and technological supremacy:

Rapid changes in technology will shape all aspects of our lives and our national interests, but the direction and consequences of the technology revolution remain undefined. [...] The United States must reinvest in maintaining our scientific and technological edge and, once again, lead by working alongside our strategic allies to establish the new rules and practices that will allow us to seize the opportunities that technological advances present.<sup>5</sup> (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2021, p. 8-9).

Of meridian clarity, therefore, the connection between the national security scenario involving all the international players of the global geopolitical power game and the triad of technological innovation centered on the interrelation of strategic nuclei, that is, company of all types, universities of all shades and state agents, whether they be regulators, watchdogs or financiers.

It is for all of this that the idea is defended that the formulation of a National Security Strategy should be conceived with a focus on strengthening and

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5 Rapid changes in technology will shape every aspect of our lives and our national interests, but the direction and consequences of the technological revolution remain unsettled. [...] America must reinvest in retaining our scientific and technological edge and once again lead, working alongside our partners to establish the new rules and practices that will allow us to seize the opportunities that advances in technology present. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2021, p. 8-9).

expanding the strategic nuclei of the State, it is worth making explicit, once again, for fundamental reasons, its private and state companies, linked to the global value chains, as well as its universities, research centers and technological clusters, supported by the strategic actions of the State.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, the struggle for control of the large global value chains has become the foundation of the Great Strategy of the global powers, notably the US and China. In other words, it can be said that the commercial dispute is made on a planetary scale, reaching all the economic spaces of the underdeveloped countries of late modernity, of the Global South, as, unfortunately, is still the case with Brazil.

Such a worldview allows one to interpret, without academic zotism and without strategic ingenuity, what truly represents the dispute involving the multinational corporations of the hegemonic powers for control of global value chains, production and technological innovation.<sup>7</sup>

In a strategic sense, this means to say that there is no power vacuum in international relations, that is, there will always be some state trying to influence major international decisions; there will always be dispute between hegemonic nations dealing with the expansion of their respective strategic nuclei, for example, the dispute between the Chinese companies (Huawei and ZTE) versus the Nokia (Finnish) and Ericsson (Swedish) companies in 5G technology.

As already seen, we are living in the era of post-modernity, which no longer has the high degree of geopolitical stability of the Cold War era.

Indeed, in the bipolar order, the existence of two large antagonistic blocs, governed by the necessary geopolitical alignment, prevented or at least hindered the formation of large and complex global chains of production, knowledge and value. In other words, the world market was not unique, liberal and globalized, but rather a market divided into two mutually exclusive trading worlds (one controlled

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6 Universities, endowed with teaching-scientific autonomy, administrative autonomy and financial and wealth management, are centers of innovation production par excellence, operating under the principle of inseparability between teaching, research and extension. On the other hand, companies are responsible for the practical implementation of these innovations produced by the universities, while the government is responsible for the formulation of public policies that are aimed at technological innovation, as well as at the elaboration of programs to encourage teaching, research and extension. In short, the production of innovation depends on this interaction between companies, universities and government, and it is worth highlighting the mutually beneficial partnerships in which companies and the government receive qualified professionals coming from the universities, which in turn need investments made by companies and the government.

7 It is no longer a question of the classic conquest of territories, on the contrary, what is important now is to gain geopolitical muscle to conquer new markets, which are opening up on a planetary scale. (GÓES, 2018, p. 512-515).

by the United States of America and the other by the Soviet Union), which evidently made the formation of such global value chains impossible.<sup>8</sup>

However, with the end of the Soviet bloc, all the multinational companies of the industrialized countries, especially those of the capitalist triad (USA, Europe and Japan), ceased to operate only in the Western world, creating the first global chains of technological innovation, export networks of knowledge-intensive components and industrial processing.

This was the beginning of the cycle of global chains controlled by “strategic centers or leading companies”, which start to operate around the planet and within a process of integration of chains, which can bring together, for example, the conception of a product being made in the USA, which, in turn, will be manufactured in China or Mexico, with inputs coming from Brazil or Argentina.

Strictly speaking, the above is the portrait of a globalized world, in which the dispute over world markets takes place starting from global chains, structured with a focus on international competitiveness. As a result, not only is the dispute between controlling companies intensified, but also the attempt to bring new players into these global chains, hence the importance of the concept of a strategic nucleus.

The interconnection between the National Security Strategy and the expansion of the strategic centers of a given national State, finds in the contemporary arena of the postmodern world an inciting laboratory of challenges and opportunities that goes far beyond what has been conventionally called the National Defense Policy (*PND-Política de Defesa Nacional*) and the National Defense Strategy (*END-Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*).<sup>9</sup>

With due sharpness of mind, the reader is invited here to the understanding that the absence of a National Security Strategy negatively impacts the national development as well as the international projection of a country within the contemporary international context. As Peter Paret rightly points out:

[...] strategic thinking is inevitably very pragmatic. It depends on the realities of geography, society, economy and politics [...]

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- 8 Attention, note that during the Cold War, Western multinational companies did not have access to the markets of the countries of the Soviet Union for the simple reason of the Kremlin’s geopolitical and ideological fence to make such trade, and vice versa with Washington’s prohibitions against the Western market. Furthermore, the technological and industrial level of the multinational companies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan at the time of the Cold War, still did not allow for the full fulfillment of the demands of the peripheral capitalist market, hence the skeptical prospect of the substitution of imports, so important for the industrial development of Brazil in the period of the military regime, notably in the Geisel government.
- 9 The factual reality of the contemporary world is so multifaceted that it brings together diffuse interests of different branches of the National Power, including fundamental issues linked to liberal globalization itself, protection of the environment, world energy reconfiguration, aggravation of the cycle of the periphery of the Global South, intensification of international competition between the strategic centers of the West and of China, uncontrol of national borders, flows of immigrants in the world centers of power, proliferation of failed states, among other relevant issues.

The history of strategic thinking is not that of pure reason, but that of applied reasoning. (PARET, p.18).

With this kind of intellect in mind, it is important to highlight the pragmatic genius of the formulators of the United States National Security Strategy, which is highly sophisticated, because in its essence it brings theory and practice into direct contact, engendering strategic archetypes that shape the factual reality of a world order in constant change, through systematization that ensures the world hegemony of the USA. The American strategist knows exactly where he's going.

This is the central point that demonstrates, in a way, the main differences between the strategic worldview of Brazil and that of the USA, or rather, it evidences the high strategic sophistication of American society when compared with that of Brazilian society.

In this sense, there is no successful career in the United States without a strategic vision: any judge, journalist, politician, military, scientist, lawyer, attorney of justice, professor, jurist and others will be severely criticized by their peers and society at large for an act of their respective office that goes against U.S. strategic interests in favor of a foreign country.

In this way, the lack of a genuine Brazilian National Security Strategy, along the lines of the United States *National Security Strategy*, puts Brazil adrift, a country with no direction, without knowing where it wants to go, easily influenced by external strategies.<sup>10</sup> This keeps us further and further away from the categorical imperative of our geopolitics, which is to be one of the five greatest global powers.

For the American strategist, the concept of National Security is a strategic whole that transcends the levels of National Defense and Public Security, even reaching that level of the Great Strategy, which defines the nation's future.

The theorizing of Richmond M. Lloyd, former Director of the Strategy and Power Planning Course at the U.S. Naval War College, portrays with perfection this architecture engendered by the pragmatic genius of the American strategist, whose systemic vision always points to a national project for power projection.<sup>11</sup>

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10 It is in this sense that without strategy there is only drift, that is, in the absence of strategy there is only drift, the deviation of national objectives by external actions. (CERAMI; HOLCOMB, 2001, p. 1).

11 Moreover, the completeness of the American strategy is established not only by the imbrication of the three political, economic and military dimensions, but mainly by the larger project that makes the internal and external policies of the United States coincide. It makes no sense for the American strategist to rigidly separate his domestic and foreign policies, since his power potential alone maximizes in global terms. It is therefore no mere coincidence that the US National Security Strategy engages in state actions aimed at dominating wealth in foreign territories, controlling territories and markets on a global scale, for the benefit of its strategic hubs, notably US multinational companies. That is why, for the United States, the process of transforming potential into national power is only complete if it involves the whole terrestrial globe. Every major American company is born thinking globally

Conceptually, Richmond M. Lloyd develops a strategic formulation model, which will be presented in sequence, showing the importance of the National Security Strategy having a clear set of objectives to achieve:

The United States continues to reassess its national priorities and the fundamental elements of its national security strategy. It is important for the nation to make good use of this moment, but for this it is necessary **quality and clarity** in the strategy and decisions of force planning. The lack of a clear set of goals and a robust and robust national security strategy will lead the United States to react, rather than control, the world events that are of interest to it. To confuse such a step will not suffice. (LLOYD, 1995, p. 1).<sup>12</sup>

Lloyd's words project the heart of the Great U.S. Strategy, which is controlling world events. The same can be said about China's grand strategy these days. Power is relational, it is something that is exercised, that is disputed, that is stimulated; to have power is to be taken into consideration in the acts of others, it is to have the capacity to shape favorable behaviors. (GÓES, 2008, p. 49).

From the strategic inaction of one State, the power of others will be born, hence the importance of gaining unoccupied spaces or even of alienating an opponent who is dominating an area of relevant and fundamental interest. It is in this guideline that U.S. National Security Strategies are formulated, notably from the expansion of Chinese geopolitics, which in turn acts in the same way, both seeking to broaden their respective global spheres of influence.<sup>13</sup>

From these considerations, it is better understood the reason for choosing the

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12 The United States continue to reassess its national priorities and the fundamental elements of its national security strategy. It is important for the nation to take advantage of this moment in time, but to do so well requires quality and clarity in strategy and force planning decisions. Lack of a clear set of objectives and a focused, robust national security strategy will lead to the United States reacting to, rather than controlling, the events of the world which are in its interests. Muddling through will not do. (LLOYD, 1995, p. 1).


13 This is the best vision to capture the spirit of the National Security Strategies of the great powers, engendered under the aegis of the struggle for leadership of the world system. Such strategies form a chain of strategic links that complement and support each other in the construction of hegemonic structures of global power, such as, on the United States, among others (IMF, IBRD, World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD), Group of Seven (G7) is an informal group of seven countries, which are among the largest and most industrialized economies in the world. These countries also have great strategic, political and military influence in the world: the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Italy; the tripartite military alliance formed by Australia, the US and the United Kingdom (AUKUS); Quadrilateral Security Dialog, also known as QUAD; and on the Chinese side, also among others (BRICS, OXC, OBOR, NDB, CRA, AIIB, G20).

name of Clinton’s NSS, which is National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Engagement, signifying the repudiation of the pre-Truman isolationism; and enlargement, projecting the perspective of the pax americana, it is worth saying, the imposition of an American unipolar world.

But the names of the Obama and Trump NSS project the need to contain the expansion of Chinese geo-power, thus regaining world leadership, otherwise we see: Obama’s NSS (National Strategy of Nation Renewal and Global Leadership) and the Horn NSS (National Strategy of Making America Great Again).

The figure below shows the aforementioned methodology developed by Richmond M. Lloyd and which is called Top Down Framework.

Figure 1 - Strategy and Force Planning Framework



Source: LLOYD, 1995.

Such a strategy model and force planning starts with the analysis of national interests and objectives, runs through the National Security Strategy, until it reaches the available forces.

The Richmond Lloyd archetype begins from top to bottom, assessing various factors that may affect, positively or negatively, national interests and objectives, such as resource constraints (human, natural, and financial); the available technology and the one to develop, threats; challenges, opportunities; traditional allies; friendly nations; and international organizations/institutions, to then conceive the National Security Strategy in its three large dimensions already widely commented upon: political, economic, and military.

Note carefully that in the case of US NSS, national interests and objectives are already defined in advance from the triple helix of American world hegemony, i.e., revitalization of the American economy, world democratic enhancement, and undeniable military hegemony.<sup>14</sup>

The situation is different in Brazil, a developing country in the Global South, whose national objectives are provided for in the Constitution itself, in its Article 3, paragraphs I to IV.

Thus, it is up to the Brazilian strategist to interpret - with a critical spirit - the logic of the construction of our strategic models linked to national security and to compare them with those of the United States and those of other global powers.

The fundamental question that is required is to know until when the patriotic strategist will fall inert, without the capacity to engender a strategic construct genuinely autochthonous in relation to external pressures and our needs of dignified existence for all Brazilians.

Here is one of the most important lines of investigative analysis of national development: the urgency of formulating a National Security Strategy able to articulate the entry of Brazilian strategic centers in the reorganization of global production chains, brought about by the pandemic and potentialized by the War in Ukraine.

### **3 THE IDEA OF A STRATEGIC CORE AS THE FOUNDATION OF BRAZIL'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

The present thematic segmentation begins, highlighting that Brazilian society has the challenge of engendering its National Security Strategy, especially in this complex world context, governed by the dispute of markets and minds on a planetary scale, involving, on the one hand, the capitalist democracies (USA, Europe and Japan) and, on the other hand, the revisionist states (China and Russia).

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<sup>14</sup> In the broad sense, the National Strategy is perceived as the art of preparing and applying National Power to, overcoming obstacles, achieve and preserve National Objectives, according to the orientation established by the National Policy. (ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA (Brasil) 2019, p. 50).



It should be noted that the outcome of this geopolitical tension will be: either the rescue of the *pax americana* or the definitive implantation of a multipolar world. And it is precisely in this sense that Brazil's role emerges within this reconfiguration of the new world, whose course already points to multipolarity.

In this tuning fork, please note that the nation project prepared by the Sagres Institute, in setting the world's foresight scenario for 2035, has not placed Brazil as one of the important poles of the multipolar world under construction:

The global situation, in this year 2035, presents itself markedly complex and with relevant peculiarities - some never experienced, at least in the current scale and intensity. The predominance of the United States of America (USA) and China, in an international context, does not go so far as to characterize a hegemony of these two powers, but rather a ordering that can be considered multipolar, since the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, India and Russia also play important roles. (PROJETO DE NAÇÃO, 2022, p. 11).

This means to say that the forecast made by the Sagres Institute projects the image that Brazil has not managed to realize the categorical imperative of its geopolitics, which is to be among the five greatest global powers.

In fact, it should be noted that the multipolar planning envisaged for the year 2035 did not include Brazil, but only the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, India and Russia.

Likewise, this forecast also indicates, albeit indirectly, Brazil's inability to convert all its power potential into real power, hence the relevance of delineating the basic foundations of a National Security Strategy in the face of a complex world scenario, whose macrotrend already points to the dispute between China and the USA for control of global chains of production, knowledge and value.

Here, it is important to highlight the idea that only a strategically sophisticated elite would have the capacity to articulate the Brazilian strategic centers under the aegis of a National Security Strategy, capable of realizing all this potential. In this sense, the lesson of Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo clarifies:

The more efficient the conversion of potential power into reality, the greater the possibility for a state to act in the international system. One more example: Brazil is regarded as one of the largest producers of raw materials and as the holder of biodiversity in the world, but the processing of many of these raw materials is not carried out here, but rather abroad. Brazil, therefore, has potential power that cannot be converted into real power, allowing others to add value and gain dominance

from their resources, leaving, moreover, many of the resources without exploitation. (PECEQUILO, 2005, p. 57-58).

It will not be the Chinese, French or American statesman who will engender a major strategic model for the economic exploitation of the Amazon, who, without disregarding geoverdism (an expression coined by Thomas L. Friedman),<sup>15</sup> will be capable, at the same time, of promoting the sustainable development of the region, using its biodiversity and its different ecological subsystems.

On the contrary, one can expect geopolitical formulations, for example, Triple Corridor A, whose intention is precisely to avoid that Brazil, as the holder of the greatest biodiversity on the planet, can make possible the creation of new strategic nuclei in the region, that is, to make possible the creation of new companies capable of competing internationally in the billionaire market for medicines and cosmetics.

Here is the importance of strategic centers of biotechnology, engendered with scientific latitude to potentialize the production of medicines based on Brazilian nature, at the same time that the mastery of the rich biodiversity is preserved, without the risk of transforming itself into a mere exporter of raw materials, without added value.

In fact, without significant investments in the region's own strategic centers (companies, universities and state entities, for example, the National Research Institute of Amazonia) linked to the national genetic heritage, the processing and adding value will continue to be done abroad, without generating income and quality jobs within Brazil itself, the owner of this rich genetic heritage, but without the capacity to exploit it in full.

Accordingly, it is time to reject such external subordination, which does nothing more than aggravate the cycle of the periphery that accompanies Brazil throughout its history, especially in the Amazon region, with the task of articulating a large *cluster* agglutinating the exploitation of this national genetic heritage.

It is not appropriate to embark uncritically on geoverdism, without, however, irresponsibly disregarding it. The weighting between the constitutional values of national development and protection of the environment must be weighed up by the country strategist, without succumbing, however, to external pressures.

It is therefore clear that the absence of a genuinely Brazilian national security strategy along the lines of the United States National Security Strategy is making the country's development process extremely difficult.

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15 This is a philosophy that I would like to call "geoverdism." We, the Geoverdes, seek to unite in a single environmental political movement that wants to reduce the use of fossil fuels that cause climate change, evangelicals that want to protect God's green planet and all His creation and geostrategists who want to reduce our dependence on raw oil, because it feeds the worst regimes in the world. (FRIEDMAN, 2007, p. 469).

In the case of Brazil, the formulation of a Great Strategy is much needed, not only to plan the expansion of the different strategic centers already existing in the country, but, mainly, to conceive the creation of new technological, economic, financial or commercial segments, capable of penetrating the global value chains.

The result of all this is melancholic: the existence of a fragmented building of strategic centers, or that is to say, a country without any strategic link between its various segments integrated with the international chains of production and knowledge.

Unfortunately, it is easy to perceive not only the difficulties of internationalization of Brazilian companies, but also the deconstruction of strategic nuclei already consolidated and which are often broken or absorbed by global conglomerates, from the uncritical reception of economic fundamentals coming from powers that control the global markets.

In this sense, as the document - Foundations of National Power - of the Escola Superior de Guerra (2019, p. 136):

If that were not enough, the so-called developed world is putting **pressure on developing countries** to adopt what they call **good institutions and procedures** which are **supposed to be indispensable for** achieving economic development, which may well be a fallacy, since economic developments in those countries have not always been based on the good institutions and good procedures **which they now recommend to developing countries**. Such a strategy is very well qualified by Ha-Joon Chang (2004) in his work - *Kicking the ladder*.

With this, almost all the countries of late modernity, as is unfortunately still the case of Brazil, positioned on the periphery of world power, are, if not directly commanded, indirectly controlled by the strategic centers of the rich countries, which make up the great structures of global production.

That is, devoid of internal savings, technology and innovation, they remain dependent on the large financial and commercial corporations of the rich nations, which decide where to invest or disinvest, without any connection with the development of the poor countries. Here the need for reassessment by companies and universities, but above all by the Brazilian government, of the risks of depending on international sources of supply of inputs, products, services, knowledge, innovation and technology comes into consideration.

In the telecommunications sector, for example, there is practically no Brazilian strategic nucleus with international competitiveness, especially in 5G

or in the construction of communications satellites, which evidently transforms the country into a mere consumer market in this area, without any participation in the respective global chains of value, production and knowledge. In other words, we are going to buy communications satellites and not produce them in the country.

From everything one can see, therefore, the importance of the Great Strategy of Brazil promoting the expansion of the set of Brazilian companies that are close to the traditional multinational companies of democratic capitalism, in that they remain as poles of world production and not as mere consumer markets (direct import of products coming from abroad). (GÓES, 2020).

The problem outlined above can be understood more easily with the help of the figure below, which shows the only two positions that the country can occupy in the face of the new cycle of global value chains, namely:

a) the superior position of the controllers of the global chains - intensive in innovation, technology and investment - and, in the majority, occupied by the strategic centers of the rich countries of the decision-making center of the capitalist system; and

b) the inferior position of mere consumer markets or simple exporters of natural resources, almost without relevant strategic nuclei and, completely, occupied by the poor countries of the Global South of late modernity.

Table 1 – New Cycle of Global Value Chains



Source: THE AUTHOR, 2022.

In global value chains, Brazil's positioning as a mere exporter of primary products undermines national development and its capacity to transform potential into power, notably in its four major geopolitical archetypes, already exhaustively cited (energy, food, water and biodiversity).

With this, Brazil makes it impossible to realize its categorical imperative of being among the five greatest powers on the planet, as well as ceases to attain the fundamental constitutional objectives aimed at the dignified life of all, with the eradication of poverty and a reduction in social and regional inequalities.

All of this leads to the most elementary notions of the peripheral State of the Global South, deficient in the chains of products of high and medium technological intensity, without the capacity to promote the internationalization of their companies, and, as a consequence, without any greater leading role in the global market. What's more, the few strategic centers existing in Brazil, including the subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, operate with imported technological content, without contributing towards the perfecting of the triple helix of technological innovation in the country.

The result of this Brazilian reality is inexorable: subordination or dependence on external actors in almost all fields of national power. The question is not one of xenophobia or xenophilia, to the extent that one is fully aware that foreign investment is not - because it is foreign - necessarily bad, on the contrary, it may even represent the only way of creating a Brazilian strategic nucleus in a determined sector of the fatherland economy.

However, one must extract what consults the Brazilian national interest, and, above all, one must safeguard and build the expansion of our strategic companies and corporations. In fact, the vast majority of multinational companies operating in Brazil do not contribute to the perfecting of our triple helix of innovation, in that they do not generate technology on Brazilian soil, on the contrary, they only import the technology necessary for serving the domestic market.<sup>16</sup>

It is therefore urgent to build a new set of strategic centers that is capable of integrating with global trade, notably in chains of technological innovation, export of industrialized products and of parts and components intensive in biodiversity, thus generating more benefits for society and the country.

Thus, expanding the Brazilian strategic nucleus does not mean reducing the number of Brazilian state-owned companies and multinational companies

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16 In this sense, Ignacio Ramonet unveils the idea of civilization from the chaos of the new world's masters (private financial and industrial conglomerates), from the plundered planet (systemic destruction of the environment), from the metamorphoses of power and its negotiated, reticular and horizontal forms (media, pressure groups and non-governmental organizations), from the shock of new technologies (side by side with the clash of civilizations from the ethnic wars) and all this causing to exude in this post-modern Western society a bad smell of remorse and something like a feeling of nausea. (RAMONET, 1998, p. 7-12).

of other nationalities. So it is not a question of being against privatization, on the contrary, it is argued here that privatization will always be welcome, as state-owned companies will always be less competitive than private companies. (GÓES, 2020).

However, what is not admitted is the reduction of the Brazilian strategic nucleus, made by poorly conceived privatizations, which do nothing more than transfer Brazilian industrial activity abroad, with the subsequent importation of that same product in the future. A logic that is not very easy to understand, but, undoubtedly, a logic followed by Brazil, right from the first cycle of privatization, in the 90s.

This is what happened, for example, with the destruction of the fertilizer industry in Brazil, which, in a few decades, has raised the percentage of dependence of the country from something around 50% to the current 85%, with serious risks as yet of a shortage of supply, as a result of the War in Ukraine.

And worse: this is what may happen with the privatizations of Petrobras's refineries and their subsequent destruction, making Brazil, at the same time, one of the world's largest exporters of low added value crude oil and one of the largest importers of refined oil, notably gasoline and diesel, of much higher added value.<sup>17</sup>

Another exemplary case of deconstruction of Brazilian companies (state or private), profitable and endowed with reasonable technological mastery, was the Brazilian shipbuilding industry, until then located amongst the first three in the world and whose outcome was melancholic: a strategic sector of the national economy was practically wiped out in the name of an international competitiveness that never reached the country.

Finally, overnight, the near destruction of this important Brazilian strategic nucleus, of high added value and considerable technological content, left the country to spend today billions of dollars in freight payment for foreign ships to

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17 What is the point of commemorating the success of the pre-salt auctions and the future privatizations of Petrobras refineries, when it is established that the country is unable to devise a strategy for expanding the refining (construction of new refineries) that guarantees, at the same time, the much desired autonomy of refined oil relative to domestic consumption and, in its wake, the consequent independence from the international price variation of refined oil, mainly gasoline and diesel? In terms of prospective development, Brazil tends to increase its consumption of refined oil to levels far higher than the current level, hence the urgency of constructing these new refineries to meet this demand. If Brazil does not build these new refineries, whether by private companies or by Petrobras, it runs the risk of transforming itself into one of the world's largest exporters of low added value crude oil, to transform itself into a major importer of refined oil, notably gasoline and diesel, of much higher added value. In other words, less money is earned by exporting crude oil and more money is spent on importing fine oil. From everything, therefore, one can see the need for carrying out academic studies that make it possible to understand the complexity of the new world order in the field of energy and its impacts on national life. (GÓES, 2021, p. XXI).

carry out their maritime trade, which, in turn, corresponds to more than 90% of all the foreign trade of Brazil.

Here is the record of one more example, which reinforces the importance of the idea of a strategic nucleus as the founding base of the National Security Strategy of Brazil. In this sense, it is important to assess whether it is still worth insisting on the reconstruction of some Brazilian strategic centers, deconstructed, that were aligned with the Washington Consensus.

The question that is being formulated is to know what were the consequences for the Brazilian State to uncritically follow the rules of the neoliberal epistemological project of the Washington Consensus? The creator of the Washington Consensus himself, John Williamson, responds:

We can also discuss privatization. Once again, the economic literature had come to the conclusion that in general privatization brought net benefits, mainly by increasing the quality and coverage of the services provided. However, we know that in Latin America privatization is very unpopular. I think we don't fully understand this phenomenon, but it may be partly a reflection of the belief that in some cases the privatization process was corrupt, and partly also a reflection of the lack of a **modern regulatory system for non-competitive industries**. (KUCZYNSKI; WILLIAMSON, 2003, p. 6) (our griffin).

Despite the advances brought about by the process of privatization in various sectors of the fatherland economy, the fact is that several strategic centers were naively deconstructed, when in truth they should have taken advantage of to integrate themselves into the global chains that were formed at that exact moment of liberal globalization. Brazil lacked a modern regulatory system for non-competitive industries, as the creator of the Washington Consensus rightly pointed out.

In simple terms, Brazil chose to destroy certain strategic nuclei, instead of including them in the global chains when they began to be born.

Here is the relevance of the debate around the reindustrialization of Brazil, within a process of internationalization of private and state-owned Brazilian companies, endowing them with international competitiveness so as to keep them in the global chain of capitalist production. What is more, the Ukrainian War brings an entire process of reorganization of global value chains, which evidently opens up a new opportunity for the international insertion of Brazil in the new world context.

The question is whether or not it is worth insisting on the strategic control of the State in this process of intensifying commercial and technological relations on a world scale? As a typical example of this type of questioning, one can cite

the reindustrialization of fertilizers in the country or the very regulatory landmark of the pre-salt layer that fixes a minimum percentage of national content in the activities of this region, or even the resumption of the national manufacture of semiconductors.

From everything, therefore, it can be seen that one of the great challenges of the Brazilian strategist of the 21st century is to promote the revaluation of national industry, expanding productive investments in the country, without, however, violating the dictates of the Democratic State of Law and without violating the international rules of free trade.

This means to say that the formulation of the regulatory landmarks of national economic life (laws that regulate transport, industry, commerce, the exploitation of the pre-salt layer, the generation and distribution of energy, Brazilian biodiversity, health and basic sanitation, etc.) must take into consideration this reorganization of global value chains, thus guaranteeing national development.

Note, with the necessary scientific acuity, that, often, the modifications of these regulatory landmarks in the Global South Countries are made to meet the interests of the multinational companies of the world's centers of power.

As Italian author Natalino Irti rightly points out, analyzing the correlations between the deregulatory forces of economics, technology and law:

[...] [rich-country] companies, facing the market for legal systems, choose the most advantageous and convenient legal system [in the countries of the world's periphery]. The "legal where" is determined by the companies [of the hegemonic powers], which can easily multiply it or adjust it. (IRTI, 2007, p. 6).

Hence the importance of a reflection purposefully committed to understanding the relations between global strategies of dominant powers and national legal orders on the periphery of the world system. Strictly speaking, it is multinational companies that shape the world order under the protection of their respective national states.

It is therefore urgent to formulate a National Security Strategy, genuinely Brazilian and with the capacity to promote the export of goods of higher added value, thus making possible the expansion of the country's strategic core of industrialization and, in its wake, guaranteeing the essential core of dignified life for the Brazilian man.

As already seen, the Brazilian strategic nucleus represents the set of Brazilian companies that are found in global value chains and not as mere consumer markets. The figure below summarizes this idea.



Table 2 – Expansion of the Brazilian Strategies Centers



Source: THE AUTHOR, 2022.

It is in this tuning fork that the country strategist is urged to understand the post-coronavirus/post-war world of Ukraine, which will experience the geopolitical dispute between China and the United States for global leadership. What is more, in the midst of all this, the legitimate aspiration for the national development of the late modernizing countries of the Global South. In this context, the expansion of the so-called “Brazilian strategic nucleus” becomes the fundamental basis of the development of the country and, as a consequence, of the National Security Strategy.

Taking into consideration the geopolitical realities that are binding on Brazil in the world scenario, which place it as an energy, food, aquifer and green power, it is up to the country’s strategist to promote the reindustrialization of large and new strategic centers, which cannot be confused with the much proclaimed “national champions”, associated with systemic corruption and the allocation of benefits to companies in collusion with the government.

In short, Brazilian geopolitical projection cannot give up the consolidation of genuinely national companies that have the capacity to compete internationally with the other poles of global power.

#### 4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present study initially sought to analyze the systematic construction of the National Security Strategy, notably the models of the United States and China, in order to develop a comparative picture with the Brazilian reality.

Thus, the nodal question that was imposed was to know to what extent the formulation or the absence of a National Security Strategy, here envisioned as the Great Strategy, impacts the international projection of a country within the contemporary international context? Such a type of conceptual analysis is relevant within the scope of the comparative examination, since it has evidenced the reflections of the *US National Security Strategy* in relation to the rest of the world, such is in essence the genesis of its construction.

Indeed, the *US National Security Strategy (NSS)*, since the end of the Eurocentric world in 1945, has transcended the scope of its simple nationality to shape the global geopolitical order. It is Biden's own Interim Strategy that emphasizes that "the United States must renew its advantages so that we can meet today's challenges from a position of strength. We will better rebuild our economic bases; we will regain our place in international institutions; we will build our values at home and defend them around the world; we will modernize our military capabilities, leading first with diplomacy; and we will revitalize the unparalleled network of alliances and partnerships. Today, more than ever, America's destiny is inextricably linked to events beyond our shores" (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2021).

Biden's interim *National Security Strategy (NSS)* therefore seeks to rescue the leadership of neoliberal globalization, while maintaining economic protectionism and trade war against China, repatriating domestic industry, without relinquishing the world's openness of trade to other countries.

On the other hand, China's Strategy for a New Age highlights that today's world is undergoing profound changes not seen in a century. As economic globalization, the information society and cultural diversification develop in an increasingly multipolar world, peace, development and win-win cooperation remain the irreversible trends of the times. In addition, the China Strategy highlights as its main objectives in this new world era, among others, the ability to: safeguard people's security and social stability; oppose and contain "Taiwan's independence"; repress proponents of separatist movements such as "Tibet's independence" and the creation of "Eastern Turkistan"; safeguard China's maritime rights and interests; and support the sustainable development of the country. (CHINA, 2019).

From everything one can see, therefore, that the geopolitical game of the countries of late modernity is not simple, as is the case of Brazil: if they automatically align themselves with the world powers, they will probably be obliged to accept the simple role of exporters of commodities. On the other hand, if they reject the

major multilateral trade opening agreements, they could be cut off from the largest consumer markets on the planet.

Furthermore, one has to recognize that there are those who believe that Brazil's international projection should be done starting from the opening up of the national economy, without any kind of protection for the Brazilian strategic centers. For others, however, the Brazilian projection should be conceived as a result of the integration of these strategic centers into global production chains.

In other words, they defend the idea that Brazil cannot occupy the inferior position of being a mere consumer market in certain sectors of the world economy.

Thus, it remained demonstrated that Brazilian geopolitical projection cannot give up the consolidation of genuinely national companies that have the capacity to compete internationally with the other poles of global power. Finally, it is up to the country strategist to unveil the advantages and disadvantages of the expansion of the Brazilian strategic nucleus, identifying whether or not it is worth strengthening the national industry and the internationalization of Brazilian companies, endowing them with international competitiveness so as to keep them in the transnational chain of capitalist production. This is the basis for a possible National Security Strategy.

It is therefore urgent to examine the regulatory frameworks of national policy pertaining to national development (policies of industrial development, policies of development of the defense industrial base, policies of strengthening agribusiness etc.).

In this sense, the question that imposes itself for the Great Brazilian Strategy is to assess whether it is worthwhile to insist on the reconstruction or maintenance of the Brazilian strategic nucleus, strengthening national industry and the internationalization of private Brazilian companies, endowing them with international competitiveness so as to keep them in the transnational chain of capitalist production.

It was in this tuning fork, which stood out that the statesman/legislator of the country had to rethink a new paradigm of the state, now considering new forms of international relations and new formulas for interpreting the Constitution. The solution envisioned will have to give priority to the expansion of the Brazilian strategic nucleus, as a set of autonomous economic and technological segments capable of participating effectively in international competition.

At the turn of the 20th century to the 21st century, the achievement of the great categorical imperative of Brazilian geopolitics will be the great reminder of happy times in the meeting of the guarantee of the essential core of a dignified life for all Brazilians with the expansion of the strategic core of the large Brazilian multinational companies.

This is the only way to overcome the cycle of the periphery, placing Brazil among the top five world powers.

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## THE EASTERN FLANK OF BRAZIL'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: the Security Challenge of the South Atlantic and the Coast of Africa

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### ABSTRACT

At the time of Brazil's independence in 1822, the South Atlantic and the African coast were vital for national security, but later lost relevance. However, some time ago the analysis of Brazil's Strategic Surroundings began to consider the configuration of an eastern flank, made up of the South Atlantic Ocean, as well as the West African coast. The extroversion of the Brazilian economy, the identification of off-shore natural resources (especially oil) and the growing presence of extra-regional players, like China, in the area studied, gave substance to the theme in its security dimension. Although the South Atlantic is not the most strategically relevant maritime space, its importance is growing rapidly. Thus, the chapter seeks to analyze the Chinese, American and British presence, which is already a feature of a heated dispute, in a scenario of concern for Brazil and the countries of the region, associated in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS).

*Keywords: Strategic environment; South Atlantic; South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS).*

*O FLANCO LESTE DO ENTORNO ESTRATÉGICO DO BRASIL: o desafio securitário do Atlântico Sul e do litoral da África*

### RESUMO

*Na época da independência do Brasil, em 1822, o Atlântico Sul e o litoral africano eram vitais para a segurança nacional, mas depois perderam relevância. Todavia, há algum tempo a análise do Entorno Estratégico do Brasil passou a considerar a configuração de um flanco oriental, constituído pelo Oceano Atlântico Sul, bem como pelo litoral ocidental africano. A extroversão da economia brasileira, a identificação de recursos naturais off-shore (especialmente petróleo) e a crescente presença de atores extrarregionais, como a China, na área estudada, deram substância ao tema em sua dimensão securitária. Embora o Atlântico Sul não seja o espaço marítimo mais relevante estrategicamente, sua importância cresce rapidamente. Assim, o capítulo*

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*busca analisar a presença chinesa, norte-americana e britânica, que já caracteriza uma disputa acirrada, em um cenário de preocupação para o Brasil e os países da região, associados na Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS).*

*Palavras-chave: Entorno estratégico; Atlântico Sul; Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS).*

### *LA FLANCA ORIENTAL DE LA ENTORNO ESTRATÉGICO DE BRASIL: el desafío de la seguridad del Atlántico Sur y la costa de África*

#### **RESUMEN**

*En el momento de la independencia de Brasil, en 1822, el Atlántico Sur y la costa africana eran vitales para la seguridad nacional, pero después perdieron relevancia. Sin embargo, desde hace algún tiempo el análisis del Documento Estratégico del Brasil comenzó a considerar la configuración de un flanco oriental, compuesto por el Océano Atlántico Sur, así como la costa occidental de África. La extroversión de la economía brasileña, la identificación de los recursos naturales mar adentro (especialmente el petróleo) y la creciente presencia de actores extrarregionales, como China, en la zona estudiada, dieron sustancia al tema en su dimensión de seguridad. Aunque el Atlántico Sur no es el espacio marítimo más estratégicamente relevante, su importancia está creciendo rápidamente. Así, el capítulo busca analizar la presencia china, norteamericana y británica, que ya caracteriza una dura disputa, en un escenario de preocupación para Brasil y los países de la región, asociados en la Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur (ZOPACAS).*

*Palabras clave: Entorno estratégico; Atlántico Sur; Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur (ZOPAACAS).*

#### **1 INTRODUCTION**

The role of the South Atlantic and the African coast, in the period of independence (1822) and the following decades, was relevant in terms of defense (threat of European powers) and trade (especially slave trade). Almost all communication with the regions of the country took place by sea and there was a political movement for the belonging of Angola to Brazil, which was vetoed by the British. However, in the second half of the 19th century, the situation changed and lost relevance to the security of Brazil. However, in recent years, the concept of Brazilian Strategic Surroundings has come to give greater attention to this region. While in the past the debate was only speculative, there are already concrete elements underpinning the analyzes, due to the new geopolitical and economic importance of these, as well as the growing interest of extra-regional powers in the area. Such developments are independent of the Brazilian will and can no longer be neglected in terms of defense planning and scenario analysis.



The growing development of Asia and the BRICS and the rapidly growing population from Africa to South Asia, and the global consumption of goods and food have an immediate impact on the reordering of international flows and the race for natural resources. In relation to this last point, the oceans represent an area of growing importance, with oil/gas, minerals and fishing, as well as military relevance, within a framework of geopolitical redefinition. Amongst the Oceans, even though it is not the most quantitatively impacted, the South Atlantic gains geopolitical importance at an accelerated pace, constituting a sort of a strategic flank.

## **2 NEW AXES OF WORLD POWER**

To analyze the projection of powers in a given region it is necessary, first, to understand the strategies, perceptions and global cleavages of the powers. In the measurement of world power, the great and medium powers are identified and classified hierarchically. The criteria used for this are, however, limited and are predominantly based on quantitative elements. They generally take into account the geographical area of the country, its natural riches (agricultural and mineral), the weight of its economy (in general total and per capita GDP) and the size and structure of its population. Geopolitical position, membership of influential international organizations (G-7, OCDE, NATO, CSONU), political and institutional stability and, last but not least, the size and quality of the Armed Forces are also considered. These items are quantified and tabulated, producing a ranking of powers and, from there, a series of strategic reflections and geopolitical scenarios.

They undoubtedly deal with basic elements, but the way they are articulated and their relative importance must be related to other qualitative elements. In the first place, there is the historical evolution (each nation-state has its specific characteristics), the level of social and economic development, the degree of articulation of the ruling elites, the existence of a national project, the international connections and the positioning in the global economic and political-military system, among others.

A country may possess significant military power and a large economy, but it may also find itself in decline by a transformation in the world economy and by the emergence of challenging poles of power. Moreover, despite having a strong economy and quantitative military capability, it sometimes has sovereignty limitations, which make it difficult to convert these elements into an effective instrument of action. Tabulation of material elements of power can thus lead to an erroneous statistical conception and an erroneous strategic appreciation. In addition, the explanatory paradigms and the international reality became fluid with the end of the Cold War. What was already complicated in a phase of recognized leadership and hegemony in the framework of a transitional phase may be even more complex and uncertain.

Rather than ideological or geopolitical rivalries, what counts is the political and economic position that countries occupy in the world power structure. In this context, the first group of contemporary international politics groups together in the Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and, tangentially, Israel. These are the hegemonic nations that hold military, diplomatic, financial, technological, shared intelligence and communications resources. Being in the post-industrial rentist phase, it lives off the resources of the other nations, employing for that purpose the aforementioned means.

The UKUSA (United Kingdom and United States of America) agreement, established in the second half of the 1940s between Washington and London, gave rise to the Echelon Espionage electronic intelligence and espionage system, known as such in the 1980s. This system, based in England, collects, processes and shares information among the countries that make up the Five Eyes: the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Previously focused on military issues against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, it included industrial and political espionage in the 1980s, including with respect to allies in NATO in the European Union, as denounced in the European Parliament in 2000.

The second is the developed industrial axis of the European Union, Japan and the Asian Tigers. Also with a productive and advanced industrial capitalism and high standard of living of its populations, it differs from the former, since this group lacks traditional power resources, such as the military, and full sovereignty. They were protected during the Cold War, but today the situation is uncertain and tensions with the former are growing. Much of what happens depends on the political attitude to be adopted by the relevant Axis nations, such as Germany and Japan, the defeated ones of the Second World War. The French case is emblematic, since, among the countries on this axis, it holds a unique position: nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which has a network of bases around the world and an independent technology and aerospace industry. With Germany it forms the hard core of the European Union, but since the 1970s it seems immersed in a crisis of strategic identity, following erratic and "schizophrenic" policies.

The third consists of the emerging heterodox industrial axis, integrated by the major BRICS nations, especially China and Russia, as well as Turkey and Iran, where power structures and state participation in the economy are relevant. It is what is called a semi-periphery. Like the previous one, its immediate and priority objective is to avoid an armed conflict of global dimensions and maintain its economic development. With the resources to defend themselves, they are unable to project power on a planetary scale and depend, to a certain extent, on the attitude that may come to be adopted by the second axis. Brazil and South Africa seem to be absorbed by their domestic political agendas and are seeking to redefine their regional and global position.

Finally, the fourth is the agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral axis, integrated by the medium and small nations of Latin America, Africa and geographical Asia (which includes the Middle East). Together, they have abundant human, agricultural or mineral resources (including energy). However, they do not have the necessary military capacity or diplomatic articulation, tending to act in a fragmented manner and constituting an area in dispute for the other axes. This phenomenon is exacerbated by internal instability in several areas, which makes it difficult to adopt a more objective and sustainable strategy.

### **3 THE NEW SOUTH ATLANTIC GEOPOLITICS**

European expansion, through the emergence of Naval Powers and their Maritime Empires, positioned the Oceans at the center of world politics in the 16th century. In terms of Doctrine, the “natural” conception of the Dutchman Hugo Grotius (*Mare Liberum*, 1609), of broad freedom of action at sea and defended by the Thalassocracies, was shocked with the more restrictive of the Englishman John Selden (*Mare Clausum*, 1635). The former suffocated the latter for three centuries, until the years 1958-60, when the horizontal dimension of the seas gave way to the vertical dimension, with the valorization of living natural resources and minerals. The race for control of the seas by states was disciplined legally by the Montego May Conference (CARACAS, 1974-84). But the application of justice in the open sea, besides being difficult, was complicated by industrial and population expansion, opening up a new field of international diplomatic, economic and military dispute (LOUCHET, 2018, p. 10).

The South Atlantic was, in the 17th century, more important than the North Atlantic, but was relegated to a strategically secondary place, which was aggravated by the opening of the Suez and Panama canals. The maritime connections between the western (Europe and North America) and eastern (North Africa and Asia) parts of the Northern Hemisphere continue to be the densest. In the 1970s, they were minimal in the South Atlantic, but what can be observed is that this Ocean, on its two shores (the third being Antarctica), in connection with the North Atlantic and in passages to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, is acquiring global strategic importance.

The increase in the size of the cargo ships (oil tankers and containers) and their number make the Suez and Panama canals less attractive, making the Southern Route increasingly exploited. In addition, the economic and demographic growth of Africa and South America since the beginning of the 21st century imply the accelerated growth of intra-regional trade flows or of export and import from the region to other continents. Alongside the greater horizontal importance of the South Atlantic Ocean, there was a sudden increase in its vertical relevance. The discovery of new gas and oil deposits on the African and South American shores

generates prosperity, external greed and problems. There is also an increase in fishing activities and the existence of potentially exploitable mineral resources.

It can be added that there is a “third coast” south-atlantic, Antarctica, which, besides the aforementioned items, constitutes an immense reservoir of fresh water. Antarctica, given its specific legal status, represents a source of disputes involving extra-regional powers. Furthermore, there is the passage to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in their geopolitical space, and the frozen continent should be computed within the strategic environment of Brazil.

Europe has a great interest in the South Atlantic Basin, especially Portugal and France, because they were colonial powers in the region. Similarly, the United Kingdom, despite seeking a low profile, constitutes an effective presence in the region, with a necklace of islands and vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Finally, the proposal for an Atlantic Community (merging the strategic scenario of the North Atlantic with the South) shows American interest and the possible expansion (formal or informal) of NATO to the South. This is largely due to a perceived threat to the growing Chinese and, very secondarily, Russian projection. All of these situations give this region, which is the core of the Brazilian Strategic Neighborhood, a new Geopolitical dimension.

#### **4 NEW ACTORS IN THE REGION: CHINA AND RUSSIA**

Chinese, including naval, presence is increasing and gaining density, while Russian is still limited and sporadic, with greater interest in the Indian Ocean. China has a Grand Strategy, including a naval one, which has already reached a global projection, analyzed in detail in another article of the project. Although China is opposed to Brazil, the region is increasingly relevant to its interests. Its presence is multifaceted, with economic, diplomatic and security dimensions, taking advantage of every space in which its influence can be expanded without generating conflicts. China's economic-diplomatic projection to Africa is very large, and is being followed by the military, especially naval. China has resources and strategy for the expansion of its armada, which occurs at a fast pace, although it still lacks experience.

With a strong presence in African countries (already connected by OBOR<sup>1</sup>) and on its Atlantic coast, China considered Latin America an area of American influence and respected this geopolitical reality. After the economic crisis caused by the subprime in 2008, the Chinese presence has grown in the American continent, which has immense natural resources. With difficulties in the balance of payments and lack of investments, Latin American countries have found in the Chinese connection if not a solution, at least an economic relief. Although China does not engage in domestic political affairs, this situation generates a considerable shift

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1 Development corridor One Belt, One Road, or “belt”.

in the strategic map, which gives logic to the reactive policy of the Donald Trump administration.

Chinese interests grow rapidly across the Western Hemisphere, from Greenland to Argentina, often focusing on countries most in need of foreign aid. The case of Uruguay is exemplary, having already had incidents with Chinese fishing boats in neighboring Brazilian territorial waters. It should be noted that China has a very articulate project of political and economic power and resources to accomplish it, but it is important to point out that its project is not that of a “dominant superpower”. She suffers from the German syndrome, that is, the fear that her ascension will provoke a war that will interrupt her, as happened with Germany in the two World Wars. The problem is that China still has the largest population in the world, and the weight and speed of its development cause an imbalance of world power. Especially now that it has reached the technological stage, the high point of which is 5G, not to mention the technologies in traditional areas.

And this weight and pace are being accompanied by rapid progress in the Defense area, including aviation. Her main interest is to keep the supply corridors close to her territory open, but as her economy becomes globalized, she seeks out naval footholds and her fleets economically explore the World Ocean. Although the Silk Road provides a way to connect overland with South Asia, the Middle East and Europe, Africa and Latin America represent new spaces for economic projection, for which it needs naval power. The result is a new dual geopolitical and strategic phenomenon: the reconstruction of Eurasian land connections prior to the 15th century, while an Earth Empire begins to become, also a Maritime Empire.

Russia’s presence is more fragmented and reactive, as the country lacks the resources to project power into the South Atlantic region. But oil and minerals are of interest to him, as well as the sale of armaments. There, in cases like Venezuela, Russia asserts its interests, and it should be stressed that this country is no longer “purely state” as it was in the USSR. The concentration of power in Vladimir Putin is more symptomatic of fragility than strength, due to the low level of institutionalization of the Russian Federation. There are private and corporate interests with their own international agendas that associate themselves with the State when necessary, which does not obey the national geopolitical logic.

Even with limitations such as a GDP equivalent to Spain’s, but with a population 3.5 times larger, and a vast territory to be defended, Russia tries to build a naval power. It is limited for budgetary reasons and for technical weaknesses, as can be seen in fires with the Carrier *Kusnetsov* (December 2019). What research has shown is that the South Atlantic has no priority for Russia (but in Africa the presence is growing), but the country also wishes to

have a naval presence, perhaps to bargain other issues with the US, such as anti-missile treaties. The case is different from China, whose military spending increased 130% in a decade, reaching 250 billion dollars. Although they are well below the US (650 billion), it is larger than those of the UK, France and Russia combined (EL PAÍS, 28 Dec. 2019, based on SIPRI/Stockholm).

## **5 THE RENEWAL OF FORMER ACTORS**

With the advent of the European Union's economic and political crisis, Portugal is increasingly valuing the South Atlantic and is trying to present itself as a privileged interlocutor for the EU and also as a member of NATO. However, this may represent a space of action for the Brazilian Navy, through the deepening of cooperation with the Portuguese Navy. Special care must be taken in relation to the silent presence of the United Kingdom, which is expanding airports (Saint Helena Island and Ascension) as well as strengthening its military presence.

There is an increase in insecurity (piracy, illegal fishing, terrorism, drug trafficking, people and weapons) and increased "veiled" insecurity of the South Atlantic countries' sovereignty over their newly discovered strategic natural resources. The South Atlantic, which has always been the most peaceful of the oceans, becomes an important flank of the global strategic dispute between Western countries (USA, France, UK) and China (with Russia as a supporting player).

On the US presence in the region, it should be noted that, in the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, the naval strategy for the South Atlantic has not been substantially changed, remaining focused on the following themes: protecting international trade and shipping, ensuring energy security and combating transnational organized crime. The political and institutional structure responsible for the implementation of the US strategy in the Gulf of Guinea region includes AFRICOM (2007), AFS (2007) and the proposal of the Atlantic Community, as well as the reactivation of the IV Fleet (the South Atlantic component of the US naval forces) in 2008. All the mechanisms mentioned seek to build cooperative relations with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, but they were also thought out so that, in an eventual situation of conflict or strong instability in the region, the USA has the capacity to act promptly - which demands a constant presence on the continent. Most African countries are strongly opposed to such a presence.

It should be noted that the Atlantic Community differs from the other initiatives, as it seeks to consolidate an indirect US presence in the region.

This recent change in American posture is due to the transformations that the International System has been going through. The main focus came to be Asia-Pacific as its strategic priority, i.e. the space where its forces would

concentrate would be in the vicinity of China. This arrangement under North American leadership aims to establish a common regional vision of security. However, it is interesting to point out that this extension of the range of activities would comply with the intention of the USA to “outsource” to other allies direct control and action, acting as supervisor of this task. The idea that NATO, as an institutional structure, should be extended to the South Atlantic seems unlikely, although there are actions to “show the flag”, as other extra-regional actors do.

## **6 AFRICA’S ROLE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE**

The security threats in the Gulf of Guinea represent more the effects of the weakness of the states in the region than a major strategic game, but, of course, there is no room for vacuum. Local, private, criminal and extra-regional interests occupy uncontrolled spaces, as the continued discovery of oil and gas deposits in the region reinforces ambitions. On the South American shore, the Atlantic Ocean also becomes a source of energy resources (pre-salt deposits) and animals, but the situation is less unstable, despite strategic vacillations and lack of resources for Defense.

Demographic issues are vital for the analysis of the strategic scenario, because while the South American population is entering a stagnation phase, in Africa there is a high birth rate, a high rate of economically active population and growing migratory flows, including transatlantic ones. By 2050, the population of sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to double, with Nigeria, Angola, DR. Congo, Tanzania and Ethiopia surpassing the Brazilian population by 2100 (UN/WORLD POPULATION REPORT, 2019). So on our shores there will be plenty of mineral, agricultural and water resources, while on the other shores there will be an immense population. One of the consequences is that nations like Angola and Nigeria will become regional leaders.

Not only will the emergence of new African regional powers and the presence of economic giants such as China, with corresponding military interests, be a matter of concern to those who formulate the Defense Strategy, but the possible regional instability on the other side requires serious attention. Relatively fragile countries, with huge populations and some strategic resources, will seek extra-regional alliances. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Africa has become an area of international strategic dispute, a New Economic Frontier, which will shape a new geopolitical dimension to the South Atlantic Ocean. Getting to know Africa well and to be present there is of the greatest interest to Brazil. Without the support of states across the ocean, any South Atlantic Defense strategy will be doomed to failure, increasing our national vulnerability.

## **7 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES FOR A MARITIME REGIONAL ORDER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC/ ZOPACAS**

Although they do not always talk in an explicit manner, Diplomacy and the Defense of Brazil have, historically, converged on some points in defense of national interest at critical moments. The main one is the explicit position of preventing extra-regional powers from projecting power to their strategic environment. It is a question of avoiding the militarization of the region, which could bring problematic or dangerous results for Brazil. As far as Defense in particular is concerned, the deterrence strategy has proved to be a vital tool, but it can no longer function in an individualized way. A regional strategy must be drawn up which integrates the coastal states on both sides of the South Atlantic in a common approach to the defense of sovereignty, peace and development. To this end, the relationship with Africa is indispensable.

According to French Admiral (retired) Jean Dufourcq, modern maritime responsibilities “must be a combination between the defense of one’s country’s interests and international responsibilities” (2011, p. 260). For him, maritime areas resemble cyber and monetary spaces, which are indispensable for human activity and development in the new century. However, as such, they are not spaces that can be permanently populated or occupied. Generally, control is weak or even nonexistent in these spaces, evidencing the vulnerability of the sovereignty of coastal countries. For Nigerian academic Paul Adogambe, “the South Atlantic needs a new maritime security and governance architecture to develop coastal surveillance and satellite technology to exploit [its vastness]. It also needs the communication networks to monitor and detect illegal activities, as well as the capacity to deal with them effectively.” (2019, p.34)

As far as the Navy is concerned, Brazil has relevant diplomatic and deterrent resources. One of them is military and diplomatic cooperation with African and South American nations, through the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) initiative. Although it has remained “dormant” for some periods, it represents a privileged institutional tool for the elaboration of a strategy of deterrence. It is not necessary to start a new negotiation, all that is needed is political will, and, currently, the relevant players are the Armed Forces and the Itamaraty. The current Brazilian agreements to revive ZOPACAS represent an action of great strategic importance. The permanent dialogue with the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOPs) also needs to be better explored, as does the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), of which Brazil and Portugal are also members.

A relevant issue is that, as in other historical moments, the rivalry of great powers in our strategic surroundings sounded like an alarm for the formulation of defense policies. On all these occasions, Brazil has sought to exploit the



situation as an effective form of bargaining, avoiding rushed alignments and disregarding pressures to position itself. By facing the challenges posed by the Chinese (and very peripheral, Russian) presence in its strategic surroundings, the Brazilian state and society have the opportunity to analyze, formulate a strategy and implement public policies to solve a set of problems.

The issue of migration, for example, has been dealt with in a fanciful way, especially if we consider that even the rapidly expanding African countries have already started a movement towards Brazil. Climate imbalances (perhaps it is too hasty to talk about changes), tend to aggravate the situation. Transnational crimes, for their part, have not received due attention, and new phenomena, such as the oil spill on the high seas, which hit an immense part of the Brazilian coastline, show that threats can arise from where they are least expected. And that the country does not yet have the necessary response capacity.

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## INDEPENDENCE OF BRAZIL, MODERN ART WEEK AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE AS IDENTITY STATEMENTS OF THE NATION

In the two hundred years of independence, the Brazilian State has undergone profound changes, many of them generated by the actions of its Armed Forces. It was alongside the cavalry soldiers of his guard of honor that Dom Pedro I, encouraged directly by his wife Leopoldina, declared the Independence of Brazil on September 7, 1822. The Armed Forces, by taking care of our borders and protecting them from possible invasions, solidified the national independence, the unity of the State and the integrity of the Brazilian Territory. Our forum deals with issues that are intertwined with the identity and sovereignty of Brazil.

Brazil's independence, like that of so many other subjugated spaces, however, did not symbolize the end of historical colonialism, but the beginning of a coloniality. Even with the end of colonialism, coloniality - the unequal side of modernity, as attested to by the two sociologists who took part in the Modernity/ Coloniality/ Decoloniality (MCD) group: the Peruvian Anibal Quijano and the Portuguese Boaventura de Sousa Santos - continued throughout the former colonies, preserving the logic existing between the explorer and the exploited as far as power, being and knowledge, in short: the essence of life and the culture of the repressed people is concerned. It is not uncommon that, within the very ambit of nation-states, this relationship between those with privileges and the peripherals persists. Eduardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas (2010), in their text *Inflexión decolonial: fuentes, conceptos y cuestionamientos*, ratify that the continuous process of decoloniality is intensified by the naturalization of territorial, racial, cultural, gender and epistemic hierarchies. It should be pointed out that, with all the adversities arising from profoundly unequal cultural contacts, in which one culture manages to impose itself on another, there is some transformative exchange, albeit in an unequal manner.

The article by Lourdes Belchior and Mary Del Priore emphasizes that few characters in the history of Brazil captivate more than Leopoldina, the first wife of D. Pedro I. Her story is not about a young woman who lived quietly next to a prince. Her trajectory was that of a strong woman who adhered with perseverance to the emancipationist cause and who allowed herself to be imbued by the Brazilianness of a people who welcomed her as an authentic Brazilian: by duty, by habit, and by affection, as the press recorded (IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL, 1826), even though she was a foreigner, coming from Austria. Having access to Leopoldina's history makes it possible to give voice to countless women of her time who, with political enthusiasm, recognized in her an example of leadership to be followed in the context of Independence, as recorded in various historical sources (O ESPELHO, 1822).

The second article of this forum turns on the lights of the Municipal Theater of São Paulo and revisits the event that took place there in commemoration of

the centenary of the Independence of Brazil. The Modern Art Week occurred, in a conscious manner, on the centenary of Independence (1922) as one of the commemorative events that proclaimed the liberation of Brazilian culture through the arts and had a character of rupture with the past cultural standards, mainly the literary ones coming from Parnassianism, Decadentism and Symbolism. The modernists of 1922, according to Alfredo Bosi (1995), widened their horizons beyond the temporal limits of the Week, made criticisms of the colonial mental structures of the old generations and valued the ideals of the so-called pre-modernists, whose works penetrate deep into the cultures coming from Brazilian reality. They are, amongst others: Euclides da Cunha, João Ribeiro, Lima Barreto and Graça Aranha - the latter already a reference of Brazilian Literature. Besides the literary discourse (Mario de Andrade, Oswald de Andrade, Cassiano Ricardo and Pliny Salgado, Menotti del Picchia, Alcântara Machado, Raul Bopp and other names), more artistic manifestations such as theater, painting, music, sculpture were represented: Guiomar Novaes, Heitor Villa-Lobos, Yvonne Daumerie, Anita Malfatti, Di Cavalcanti, Tarsila do Amaral, Patricia Galvão (Pagu), Victor Brecheret, Blaise Cendrars, who tuned their ideas to this outpouring of the new and new it breaks the past linked to influences from outside.

It was not a São Paulo movement, centered on the land of drizzle due to political-economic circumstances, but spread throughout Brazil, and brought together Gilberto Freire, Manuel Bandeira, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda and other names that are preserved in the panel of culture emanating from the masters and slaves, from Pasárgada, from the roses of the people and from the roots of Brazil. These languages are capable of expressing the Brazilian spirit, representative of various ethnicities, of cultural spaces from the center and from the periphery, amalgamating the classic and the popular, the academic talk with the accents of other Brazils as yet unknown. It was a multiple movement, bringing together in one and the same place liberals, leftists, sympathizers with fascism: all contaminated, even in a contradictory manner, by the Eurocentric vision of the vanguards, coming from the post-World War I context, and with the impulse of integrating the whipping culture of the identity of the Brazilian people.

At the same time as the modernists of 1922 drew on the European Vanguards, they criticized them, repudiating the Eurocentric model and acclimatizing it to the tropical air, to our reality. Everything was new, it lacked assimilation and Brazilianess. We were living with the ruins of the First World War and the evils of it. The crackdowns of the so-called *Belle Époque* revealed "a time of contradictions, in which peace and war, optimism and disillusionment, life and death seemed to walk side by side, in a constant threat of abrupt alteration of the established order" (SILVA, 2006, p. 16). It was a time of progress that contrasted with misery.

In the same year of the Week, from September 7, 1922 until the year 1923, the Exhibition in Rio, which presented to the world a modern Brazil, in harmony

with the advances of science and industry: a postcard; however, it left uncovered a Brazil with problems of misery and prejudices that persist until today, in the year of the bicentenary. The money consumed to hold the event generated criticism from many sectors, as proven by newspapers of the time.

Unlike the International Exhibition, the Week of 1922, despite some negative appreciations, was/is acclaimed by historians, critics, writers and thinkers as the beginning of the Brazilian imagination reflected in a multicultural mirror: a refounding milestone of our culture / our people.

As we conclude our forum, the Portuguese language is on the agenda. To this end, Luís Antônio is revisiting the text of the modernist Mário de Andrade entitled “*Gramatiquinha*”, *genuinely Brazilian*, interrupted by his death. According to Marcelo Rocha Barros Gonçalves, Andrade’s proposal “was to produce a grammar that would, in fact, take into account information specifically from Portuguese in Brazil” (2021). There is then in Luiz Antonio’s text a feeling of decoloniality of the National Portuguese Language itself, with similarities and differences in the language of the former metropolis. This is also what can be seen in the results of the study on the development of the mastery of the written language among secondary school pupils presented here in the article. The conflicting relationship between written Portuguese and everyday oral Portuguese, in its most varied dialectal expressions, is analogous to the other cultural and artistic relations in post-colonial Brazil that are among the most prominent aspects of modernist aesthetics: legitimizing and merging the country’s cultures and languages. In the words of Silviano Santiago, “The hybrid element reigns. Latin America’s greatest contribution to Western culture comes from the systematic destruction of the concepts of unity and purity” (SANTIAGO, 2019, p. 29).

These strands, crisscrossed by the figure of the Empress Leopoldina, of the Week of 22, and of the Portuguese language with a national identity, deserve scientific articles with approaches about these two centuries of independence and those that are in the coming centenary in 2122. The future’s texture is based on authority with threads that unfold from the past and prospective visions, notably marked with the ongoing scientific-technological evolution that accelerates the pace of transformations.

Maria Célia Barbosa Reis da Silva  
Guest Editor

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## BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW POLITICAL PRINCIPLES: dilemmas of Leopoldina, the Princess of Independence

Lourdes de Almeida Barreto Belchior\*

Mary Del Priore\*\*

### ABSTRACT

Carolina Josefa Leopoldina was the daughter of Maria Theresa of Naples-Sicily and Francisco I, Emperor of Austria. Her family was recognized as one of the most conservative and powerful in Europe. By being part of the coalition that defeated Napoleon Bonaparte (1815), Leopoldina's father became the leader of the Holy Alliance, a military congregation whose aim was to curb subversive movements influenced by liberalism. Married to D. Pedro, since 1817, Leopoldina would witness the consequences of the Liberal Revolution of Porto (1820) in Brazil, where several provinces expressed support for the movement that brought with it liberal values. To understand how this young nobleman traveled through this moment allows one to access the specifics of her political thinking and her influence in unleashing the facts that would lead Brazil to its separation from Portugal.

**Keywords:** Leopoldina; Independence of Brazil; Absolutism; Liberalism.

*ENTRE ANTIGOS E NOVOS PRINCÍPIOS POLÍTICOS: dilemas de Leopoldina, a Princesa da Independência*

### RESUMO

*Carolina Josefa Leopoldina era filha de Maria Teresa de Nápoles-Sicília e Francisco I, Imperador da Áustria. Sua família era reconhecida como uma das mais conservadoras e poderosas da Europa. Ao fazer parte da coligação que*

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*derrotou Napoleão Bonaparte (1815), o pai de Leopoldina se tornou o líder da Santa Aliança, uma congregação militar cujo objetivo era coibir movimentos subversivos influenciados pelo liberalismo. Casada com D. Pedro, desde 1817, Leopoldina presenciaria as consequências da Revolução Liberal do Porto (1820) no Brasil, onde diversas províncias manifestaram apoio ao movimento que trazia consigo valores liberais. Entender como essa jovem nobre trafegou por esse momento permite acessar especificidades do seu pensamento político e sua influência no desencadear dos fatos que conduziria o Brasil à sua separação de Portugal.*

*Palavras-chave: Leopoldina; Independência do Brasil; Absolutismo; Liberalismo.*

*ENTRE PRINCIPIOS POLÍTICOS ANTIGUOS Y NUEVOS: dilemas de Leopoldina, la Princesa de la Independencia*

**RESUMEN**

*Carolina Josefa Leopoldina fue hija de María Teresa de Nápoles-Sicilia y Francisco I, emperador de Austria. Su familia fue reconocida como una de las más conservadoras y poderosas de Europa. Al formar parte de la coalición que derrotó a Napoleón Bonaparte (1815), el padre de Leopoldina se convirtió en el líder de la Santa Alianza, una congregación militar cuyo objetivo era frenar los movimientos subversivos influidos por el liberalismo. Casada con Don Pedro, desde 1817, Leopoldina fue testigo de las consecuencias de la Revolución Liberal de Oporto (1820) en Brasil, donde varias provincias mostraron su apoyo al movimiento que trajo consigo valores liberales. Entender cómo viajó este joven noble para este momento permite acceder a las especificidades de su pensamiento político y su influencia en desatar los hechos que llevarían a Brasil a su separación de Portugal.*

*Palabras clave: Leopoldina; independencia de Brasil; absolutismo; liberalismo.*

**1 INTRODUCTION**

Many are the qualities directed to Empress Leopoldina, the first wife of D. Pedro I and also the first ruler of independent Brazil. Nowadays, her participation in the process of independence is gaining increasing notoriety in historiography and the media, without, however, losing sight of the sufferings experienced by her, on account of her marriage with a coarse and libertine Portuguese Prince<sup>1</sup>. It is also

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1 According to contemporary accounts, as recorded by the German Carl Seidler (1939), D. Pedro I was hostile to his wife, giving her uncordial treatment. Seidler also recorded that the Prince's extramarital affairs were known at court. Accounts such as that left by the foreigner are used in several biographies about Leopoldina, demonstrating the hardships she experienced in the marital sphere.

possible to find narratives that travel between valuing her attributes as a good wife and her intelligence<sup>2</sup>.

In the midst of a vast possibility of glances, the fact that Leopoldina belonged to one of the most powerful and conservative families in Europe, the Habsburgs, often goes unnoticed. His mother was Maria Theresa of Naples-Sicily and his father was Francisco I, Emperor of Austria who, after defeating Napoleon Bonaparte (1815) alongside a military coalition composed of kingdoms such as Prussia and Russia, became leader of the Holy Alliance<sup>3</sup> and the Congress of Vienna, thus one of the most powerful men of the time.

On the European stage, Leopoldina's kingdom was considered the heart of the old world, a model of a kingdom in which the perception of rulers by the "will of God" was present. Because they were faithful to various values of the Ancien Régime, they were contrary to changes that might upset the logic of absolutist politics, which included the rupture between colonies and metropolises. From this perspective, Leopoldina can also be understood, in the context of independence, as a woman who had to adapt, not only to the climate and the culture of her new kingdom, Brazil, but also to a new political reality that rowed against the values in which she had been educated.

In order to understand her history from this point of view, it is necessary to understand some moments before her marriage, when she was still an Austrian Archduchess who only knew Brazil through the reports of travelers<sup>4</sup>.

Archduchess Leopoldina Josefa Carolina was born on 22 January 1797, at a time marked by movements contrary to centralized monarchies, with a tendency to sacralize power and repulse popular sovereignty. This was the case of the Portuguese and Austrian monarchy.

In the same period of Leopoldina's birth, Europe had witnessed events that would forever mark the continent's history: the Independence of English colonies in America (1776) showing the European world that colonies could separate from their metropolises, and the French Revolution (1789) signaling that the old order,

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2 Maria Graham (1980), preceptor of Princess Maria da Glória, Leopoldina's first daughter, recorded in her diary that the Empress of Brazil was a kind woman, cultured and admired by her subjects. Graham's perception is confirmed by other accounts of the time and contributes to an understanding of the relationship that existed between Graham and society that was contemporary to him.

3 Following the definition given by Eric Hobsbawm in his work: *The Age of Revolutions* (2009), the Holy Alliance can be understood as a military congregation composed of the powers Austria, Prussia and Russia, with the aim of avoiding and curbing the formation of subversive and revolutionary movements opposed to the monarchical restoration, after the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte.

4 There are some correspondences written by Leopoldina (2006) to her sister, in October 1816, in which the Archduchess reports knowing some specificities of Brazil, through the reading of descriptions made by several travelers.

marked by feudal privileges, could be altered. These events broke political and social links, characteristic of the Old Regime.

These two events had a complex of ideas in common: liberalism<sup>5</sup>, whose best known and feared advocate of the time was Napoleon, a French military man who became Emperor of France and dreamed of resurrecting “an imperial Rome” under his rule (LIMA, 2006, p.36).

Even though Napoleon’s liberal ideals were admired by many Europeans, who even drew from this source of knowledge in several universities, he was never fully accepted by the Portuguese and the Austrians, after all, his liberalism took power from the Absolutist State and the Church, institutions intimately linked to the history of these states. In his quest for French hegemony, Napoleon became the main enemy of Leopoldina and D. Pedro II. The two courts had their routines altered by the advance and successive victories of the French Army.

Each of these monarchies would undertake actions to alleviate the losses suffered. While D. João, father of D. Pedro, transmigrated his family and court to Brazil in 1808, avoiding the humiliation of being deposed by Napoleon, as had happened with the King of Spain; Francisco I, father of Leopoldina, in 1797, signed the Treaty of Campoformino, giving up part of the territory of his kingdom to France and, years later, married his daughter Maria Luisa to the enemy, in 1810.

Both sovereigns understood such attitudes as political maneuvers in favor of the maintenance of their monarchies and, in this sense, succeeded. At the end of the war, D. João suffered no direct confrontation with the enemy, and Francisco I, despite attitudes that demonstrated a desire for peace, militarily defeated Napoleon’s armies. From this context Austria would have high status on the European stage, making Leopoldina perceived as the daughter of a great emperor.

In the cultural logic of the Ancien Régime, when a prince or princess was united by marriage to a prominent monarchy, the bond was seen as a reason for pride and, because they were linked to pacts between states, was always surrounded by various interests.

The marriage between D. Pedro and Leopoldina would not escape the rule. It was of interest to the Portuguese government to maintain diplomatic relations with the Austrian Empire that, at the time, held the reins of European politics, as recalled by Arno Wehling (1997). Besides, being linked to a kingdom whose monarch was

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5 According to the Dictionary of Concepts of Kalina Vanderlei Silva and Maciel Henrique Silva (2017), the Liberalism that emerged in the eighteenth century through the Enlightenment can be understood, amid a vast possibility of understandings, as: a complex of historically constructed ideas and practices, whose objective was the secularization of the State and specialization of politics, aiming to divide power, removing from the hands of the sovereign the exclusivity in managing it. With the advent of the Revolutions, liberalism came to be understood as a regime guaranteeing the freedom to own private property and individual guarantees.

the leader of the Holy Alliance was synonymous of status, as recalls Luís Cláudio Villafane G. Santos (2002).

In the case of Austria, it was positive to be linked to the only reigning monarchy in America, a continent that housed several republican nations, whose governments criticized absolutism. In addition, Brazil meant lucrative commercial possibilities (RAMIREZ, 1968). It is worth mentioning that the Austrian Government had a frank interest in enriching the collections of the Natural History Museum of its kingdom, sending to Brazil a scientific mission made up of natural science scholars, together with the entourage of the Archduchess (PRANTNER, 1997). It is important to point out that the nineteenth century was marked by the appreciation and the search for new scientific discoveries and in this sense Brazil was an unknown for a large part of Europe, which called it the New World (GAZETA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, August 23, 1817).

After the end of the marriage negotiations, D. João, through a speech (CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, July 19, 1817), informed society that his son would marry the daughter of the powerful Emperor of Austria. As it turned out, the information had been published by all the Brazilian newspapers that circulated at the time: the *Correio Braziliense* (1808-1822), the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro* (1808-1822) and the *Idade D'Ouro do Brasil* (1811-1823). Even in the case of a society whose majority of the population was illiterate, the texts read gained space in the oral tradition, assisting in the circulation of information.

On November 6, 1817, Leopoldina landed in Brazil. Accounts of the time, such as that of the painter Jean-Baptiste Debret (2006) and of the memorialist aulico Luiz Gonçalves dos Santos (1977) give the dimension of the majestic ceremonial prepared to receive it in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Through these testimonies, it is apparent that the population, the Church and the government have spared no effort to make a good impression. According to historian Maria de Lourdes Viana Lyra (2016), it was the first time that the Rio court had crawled into a big party.

In all, Leopoldina would live in Brazil for nine years, from 1817 to 1826. In the meantime, she became the mother of six princes born in Brazilian territory<sup>6</sup>. This would make this young Austrian girl admired by many as the mother of the Brazilian Princes (ESPELHO, February 21, 1823) and Princess whose fertility ensured the continuity of the royal family on the throne (DEL PRIORE, 2014).

In tropical lands, the Archduchess would experience moments considered milestones in Brazil's history, such as the King's return to Portugal (April 25, 1821), Fico Day (January 9, 1822), and the acclamation of Pedro as Protector and Perpetual Defender of Brazil (May 13, 1822). It can be said that all these events correlated directly with the Porto Liberal Revolution, an event that took place in Portugal in

6 Children of Leopoldina and Pedro I: Maria da Glória (1819-1853), João Carlos (1821-1822), Januária (1822-1897), Paula Mariana (1823-1833), Francisca Carolina (1824-1898), Pedro II (1825-1891).

August 1820.

Motivated by liberal values, which Leopoldina's father was against, the participants in the Revolution demanded changes in the Portuguese Monarchy, which at the time was in Brazil. For them, such a regime should cease to be absolutist, to become constitutional. They advocated that the King should follow laws drawn up by an assembly, as well as all of society.

The outbreak of this movement was motivated by the crisis that had installed itself in Portugal, following the so-called Napoleonic Wars, at the beginning of the 19th century. On that occasion, the Portuguese Government put into practice an old plan of transfer from the Court to the New World, as Norton (2008) recalls. From that moment on, Brazil transformed itself into the epicenter of the Empire, while Portugal came to be administered by English authorities, after the expulsion of the French army.

Discontented with this reality, the rebels demanded an end to English rule over the administration of the kingdom and its political reorganization. Victorious, at the end of 1820: "They decided to convene the Cortes, to be elected throughout the Portuguese world [...]" (BORIS, 2002, p. 71), which included Brazil, which since 1815 had been elevated to the status of United Kingdom.

As expected, the establishment of a liberal monarchy caused fear in Leopoldina, as being the daughter of Francisco I, she considered such ideas an insult to the Holy Alliance. Furthermore, having spent part of his youth in the midst of a context marked by wars against Napoleon and his liberalism, he perceived this reality as a threat to order.

Increasing his concerns further, D. Pedro began to show sympathy for liberalism. Aflita, Leopoldina wrote to her sister telling her: "my husband thinks according to the new principles and my father-in-law according to the good and true [...]" (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 372)". Her writing shows that she considered her father-in-law's conservative thinking to be correct. On the same day, on December 20, 1820, he would tell his father: "[...] the ugly ghost of the spirit of freedom took possession of the soul of my husband completely" (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p.373), and continued his missive stating "[...] how difficult my situation is between the duties of good and loving wife, valiant subject and obedient daughter" [...] "I wanted both to unite and obey strictly, but I am forced to sacrifice one of the two when the delegation from Lisbon arrives." (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p.373). Excerpts such as those cited reveal that Leopoldina's political thought was not dissociated from her condition as a daughter of Emperor Francisco I.

The scenario would get even worse. Groups from several Brazilian provinces began to show support for the movement, even in Rio de Janeiro, where D. João VI had to swear to comply with the Constitution that was to be drawn up in Portugal, before a convulsed crowd, on February 26, 1821. The event marked the entry of D. Pedro in the Brazilian political scene, since he repeated the oath next to his father

(LUSTOSA, 2006). Leopoldina referred to the moment as an unpleasant situation, caused by the spirit of freedom (2006).

From its inception, starting with the Enlightenment, liberalism assumed varied nuances. In this sense, the liberal thinking embraced by the Brazilian elites had its contradictory side, since it did not penetrate into themes correlated with slavery and the landed estates. Generally, its orbit revolved around themes that opposed the absolute power of the King.

The contrast with liberal values was also noticeable in the anti-liberal stance of Portuguese politicians towards Brazil. By means of several authoritarian decisions, such as the withdrawal of administrative freedom from Brazil and the return of the Royal Family to Portugal, the political distancing between the two kingdoms was becoming more and more latent.

## **2 LEOPOLDINA: CRAFTSMAN OF THE CONTEXT THAT HERALDED BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENCE**

From the beginning of the Oporto Revolution to the departure of D. João to Portugal, Leopoldina would go through the gestation and birth of Prince João Carlos, her first son. João VI, who had never hidden his desire to remain in Rio de Janeiro, a city in which he had perfectly acclimated himself, used the young woman's pregnancy as an argument to postpone his departure. The above can be seen in one of the letters of the Secretary of State, sent to Portugal, dated February 28, 1821 (CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, edition number 26, 1821). In the document, the monarch stated that he would only return to Europe after Leopoldina's birth, projecting it into the political situation that would lead Brazil to its independence.

In this context, it should be noted that, there were speeches that suggested that D. Pedro should return to Portugal in place of his father, leaving Leopoldina in Brazil, since the Princess was pregnant and it was feared that childbirth might occur during the trip. Dissatisfied with the possibility of staying in American lands without her husband, Leopoldina took the reins of the situation and, in March 1821, she would write to her father telling him that they were trying to separate her from her husband (LEOPOLDINA, 2006). In addition, she threatened the representative of Austria, Baron Von Stürmer and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Count of Palmela, saying that they would know her wrath (NORTON, 2008), should they contribute to the departure of D. Pedro, without it. According to the report of the Minister in question, the Prince was willing to return to Europe, but changed his mind in the face of his wife's tenacity (CASSOTTI, 2015). Leopoldina's obstinacy influenced the decision-making of D. João, who decided to return to Portugal, leaving the young couple in Brazil (MECK, 2008).

As from June 1821, it was already possible to find signs that Leopoldina had embraced the defense of the maintenance of Brazilian autonomy, with vigor, in the face of the oppression of the Courts. Certainly, she realized that, by supporting the



emancipationist cause, she would be optimizing the monarchy's permanence in the tropics and, by effect, the power in the hands of her family. Such a change can be seen in the tenor of some correspondence: on 7 June 1821, for example, she told her father that she remained loyal to Austrian principles (LEOPOLDINA, 2006), that is, faithful to traditional politics. Days later, on June 9, she began to show greater complicity with the Brazilians who defended the administrative maintenance of the kingdom: "Brazilians are good and calm heads, Portuguese troops are animated by the worst spirit" (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 381), "the people and army of Brazil are excellent and faithful subjects [...]" (LEOPOLDINA, p. 382). Her missive reveals that antilusitanism gained strength in her thoughts, as the policy emanating from Portugal showed its authoritarian face. On July 2, 1821, she would signal to her sister Maria Luisa: "Brazil is, in every respect, a country so mature and important, that it is unconditionally necessary to maintain it" (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 383).

Being a legitimate Habsburg, Leopoldina knew of its importance in consolidating the policy of the Holy Alliance in America. However, by standing up against the Portuguese troops and valuing Brazil as "a mature and important country" understanding the need to "maintain it", it contradicted part of the conservative principles and accepted points of liberalism, from the moment that it valued Brazil's freedom, in the face of the political oppression of Portugal. It should be pointed out that, no matter how much Brazil had already been elevated to the condition of the United Kingdom to Portugal and Algarve in 1815, the King had already returned to Portugal, therefore it was from there that the main political power of the Portuguese Empire emanated.

In December 1821, one of the decrees promulgated by the Cortes arrived in Rio de Janeiro, ordering the immediate return of the Prince and his family to Portugal (DOLHNIKOFF, 2017). The news caused concern, since the return of the young man signaled to part of the Brazilian elite, linked to agriculture and commerce, that the privileges conquered since 1808 could be withdrawn, which included slave trafficking. Measures already existed that required the transfer of the main offices in Brazil to Lisbon. These groups mobilized themselves for the Prince to remain on Brazilian soil, after all he represented the power of his father, and therefore the maintenance of everything that the King had granted. Without it, the kingdom would be "orphaned" by a command of its own and legitimized, returning to being a colony. The efforts to ensure that D. Pedro remaining in America gave rise to the famous "Dia do fico" - Fico Day-, for example.

It should be noted that, before returning to Portugal, D. João had decreed that D. Pedro would assume the political power of Brazil as Regent and, should his son die, Leopoldina would rule in his place, along with a ministry (GAZETA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, edition of April 26, 1821). Therefore, there was already a power structure centered on the figure of the Prince that guaranteed the permanence of the ordinances implemented by the father.

In this context, some of Leopoldina's letters attest that she embraced the idea of remaining in Brazil before her husband. Her positioning is visible in some messages sent to friend Schäuffer: "I was amazed when I saw my husband suddenly appear last night. He is better disposed towards Brazilians than I expected, but not as positively decided as I would wish." (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 389). In another correspondence, I would conclude: "The Prince is decided, but not as much as he would wish [...]. It has been hard for me to achieve all this - I would only wish to instill a firmer decision." (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 389).

The days that followed D. Pedro's decision to remain in Brazil were accompanied by moments of much tension, which involved clashes with Portuguese officialdom, refusal to comply with orders coming from Portugal, threats of a forced shipment, Leopoldina's flight to Santa Cruz and the death of Prince João Carlos, shortly after his return to Rio de Janeiro, on 4 February 1822. The premature death of the child inflamed, even more, the tempers of part of society against Portuguese interests and helped to consolidate the image of Leopoldina as responsible for the political directions of Brazil (REVERBERO: CONSTITUCIONAL FLUMINENSE, edition of February 12, 1822).

By mid-1822, it was already possible to envision D. Pedro's political drive to contain separatist movements and to garner support from important and sectarian men of the Monarchy. It is worth remembering that the union of the provinces around the power that emanated from Rio de Janeiro, with the Portuguese Prince as a prominent figure, was never consensual. On the contrary, fierce clashes occurred in several regions of Brazil, such as Bahia, Maranhão and Pará, in the name of fidelity to the Portuguese Government. There were also groups that advocated the establishment of a Dual Monarchy, and even a republican system.

In this context, on August 13, 1822, D. Pedro would travel to São Paulo in order to appease political rivalries. Before traveling, he appointed Leopoldina President of the Council of Ministers, providing her with political powers in his absence. (BRASIL, 1891). At the head of the Regency, her political actions would not go unnoticed. As an example, a group of ladies from Bahia would honor her by handing her a manifesto in gratitude for the support she had given to the Prince's stay in America<sup>7</sup>.

The political situation in which Brazil found itself caused concern to the Princess. At all times, news reports stated about a possible attack by Portuguese troops on Brazil and about the outbreak of rebellions in several provinces. Faced with this reality, on September 2, 1822, Leopoldina met at the Palace of São Cristóvão with the Council of State under her presidency (OBERACKER JR, 1973). During the meeting, they decided that the best path to be followed was separation from Portugal. Leopoldina signed the Council's deliberation. Days later, on September

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7 The manifesto can be read in the pages of the newspaper *O Espelho*, edition of August 24, 1822. Available in: <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/700916/82>. Accessed on: June 1. 2019.

7, when he was returning from Santos, D. Pedro received a dispatch containing letters and official documents. One of the correspondence was from Leopoldina. She informed him about the latest events and asked for an opinion in favor of Independence. She obtained from her husband the position she longed for.

Months after the Grito do Ipiranga, Leopoldina (2006) would inform her father that the Independence of Brazil occurred to push away the republican ideas of the kingdom. In addition, she began to act as a mediator in the recognition of the country as an independent territory on the world stage: "It is my duty to play the role of intercessor of the noble Brazilian people [...]" (LEOPOLDINA, 2006, p. 417).

It is quite true that 7 September 1822 did not in itself mean the birth of a cohesive country. On the contrary, after him, several conflicts occurred, denouncing the existence of other political projects for the Brazilian State. However, the above does not diminish the importance of this reigning woman who, with her statesmanship, had a decisive role in the process that would lead Brazil to its independence, even though it was shrouded by old and new political principles, which were in conflict with each other.

### 3 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It cannot be denied that the main character of this article realized the course that liberalism could take in Brazil. In many nations, he had promoted the growth of ideas contrary to monarchical logic, even stimulating the implantation of republics. This reality could be seen in Spanish America, in which various countries became independent following the primer of republicanism.

Always loyal to the principles of the monarchical State, Leopoldina realized that the antagonism and the political rupture between Brazil and Portugal did not mean the end of the Monarchy; on the contrary, in a continent marked by nascent republics, the permanence of the monarchy strengthened this form of government in America. Seen from this angle, Leopoldina can be perceived as an important figure in the defense of counter-revolutionary thinking in the so-called New World, even when she accepted certain points of liberalism.

It is added that, by embracing the ideas that were supreme for Brazilian autonomy, by imposing her will to stay in Brazil alongside D. Pedro and by acting diplomatically for Brazil to be recognized as an independent country, Leopoldina had gone beyond the role that was usually directed towards the Princesses: that of being a daughter, mother and wife.

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## 2022: the Political Emancipation of Brazil (1822) and The Beginning of the Liberation of the Eurocentric model in the Arts and Literature (1922)

Maria Célia Barbosa Reis da Silva\*

We have the right to be equal when our difference makes us inferior; and we have the right to be different when our equality mischaracterizes us. Hence the need for equality that recognizes differences and for a difference that does not produce, feed or reproduce inequalities.

Boaventura de Souza Santos

### ABSTRACT

This text intends to throw light on the Modern Art Week, which took place in the year of the centenary of independence, an artistic-cultural demonstration that took place at the Municipal Theater of São Paulo, a temple of European art frequented by the elite. This Week was marked by the contradictions of its participants, beginning with its patron Paulo Silva Prado, heir of an important family from São Paulo, with a ballast in business linked to coffee growing and to investment in the banking, industrial and real estate sectors. The writers and artists who participated in the Week flirted with fascist, socialist and anarchist ideologies, but had in common the desire to revise Brazilian culture and identity in the national bias, recovering our roots. The article also seeks to foster a dialog between the centenary of the Week of 1922 and the bicentenary of the Independence of Brazil and to provoke reflections about the political emancipation of Brazil, observed as a process in movement, since the commands of the rich and the elite favor, in part, the idle, whose gains, in the past, come from slaves and today from the excluded who struggle to survive in spite of adversity.

**Keywords:** Independence; Modern Art Week; nationality; culture; contrasts

*2022: a emancipação política do Brasil (1822) e o início de libertação do modelo eurocêntrico nas artes e na literatura (1922)*

### RESUMO

*Este texto pretende lançar luzes sobre a Semana de Arte Moderna, ocorrida no ano do centenário da independência, manifestação artístico-cultural ocorrida no*

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*Teatro Municipal de São Paulo, templo de arte europeia frequentado pela elite. Essa Semana foi marcada pelas contradições de seus participantes, a começar pelo seu mecenas Paulo Silva Prado, herdeiro de importante família paulistana, com lastro em negócios vinculados à cafeicultura e ao investimento nos setores bancário, industrial e imobiliário. Os escritores e os artistas partícipes da Semana flertavam com ideologias fascistas, socialistas, anarquistas, mas tinham em comum o anseio de rever a cultura e a identidade brasileira no viés nacional, recuperando nossas raízes. El artículo también pretende establecer un diálogo entre el centenario de la Semana de 1922 y el bicentenario de la Independencia de Brasil, y provocar una reflexión sobre la emancipación política de Brasil, vista como un proceso en transformación, ya que los mandatos de los ricos y de la élite privilegian, en parte, a los ociosos, cuyos ingresos en el pasado provenían de los esclavos, y hoy a los excluidos, que luchan por sobrevivir a pesar de la adversidad.*

*Palavras-chave: Independência; Semana de Arte Moderna; nacionalidade; cultura; contrastes*

*2022: la emancipación política del Brasil (1822) y el comienzo de la liberación del modelo eurocéntrico en las artes y la literatura (1922)*

## **RESUMEN**

*Este texto pretende arrojar luz sobre la Semana del Arte Moderno, que tuvo lugar en el año del centenario de la independencia, manifestación artística y cultural que ocurrió en el Teatro Municipal de São Paulo, un templo del arte europeo frecuentado por la élite. Esta Semana estuvo marcada por las contradicciones de sus participantes, empezando por su patrocinador Paulo Silva Prado, heredero de la importante familia de São Paulo, con un balasto en el negocio vinculado al cultivo de café y a la inversión en los sectores bancario, industrial e inmobiliario. Los escritores y artistas de Semana coquetearon con ideologías fascistas, socialistas y anarquistas, pero tenían en común el deseo de revisar la cultura e identidad brasileñas a nivel nacional, recuperando nuestras raíces. El artículo también busca generar un diálogo entre el centenario de la Semana de 1922 con el bicentenario de la Independencia de Brasil y provocar reflexiones sobre la emancipación política de Brasil, observada como un proceso en movimiento, ya que los rebaños de los ricos y de la élite favorecen, en parte, a los ociosos, cuyos logros, en el pasado, vienen de los esclavos y hoy de los excluidos que luchan por sobrevivir a pesar de los versos de adadadaddenda.*

*Palabras clave: Independencia; Semana de Arte Moderna; Nacionalidad; Cultura; Contrastes*

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The Week of Modern Art, which took place between February 13 and 17, 1922, in São Paulo, was - and still is - an extremely important event for the history



of art and for Brazil itself, which can be understood through art. After experiencing the excitement of the new art proposals, exhibited and encouraged in the Week of 1922, after the untimely period of destruction of the previous canons, comes the phase of putting into practice the proposals of the event: the heroic phase from 1922 to 1930.

The event of February 1922 took place in the Old Republic (Republic of Coffee with Milk, from 1889 until 1930) on a march towards modernity. This event begins its pollination with works such as: the exhibition by Lasar Segal (1913) and Anita Malfatti (1917); with the participation of Ronald de Carvalho in the launch in Rio de Janeiro of the magazine *Orfeu*, directed in Portugal by Fernando Pessoa and Mário de Sá-Carneiro and, a little earlier, with the literature of Lima Barreto and other pre-modernists. The official apogee of Modernism occurs with the events of the Week at the Municipal Theater. The city of São Paulo was the propitious stage as a consequence of the First World War (1914-1918), which made the importation of manufactured products difficult and, as a consequence, stimulated the development of the industrial sector.

The event of 1922 proclaimed in a festive and noisy manner the cultural independence of Brazil. Its creators proposed a separation of the artistic traditions that used to be based on European aesthetic creations. Parnassianism and symbolism dominated the cultural environment of the time. With the objective of breaking with this past dynamic, of rigorous metrics, of elaborate vocabulary and distant from spoken language, there was in the majority of the members of the Week of 1922 an insistence on creating a properly national artistic awareness of the recovery of culture and language emanated from the daily life of the people. These artists aspired to transgress and overcome the themes and forms that permeated the art/culture produced until then, of a Eurocentric model:

The debate about “Brazilian identity” and “Brazil’s place in the concert of nations” arose at the end of the empire, and grew between the late 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century. In it the European models of civilization and culture set the tone; our intellectuals mirrored the fashionable theories in Europe, considered the supreme of Western civilization. (NAPOLITANO, 2016, p. 42).

Culture, originating from the canon of national identity, exposes the contradictions of the Modern Art Week (1922) that accelerates the process of decoloniality, promoting cultural independence: the attempt to absorb from Europe only what could be acclimatized to the underside of the Brazilian Equator (JÚNIOR LAUERHASS; NAVA, 2003), which meant the freedom of the colonizer and, consequently, of the continent where the metropolis was seated spatially and ideologically. In Brazil, independence linked to the imperial monarchy maintained

Portuguese and European ties. Independence had to happen and, by the surrounding examples, it should be by D. Pedro I, who would maintain the link with Portugal. According to Lilia Schwarcz and Heloisa Starling, the vision of the local elites approved of the figure of a king so that this immense country would not break up and the natural flow would point to D. Pedro I. The bonds remained transparent:

But the new monarch continued to be Portuguese of origin, and the symbols of the fatherland, equally. Suffice it to recall the colors and the shield of royalty that remained on the national flag [at the time], or the well-disposed serape on the scepter - an ancient symbol of the Braganças, it represented a kind of winged dragon and symbolized the strength of the dynasty. (SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2015 p. 225).

And, after the independence and the consecration of D. Pedro as Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of Brazil, in October 1822, the tempers calmed down. The spontaneous and mutual sympathy between the Austrian wife of the emperor and the Brazilian subjects had greatly aided the independence process. The time she spent in Brazil made Leopoldina, with all the differences brought about in her original baggage, integrate herself with the Brazilians, appreciating and valuing the local culture.

Let's go back to the Municipal Theater, in February 1922. Many actors coming from various arts and sectors integrated with the presence or sending of support and/or material - the case of the poem *Os Sapos* (The Frogs), by Manuel Bandeira, which causes great rebound when read performatively on the second day of the event that shook the foundations of art in Brazil. Villa-Lobos' outfit also stands out, as it enters the stage in a coat with slippers and with an umbrella. The reasons for foot trouble, no one wanted to know, is the exotic, the legend. Many other members of the Week of 1922 deserved boos, shouts and applause - reactions desired by the modernists themselves. The spotlight at the time and afterwards is cast over Mário and Oswald de Andrade, whose works, a hundred years later, still instigate all sorts of writings.

So many modernists mixed in their works what, up until then, under the academic aegis of the Eurocentric standard, were not reconcilable, they were part of a false axiom based on dichotomies. The new emerged to frighten, but also to sharpen the search for paths more in tune with the recent changes brought about at the dawn of the twentieth century: the new technologies, the process of industrialization, the European vanguards, the new means of locomotion, the quake occasioned by the First World War (1914-1918), perhaps, heralding a mutant century, accelerated, marked by unforeseen compasses. While the Andrades marked literature, Paulo Prado and Graça Aranha celebrated the emblematic Week with their already consecrated names.

The forum format of this publication does not give voice and time to all who composed the symphony of the week of Modern Art - both those who participated directly or indirectly, but also those from other Brazilian regions, far away from the metropolises of the southeast, who, even before the event, embroidered with their instruments and cultural experiences, an identity map, multifaceted and particular of Brazil. Our motto is to present its relevance and its contradictions in the centenary of the Week (1922) and in the year of the bicentenary of Independence (2022). The dates of political independence and cultural independence, roughly speaking, mark two moments away from the Eurocentric model, the basis of Western civilization.

## **2 THE PRECURSORS AND HEIRS OF THE WEEK OF MODERN ART : CONTRIBUTIONS**

The accuracy of the date does not match historical-artistic events, we have no mastery of cultural production in a country with the dimension of Brazil, even more so before the galaxy of the internet (CASTELS, 2003). The ideas of the week, spread through travel, correspondence, exhibitions, book launches, literary festivals, reached many regions of the country.

There are announcing proofs that a new look towards the interior, towards the periphery, towards other corners of Brazil, had already been registered by some actors before or concomitant with modernism: Euclides da Cunha, Lima Barreto, João Fernandes, Luís da Câmara Cascudo and others. Many like Carlos Drummond, Pedro Nava are not exhibited in the window displays of the Week of 1922, but were later recalled and incorporated into the movement. Others are being rediscovered by the scholars of the Modern Art Week. There are those that were arriving after the Week, those of the modernist generations to come that have widened paths that end up in the now under construction.

The people who frequented the backstage of the Week lived in the southeastern metropolis circuit, mainly São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The conductors of this agitated spectacle knew the airs of the European vanguards, but repudiated the imported novelty: they wanted a literary-artistic-cultural product marked by national identity, by characters and lines that also came from the people, of ordinary scenes, captured from the streets, theaters of daily life. The modernists, in their majority, preached the free will of creation. The meeting of classical, modern, erudite, popular, the lack of commitment to metrics and versification, the Brazilian babel of languages.

The Week coincides (mere synchrony?) with the year of the Centenary of the Independence of Brazil, and spreads the ideas of the country's revision and the disclosure of the multiple identity of the country. It completes with fanfare what had been cautiously announced in independence. The event of 1922 consolidated other isolated movements manifested in various spaces of Brazil, had the power to

awaken a public accommodated to imported models and to lead to this fraction of society other faces of the Brazilian and of their respective cultures.

Also to the legacy of the modernists, we can add the annotations and catalogings of the Brazilian cultural heritage, a providence taken after the visit of a group of Modernists to the historic cities of Minas Gerais. The works of Antônio Francisco Lisboa, O Aleijadinho, rich in rococo details, impressed the visitors, among them: Tarsila do Amaral, Paulo Prado, Mário and Oswald de Andrade.

The unfolding of this work undertaken by the modernists only happened in the 1930s and still with gaps, as Marcos Paulo de Souza Miranda asserts:

However, with the advent of the Constitution of 1934, thanks to the new thoughts started in the country from the Modern Art Week of 1922, the social function of property was recognized, as well as the duty of the government to adequately protect the cultural goods existing on Brazilian soil, which laid the foundations for the advancement of Brazilian legislation in such area. (MIRANDA, 2022, S.p).

Only three years later, on January 13, 1937, Law no. 378, signed by President Getúlio Vargas, gave new organization to the Ministry of Education and Public Health, instituting the National Historical and Artistic Heritage Service (Sphan) with the purpose of promoting, in the national territory, the conservation and promotion of the country's cultural heritage. The direction of the agency was given to Minas Gerais modernist Rodrigo Melo Franco de Andrade.

### **3 THE DANGER OF A UNIQUE STORY**

The danger of the unique history of a country, whose independence (1822) was caused by the yoke of a Portuguese, in a certain way tied to the metropolis of Portugal, is to provide a reading of one of the sides, therefore that of the colonizers: the Eurocentric version of history. There are terms that are similar, but not equal. The theoretical foundation of our article comes, among other sources, from two authors and their peers with whom we are in dialogue in the process of rethinking our political and cultural history. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (colonialism/ post-colonialism) and Aníbal Quijano (coloniality/ decoloniality) show another story, that of the colonized, retold by those who had their culture submerged by the conqueror. Influences are valid and enrich the cultural fabric, yet a culture, supposedly more developed, cannot crush that of the indigenous. There is no upper or lower culture, there are different cultures.

We are susceptible to the stories we have heard since childhood and which are ratified by the textbooks that tell the so-called official story carved out by the gaze of power. Latin America, Brazil inserted into it, carries a history

of colonization, rooted in a superposition of the so-called European superior culture that plunders, devalues our culture, our roots, our multiplicity. The colonizer, which changes its origin in accordance with the political-economic context, but does not reconsider attitudes towards the so-called peripheral countries, uses pejorative or pseudo-praising predicatives for the autochthonous peoples, and, in the case of Brazil, also for blacks coming from various localities in Africa. In a sensible tone, Nigerian Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie ponders: “This is how to create a unique story: show a people as one thing, one thing only, without stopping, and that is what these people become.” (2019, p. 22). So let us begin with the history of the peoples who lived here before the colonizers arrived here, then let us record the slavery whose traces have to be cleared for the sake of the correctness of the version. This was the reading of some artists, writers and musicians from the Modern Art Week who wanted to think about Brazil, and discuss and reflect on its history, analyzing the consequences of almost four centuries of colonialism and slavery.

The intellectuals who took part in the Week of 1922 looked at the country outside of the imported European model, therefore they have already weaved - without knowing the concepts formulated in the following decades, their weightings supported by two binomial concepts that appear in the 1970s, but which will be conceptualized from the 1980s onwards: colonialism/ post-colonialism and coloniality / decoloniality<sup>1</sup>, sheltered by Cultural Studies that, according to Jamaican Hall, “do not constitute a discipline, but an area where different disciplines interact, with the aim of studying cultural aspects of society” (HALL, 1998, p.47). In this area, therefore, includes the history ignored: that of the colonized, which makes pertinent the interconnection of the theoretical choice with the guiding question of the modernists of 1922 and of a significant part of predecessors and heirs of this Week.

The theoretical path grants the place of speech to the colonized, to those who by empathy see themselves in it and to other heirs of all forms of oppression that remain on the periphery of the narratives. The theories that discuss the revision of the narratives of the conqueror by the conquered are elected in this article, and reflect, in an emancipatory way, the ideas divulged by the majority of the participants of the Modern Art Week. These thinkers / artists share the ideas of Portuguese and Peruvian: voices echoed from colonizing Europe and colonized Latin America, voices that cry out for various versions and that do not believe in the single narrative.

Boaventura (2003) focuses on his country where one of the threads of our cultural fabric emanates: in the world system of the current state of globalization,

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1 The terms arise long after the feeling springs up both in the colonizer who yearns for the domination of the land and the crushing of the subjectivation of the other who lives there, and in the colonized who sees his story told/recorded by a version that is not his own.

Portugal's position is not prominent, it is semi-peripheral. Portuguese colonialism manifests itself in:

[...] hierarchical relations between the various European colonialisms. If specificity is the affirmation of a deviation from a general norm, in this case the norm is given by British colonialism: and in relation to it the - subaltern - profile of Portuguese colonialism is defined. (SANTOS, 2003, p. 24).

In other words, the official history imputes to the Portuguese the "discovery" and the independence of Brazil (the latter encouraged and influenced by the female figure of Leopoldina of Austria). The situation of Portugal at the time of the Great Navigations was, along with Spain, a protagonist, which differs from the condition of Portugal today in Europe. In the days of maritime expansion, there was "the beginning of the history of an empire of gigantic proportions and which, at its zenith, united Asia to America" (SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2015 p. 224). It does, however, partly explain why our history rests on the European subalternity of Portugal, a country with which we have established links of friendship and post-colonial interaction. All these digressions, in fact approximations, explain, in part, the anthropophagic spirit that marks the before and after the Week of 1922. The distances, the approximations, the central and peripheral visions circumvent and form multiculturalism, and leave, in the past and in the today superconnected, vestiges in the colonized peoples and in the colonizers, few are the isolated who fight for the preservation of their original culture.

The colonialism/post-colonialism addressed by Boaventura extends far beyond America, arriving in almost all continents where in some corner the Portuguese language and Portuguese customs demarcated its presence. Sousa Santos belongs to the lineage of the colonizer, including our country, but also absorbs the place of the other of the colonized: of those who retell their history under the eyes of the oppressed of the former Portuguese colonies, and of their own countrymen in relation to Europe.

Bonaventura attests to Portugal's role as a colonizer of conquered lands and peoples and as colonized by the contrasting vision that Northern Europe (England, France and Germany) has of Portugal:

The characteristics with which the Portuguese built, from the fifteenth century onwards, the image of the native peoples of their colonies are very similar to those attributed to themselves, from the same time, by travelers, traders and religious coming from Northern Europe: from underdevelopment to precarious living conditions, from indolence to sensuality, from violence to affability, from lack of hygiene to ignorance, from superstition to irrationality. (SANTOS, 2003, p. 30).

It should be noted that the aforementioned text of Bonaventura endorses the double alternation of the Portuguese colonies, including Brazil, and that of Portugal in relation to the part of Europe.

Aníbal Quijano glimpses Latin America from the singing of its origin and experience. Europe exercises the power of coloniality over the conquered peoples from the image built by it, the other. Our portrait is not made under our gaze, but by the vision of the other who wants us inferior, acculturated, subalternated, subject to easy domination. This power has been prolonged for a long time, and under various shades, it shows that it has been reinvigorated by means of the economy and subsidized by culture: the market makes everything a product, put up for sale, priced/valued by the other. It seems to be a mere repetition, but it is not. They are secular cultures of colonized peoples, which had their roots buried by the ethnocentric vision of the colonizers: religions, clothing, dances, customs, languages were considered smaller, following a subjective qualification, of a Eurocentric model. The colonizers of yesterday and of today, acclimatized to the market, instituted a new hegemonic standard of power, as the Peruvian sociologist reassures us:

On the one hand, the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of race, that is, a supposedly distinct biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority in relation to others. This idea was assumed by the conquistadors as the main constitutive, foundational element of the domination relations that conquest required. On these bases, consequently, the population of America, and later of the world, was classified in this new standard of power. On the other hand, the articulation of all the historical forms of control of work, of its resources and of its products, around capital and the world market. (QUIJANO, 2005, p. 117).

Artisanal products of the original peoples; products of the colonizers made by servile work, poorly paid. It is the continuation of slavery on the cusp of globalization that makes use of the cheap labor of Latin America and of the other peripheral, poor, dominated countries. Serfdom leads a people to a position of inferiority which makes them think, many times, that the identity of those who rule is superior to his. Since then, the composition or recomposition of Latin American identity has been a debate in process on the part of scholars of the coloniality/decoloniality of power. The understanding of the process of coloniality implies the *modus operandi* of the translation of history by the colonized side, by decolonial thinking - a discourse of deconstruction of the standards imposed on the peoples subjugated by the dominators of old, but also updated discourse of decoloniality directed to the new standards imposed by the powerful, the main players of the geopolitical scenario of the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Power flows from all areas and from all fronts. The discourse of identity of Brazil and Latin America needs to be legitimized in favor of our sovereignty, of our identity, of the belief in the power of our knowledge. Brazil takes a significant step with the Modern Art Week of 1922, a non-random step that articulated to coincide with the Independence of Brazil (1822).

#### **4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The research in relation to the Modern Art Week and the cultural developments that came from it are still ongoing and open to (re)visitation. Books, theories, correspondences, periodicals, manifestos, photos, music scores, paintings, sculptures etc. are scattered through libraries, personal archives, exhibitions, films, recordings. This article aims to amalgamate the two moments of independence: political and cultural; and it also intends to sharpen the spirit of researchers about Brazil, its political and cultural independence, inseparable fields. There is no way of exhausting subjects so manifold and eager for debate.

Our cliché of independence, both political and cultural, favored Cultural Studies with a focus on colonization/decolonization and on the intricacies of Eurocentric domination of Latin America called Coloniality/Decoloniality, developed by the group Modernity/Coloniality (M/C) in which so many theorists<sup>2</sup> participated, but which in this article gave space to Peruvian Aníbal Quijano to whom we attributed the protagonism of decolonized Latin American thought.

In the introduction, we explain what led us to the writing of these writings: What is the connection of decolonial thinking to the process of re-reading the political and cultural independence of Brazil still in gestation? We understand that the time has come to give voice and turn to those who have been colonized and whose history and memory underlie hidden by the colonizer's narrative. Still on the trail of decolonial thinking, to recover the praxis capable of making the sovereignty and Brazilian nationality emerge from the entrails of the plurality of our history.

The meaning attributed to the term "decoloniality" or "decolonial thinking" is linked to a configuration of theoretical, fictional and, by historical extension, Latin American production with which we have numerous affinities from the process of Portuguese-Spanish colonization to the economic, intellectual, moral, political, cultural dependency etc. that we aim to untie anthropologically, that is, taking advantage of what we like what may be suitable from the European epistemological matrix to the tropics. Decoloniality is the adaptation of decolonization to the molds of Latin American thought, with which we Brazilians harmonize ourselves, mainly as far as the filter is concerned, so that we must evaluate local identities.

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2 The authors of the group Modernity and / Coloniality have nationality and multifaceted knowledge: Aníbal Quijano, Dussel, Fernando Coronil, Immanuel Wallerstein, Santiago Castro-Gómez, Grosfóguel Ramón, Zulma Palermo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Walter Mignolo.



The story of subjugating defeated peoples did not begin in America, it comes from the dawn of humanity and, unfortunately, it will continue until the utopian respect for the culture of the other becomes an intersubjective and empathetic feeling that goes beyond the barriers of the non-existent ethnic superiority and reaches the stage of assimilation of the culture of the other as part of its own.

The absence of the history of the pre-Columbians, which they themselves told, results in a unique history whose gap is beginning to be filled by the heirs of the native peoples, the current inhabitants of Latin America destined to reconstruct the narrative of decoloniality and to complete the absence of a time that is still lacking, waiting for other voices to recover the voices of the past, a matter of memory to write their history today and tomorrow.

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## IN THE LIGHT OF “GRAMATIQUINHA”: Mário de Andrade’s actuality in teaching mother language 100 years after

Luiz Antonio Gomes Senna\*

### ABSTRACT

In dialogue with the concept of national language in the work of Mário de Andrade, we present an analysis of the social and cultural circumstances that permeate the experience of learning written Portuguese in Brazilian schools, having as object the notion of cultural bilingualism and its relationship with the demand for subjectivation of the universal right to education. The study derives from the observation of facts of written production among school subjects, which justify the overcoming of classical concepts of bilingualism based exclusively on grammatical-functional aspects or on the use of language systems. The article analyzes the tensions in the contact between oral and written Portuguese as derived from historical and cultural aspects of the process of its creation and implementation in the Brazilian territory, resulting in situations of languages in contact that can only be explained by the concept of cultural bilingualism.

**Keywords:** inclusive education; teacher training; literacy and literacy; bilingualism; mother tongue teaching.

*À LUZ DA “GRAMATIQUINHA”: atualidade de Mário de Andrade no ensino de língua materna 100 anos após*

### RESUMO

*Em diálogo com a concepção de língua nacional na obra de Mário de Andrade, apresenta-se uma análise das circunstâncias sociais e culturais que perpassam a experiência de aprendizagem do Português escrito na escola brasileira, tendo por objeto a noção de bilinguismo cultural e sua relação com a demanda por subjetivação do direito universal de educação. O estudo deriva da observação de fatos de produção escrita entre sujeitos escolares, os quais justificam a superação de conceitos clássicos de bilinguismo arrolados exclusivamente a partir de aspectos gramático-funcionais ou de uso dos sistemas linguísticos. O artigo analisa as tensões no contato entre o português oral e o escrito como derivadas de aspectos histórico- culturais oriundos do processo de sua criação e implantação no território*

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*brasileiro, resultando em situações de línguas em contato somente explicáveis a partir do conceito de bilinguismo cultural.*

*Palavras-chave: educação inclusiva; formação de professores; letramento e alfabetização; bilinguismo; ensino de língua materna.*

*A LA LUZ DE "GRAMATIQUINHA": realidade de Mário de Andrade en la enseñanza de su lengua materna 100 años después*

## **RESUMEN**

*En un diálogo con la concepción del idioma nacional en la obra de Mário de Andrade, un análisis de las circunstancias sociales y culturales que atraviesan la experiencia de aprendizaje del portugués escrita en la escuela brasileña, tiene como objeto la noción de bilingüismo cultural y su relación con la demanda del derecho universal subjetivo a la educación. El estudio se deriva de la observación de hechos de producción escrita entre escolares, que justifican la superación de conceptos clásicos de bilingüismo estructurados exclusivamente desde aspectos gramaticales funcionales o el uso de sistemas lingüísticos. El artículo analiza las tensiones en el contacto entre el portugués oral y el escrito, derivadas de aspectos históricos y culturales derivados del proceso de su creación e implantación en el territorio brasileño, lo que resulta en situaciones de contacto lingüístico que sólo se explican a través del concepto de bilingüismo cultural.*

*Palabras clave: educación inclusiva; formación de maestros; alfabetización y alfabetización; bilingüismo; enseñanza de la lengua materna.*

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The training of teachers in the ambit of Brazilian education, or, better to say, of the Brazilian school, since it is in it that education takes shape for the teacher, demands a discourse that integrates in the same order of relevance these three instances: the theory that gives it foundation, the general principles of Education - understood as universal right -, and the formative circumstances that emanate from the different social subjects who seek to become students. More specifically, it is, above all, an inclusive education, which, in the interests of the individual and, therefore, of the individual right, aims to ensure the universality of access to school and quality education. In this regard, the myth of quality education is understood here as an education that provides integration to the practices of citizenship, not to this or that, but to the universe of public life of a society. The underlying subject of this text is the written language in the context of an education program linked to inclusive education and, therefore, to training committed to the quality of teaching.

It is within this context of such an object of interest that Mário de Andrade's vanguard is seen as a source of discussions about the most sensitive theoretical

aspects that give support to teacher training. His pioneering vision of a derived national language in Brazil - today enshrined in the identity of a so-called Brazilian Portuguese- is expressed in a set of unfinished essays that he called his "Gramatiquinha", not in the diminutive for being understood as something minor, but by affective stamp, an esthetic whim with which he reveals his intimacy with that language of a prosaic, spontaneous, unfinished Brazil: "[...] I am aware that one day the grammar of Brazilian Speech will be written<sup>1</sup>[...]" (apud PINTO, 1990 p. 44). And regarding the issue of academic theories and doctrines underlying the description of this national language, Mário brings us considerations that essentially synthesize the still present demand in the training of teachers for the Brazilian school:

[...] we have valuable books such as *A Língua Nacional* by J. Ribeiro, *O Dialeto Caipira* by Amadeu Amaral, which are true invitations to speak Brazilian. But the authors, being idealists and not practical, invite, invite, but they start by not doing what they invite. They didn't have the courage [...] As for the great ones, the ones who know, don't see that they have the courage to sacrifice themselves for the others, do what I say, they are always talking, telling the others to make the language more Brazilian, but they themselves live in the glue of what Figueiredino Chupamel comes to us from the Lisbon grammar" (apud PINTO, 1990, p. 44).

The linguistic experience of the Brazilian people, as well as the example of their cultural experience in all senses, oscillates between the familiar, their oral language, and a written language whose character is neither transparent nor familiar to them. The purpose of this text is to describe and define what is understood by cultural bilingualism and why it constitutes a relevant theoretical contribution to the training of the teacher of basic education. In the interest of demonstrating the fusion of the academic areas impregnated in the concept of cultural bilingualism, this study starts from a broad scenario, anchored in the general principles of education, from which the problem that will follow in discussion along the other stages of the text is extracted: the tension between the universal principle of the right to education and the principle of its subjectivation. In order to demonstrate the costs of social diversity in subjecting the right to the development of full command of the written language, the data and results of a longitudinal survey conducted with students from regular secondary education are presented below. The research concludes that, at the end of basic education, those pupils showed interference from the oral language when using writing, although they had developed throughout their

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1 Mário de Andrade explores different inflectional variations of nominal agreement and verb-nominal in his *Gramatiquinha*; they are here preserved in full.

training the capacity to control other skills of textual production in the field of their semantic organization.

This interference of the oral language in the use of the written language is the motivation for the analysis that, in the sequence of the text, is going to characterize it as a case of cultural bilingualism. This is followed by the argument in favor of the concept of cultural bilingualism, which is defended from the notion of bilingualism as recognition of universal rights to identity, culture and language, and, in parallel, a process of subjectivation. We also analyze the situation of Brazil in the face of, on the one hand, its designation as a monolingual nation and, on the other, the various situations of languages in contact existing in its territory.

Finally, by concluding the study, we analyze the situation of the oral Portuguese of Brazil and of the official language written as a case of cultural bilingualism, then resuming the question that centrally derives from the aesthetic movement of Mário de Andrade. The differences in the process of generation of both linguistic systems and the differences in their cultural character are pointed out, which, together with processes of subjectivation and social resistance, explain the interferences of speech on writing produced by students of basic education.

## **2 EDUCATION AND SUBJECTIVITY**

A fundamental principle guiding this study is the conception of the school education process as a universal, full and inalienable right. However, at the heart of this essential question, the scope of the universal term which, properly speaking, expresses the fundamental meaning of the right to education has yet to be defined. By universal, one understands what is proper to the unlimited, to what therefore does not discriminate this or that, nor does it restrict in degree to that or that. By universal law we mean what is due and proper to humanity, or, in the strictest sense, to the citizen thus recognized by the State. In Brazilian territory, education is governed by a stone clause of the Federal Constitution, defined as a fundamental right, with the objectives of "the full development of the human personality and the preparation for the exercise of citizenship and qualification for work" (BRASIL. 1988). The constitutional principle, as such, abstract, is not guaranteed, however, except by means of its effective subjectivation, as it is defined in the concept of subjective right (cf. SCAFF et al., 2016; DUARTE, 2004).

The subjective law is the concept with which the effective appropriation of the principle of law, or abstract right, is defined. It is the competence of the public power and of the entire organized civil society to assure to each individual the subjectivation of fundamental rights, among which is Education. Herein lies one of the great themes recurrently discussed in Sociology, regarding the tensions between universal right - the abstract principle - and subjective right. It is worth, then, asking ourselves what education the constitutional right refers to and what

“education” the subjective right refers to in the face of a society marked by socio-cultural plurality. Although not expressed in the body of the federal constitution, the universal right to education refers to a concept of formation that prevails in the hegemonic culture in the spheres of a, so called in Miranda (2006), illustrated reason.

The thinkers of the eighteenth century defended the principles of liberty and equality that had great repercussions throughout contemporary history. However, they found themselves faced with a thorny problem: judging the multiple forms of social organization without compromising those supposedly universal principles. To combat injustices, the Lights attempted to define human nature and announce universal rights. However, the illustrated definitions failed to explain certain behaviors, customs, desires and beliefs (MAYER, 1982, p. 11-29). Studying social experiences across the globe, philosophers found diverse forms of religiosity, political systems that denied their ideals of citizenship, manifestations of sexuality and aggressiveness shocking to the Republic of Letters. (MIRANDA, 2006).

To a large extent, the universal right to education provided for in law is closely associated with the right to school education, especially implicit in the strong instrumental nature provided for in its vocation as a training institute for work. There is plenty of literature that problematizes the scope of education subject to the universal right, as in Rodrigues (2001), below:

[...] we can suspect that the mastery of knowledge and skills does not guarantee humanitarian development in the students, because it does not promote, by itself, the ethical formation of the human being. This ethical training is a necessity of the human training process, which cannot be reduced to a simple task of producing, organizing and distributing knowledge and skills. Human formation will only be complete if accompanied by the development of principles of conduct that can be recognized as being of universal validity. (RODRIGUES, 2001).

As a training institute, school education has a fundamental role in the process of subjectivation of the right to education. However, the difference between a universal civilizing process and, in Rodrigues' (2001) terms, the development of principles of conduct that can be recognized as having universal validity, has always been very badly misinterpreted in the school of the Modern Era. In the case of peripheral peoples and nations, as in the case of Latin American countries, the

problem of subjectivation of the right to education becomes more acute in view of the model of subjectivity that was built from all the violence of the colonization process.

Freud had already pointed out flaws and imperfections in the ideals of civilization, making possible the inference of two problems. The first, for the domination of nature: Western culture supported by the instruments of violence and the thesis of Christian-Western morality needed to brutalize, pillage and assault non-Western peoples, ripping them from their roots. For example, there is the atrocious invasion of black Africans, indigenous peoples, Latin Americans and Asians. A kind of violence I call here "civilizational violence." That is, a way of violating other non-Westerners with civilizing and moralizing arguments, such as "saving the black soul from sins." [...] The same happened also, by means of the insufficient and prejudiced descriptions, which tie the African to primitivism and the Oriental to mystery. That is, the non-us need to be subjugated and violated so that they can civilize themselves and therefore emerge from "natural" unhappiness. (DANFA, 2020).

In the context of the efforts to colonize the peoples of the periphery, the school is established between them as an instrument of a civilizing project. Not exactly in the strict sense of the term, that is, as a process of culture development, but as a tool for the creation of subjects subordinate to a certain standard of civility and civility. Consequently, this school is not expected to contribute to the subjectivation of rights, since these peoples are a priori denied subjectivity.

Public inclusion policies implemented in Brazil in the field of Education have been bumping into the memory of this subject without the right to subjectivity, which crystallized in the school culture. The Brazilian school shows a lack of appreciation for the subject of cultural diversity, which is inherent to the society in its surroundings. For this reason, it has become natural in Brazil for certain social subjects to be doomed to learning failure or avoidance (cf. PATO, 1993; BETH, 2020). However, despite public policies - from the Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education to the other normative instruments of education in all the federative spheres- or other instruments such as the controversial national curricular bases, even though these are aimed at guaranteeing the universal right to education and, as far as they are fit, guaranteeing its subjectivation, it is in the school itself and in the teaching-learning processes that the subjective right is denied. On the one hand, subjectivation of the right to education is denied, since, as already discussed here, subjectivity itself is denied; on the other hand, subjectivation of the right to education is also denied when, on the justification of an inherent failure of the



student himself whose subjectivity is not recognized, he does not give himself to know and master the instruments of social experience that guarantee him autonomy and legitimacy in the public space.

Rodrigues (2002) points out that the universal right to education projects a subject in training for the exercise of citizenship. In other words, it is a training program committed to the development of autonomy to interact with all kinds of cultural experience, from the most familiar to the most formal. Such a program, which takes place in parallel with the psychosocial development of the school subject, is what can be understood as a curricular project of subjectivation of the right to education. Within a curricular project of this nature, the right to citizenship and to sociocultural and linguistic uniqueness must be recognized for the subject.

Even so, even if one has a curriculum committed to the subjectivation of the right to education, the problem remains the fact that the processes of teaching-learning are based on didactic concepts and protocols that are not based on Education, but on the academic doctrines of the respective areas of education, as Mario de Andrade rightly pointed out: “but they themselves live on the glue of how much Figueiredino Chupamel comes from grammatical Lisbon”. And so, once again, the subjectivation of the right to education comes up against the closest one to the agents of formation: the teacher and his formation.

The development of Brazilian education, considering the interest in making it a subjective right of each citizen, is intrinsically related to the development of academic-doctrinal concepts and principles in the various areas of knowledge that make up the teaching body. The training of teachers as literacy agents is considered here by its scope, particularly teachers who teach literacy and teachers of the mother tongue, whose work in basic education has a particular interest in teaching and developing the use of written language, thus understood as an instrument of culture and social inclusion. It is understood, therefore, that the full mastery of the written language represents the subjectivation of the universal right to an education for the exercise of citizenship. It is presumed that the lack of full command of the written language restricts the exercise of citizenship in the context of cultural practices - also called discursive genres - in which it is required by virtue of appropriateness.

### **3 WRITTEN PORTUGUESE IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL**

The stereotypical treatment of the relationship between speech and writing in school culture has greatly hindered the development of inclusion policies, as it tends to mask facts of a sociocultural order that interfere decisively in the conditions of permanence of the subject in the condition of student, considered factors such as evasion, retention and permanence under low levels of learning.

Despite the mnemonic processes characteristic of writing production, the available literature spares no commentary on cultural immanence on writing practices. Writing production is itself a cultural act, which in some cases means the subject's entry into a system of values foreign to those who are part of his identity.

Different forms of severe cost in the development of writing - whether in literacy or in the subsequent stages of literacy - can be explained as resulting from contact cultures, in a situation where the school, even not disregarding the diversity of cultures as a social fact, does not realize that different cultures result in equally unique cultural products, such as the writings and other cultural records presented by the students. The relationship between culture, languages and text production was the subject of a research in which they analyzed written productions of a total of 58 students from the 10<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> years of basic schooling of a federal college, between two groups: students without indication of school failure and students with indication of school failure in the Portuguese language discipline<sup>2</sup>.

The results of the research showed that the students' performance in the use of alphabetic writing was reflected in the general condition of the student regarding school failure: all students in failure condition showed significant performance problems in the production of written texts; most students without indicative of school failure showed less significant problems in the production of texts. In evaluating the texts, we used criteria divided into two fields of production: (a) the semantic field, taking as parameters the control over the cohesive relations between the formal and semantic parts of the text, and the planning and sequencing of information; (b) the formal structural field, considering all aspects of morphosyntactic order in the domain of the sentence and spelling.

The data suggest that schooling interferes satisfactorily with the process of education in high school, which can be supported by the fact that there has been a significant reduction of production failures in the semantic field among students of the last year, indicating, therefore, that there has been the development of the capacity for producing texts suitable to the privileged discursive genres in high school. It is presumed, therefore, that the students of the analyzed corpus have acquired the capacity to select modes of thought organization suitable for the production of written texts, showing very low interference of modes associated with the production of speech or other texts, verbal or non-verbal, not associated with the privileged discursive genres in high school. However, the same ability to select modes of textual production was not fully verified when considering the formal layer of written Portuguese.

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2 Research linked to the project "Guidelines for evaluation and selection of the textbook of the Portuguese language discipline and writing in classes with learning difficulties" (2013-2017), developed in the Postgraduate Program in Education of UERJ, with funding by the FAPERJ Foundation. See: SENNA (2021).

The high incidence of failures in the formal layer of written production analyzed is usually listed as arising from the interference of the oral language in the act of production, a phenomenon therefore associated with the area of language studies in contact (cf. WEINREICH, 1953). Since speech and writing are subject to different types and processes of linguistic variation, the interference of the former on written production would be explained by interposing the morphosyntactic system in drift in speech about the stable system of writing. This would lead to cases such as verb-nominal agreement (e.g.: '[...] it has been years since we saw so many people [...]', '[...] the police officers were attacked on arrival [...]''), and the use of subordination marks (e.g.: '[...]have brought many justifications where the main one was[...]; [...].Since the book that the cover fell was the main reason for the [. .]')

The hypothesis of transfer between linguistic systems is strong and gained even more support in the theory of variation, on the basis of which the timeless structure of the grammatical system governing modern written languages goes against the nature of natural linguistic systems, eminently open and subject to variation. What we do not understand, however, is why students are fully capable of controlling the use of the modes of production and semantic organization of the written text and are not, when it comes to the formal structures, even when faced with the same conditions of production.

How can one explain that students who master the grammatical knowledge of the alphabetic written language and who, at the same time, develop parameters for the use of writing in the semantic plane of their organization, are not capable of adequately employing the formal structures proper to the morphosyntactic system of the standard language, even when at the end of the last few years of basic education?

#### **4 PORTUGUESE AND CULTURAL BILINGUALISM**

As in the language sciences, bilingualism is a concept that has evolved over time, parallel to the evolution of the primary concept of grammatical systems. The development of studies of bilingualism accelerates significantly from the 20th century onwards, from its association with the areas of psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, since which it breaks with the until then tradition of strictly grammatical approach. More recently, already close to the 21st century, contributions from the theory of discourse and theoretical-descriptive doctrines based on the principle of languages in perspective of use, have repercussions on the concept of grammatical system and, consequently, on the conception of bilingualism. There is no attempt here to discuss exhaustively the various meanings of bilingualism. Let us focus in particular on those that help us in the discussion that has already begun on the relationship between the teaching of the

written language and the subjectivation of the right to education for the exercise of citizenship.

The classical notion that bilingualism is associated with communities that adopt two official languages is common sense. In this case, bilingualism is usually taken as a trait of a country, so-called bilingual, as in the case of Canada, Spain or Switzerland. It is worth noting that, in a bilingual country, not every citizen is bilingual, because, in this sense, bilingualism has a statutory character, being defined as the condition of recognition by the State of the right to the use of more than one language by citizens. It is the state that becomes bilingual, which implies that all official communication and all kinds of information in public spaces must be expressed in the recognized languages. What is implicit in statutory bilingualism on a national basis is the fact that the state grants the citizen the right to recognize himself as a linguistic and cultural subject, ad referendum to universal human rights policies.

La Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (1948:2), recoge en su artículo 2 la única mención a la no discriminación por razones lingüísticas cuando proclama "la fe en los derechos humanos fundamentales, en la dignidad y en el valor de la persona humana y en la igualdad de derechos de hombres y mujeres [...] sin distinción de raza, color, sexo, lengua, religión, opinión política u otra". El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (1966: 9341), promulgado por Naciones Unidas solo recoge en su artículo 27 que "en los Estados en que existan minorías, étnicas, religiosas o lingüísticas, no se negará a las personas que pertenezcan a dichas minorías el derecho que les corresponde, en común con los demás miembros de su grupo, a tener su propia vida cultural, a profesar y practicar su propia religión y a emplear su propio idioma". (cf. MOREIRA, 2019, p. 83).

Recognizing the condition of a multilingual state is, however, a very complex political decision, not restricted to purely linguistic aspects. This is a situation of subjectivity of law, in this case, the universal right to cultural and linguistic identity. There are few modern nations that do not have plurilingualism. It is the state that becomes bilingual, which implies that all official communication and all kinds of information in public spaces must be expressed in the recognized languages. What is implicit in statutory bilingualism on a national basis is the fact that the state grants the citizen the right to recognize himself as a linguistic and cultural subject, ad referendum to universal human rights policies.

In other cases, however, plurilingualism stems properly from the mechanisms through which nations were constituted, bringing together on their borders different

cultural subjects and speakers of different languages or dialects. In these cases, the feeling of affiliation with the nation may have developed an appreciation for a language that could be taken as the language of unity, or national language. However, each nation is formed from unique processes, not all successful in developing a sense of national unity. It is in this type of situation that internal conflicts end up being reflected in linguistic disputes, sometimes less veiled. Historical factors and political or cultural disputes may result in bilingual nations even under a condition of non-recognition by the government. It is worth saying, then, that this is a non-recognition of the subjective right to identity among national subjects in a condition of cultural and linguistic diversity.

Bilingualism in Brazilian territory has been treated as a taboo subject since the advent of its independence from Portugal in the 19th century, when it declared itself monolingual. To this day, in addition to Portuguese, only indigenous languages and Brazilian Sign Language are recognized, although this has not changed its name as a monolingual nation. As pointed out in Preuss; Alvares (2014), bilingualism in Brazilian territory extends to several other cases, particularly among communities constituted from migratory flows from Europe, occurring between the 19th and 20th centuries. Since then, even though they have been established in the country for more than a century, the languages spoken there are still considered as foreign languages in the national territory, even though they have already been absorbed by cultural and linguistic processes that are typical of the local experience of these communities and their heirs (cf. FRITZEN, 2008).

The denial of the right to linguistic identity has profound implications for the subject's socio affective development, since identity, culture and language form an inseparable triad. When the subjective right to language is denied, at the same time the right to culture and identity is denied, therefore the subject himself is denied. In research reported in Diaz; Schmidt (2016), it is found that by producing sentences in non-mother tongues, bilingual subjects tend to express emotions in semantically different ways than those they would produce in their mother tongue. This is not merely a structural difference, but a semantic difference which also affects the way in which the form is organized. "Emotions" are not grammatical facts, but rather identitarian ones, impregnated in the way the language of a given culture expresses them.

Among subjects whose language is not recognized by the public authorities, there is a lack of identity which calls for a language of belonging. Among Brazilians from unrecognized speech communities, this need to provide themselves with a language, like the subject whose phrase gives the title to Fritzen (2008): "Ich spreche anders aber das ist auch Deutsch" (translation: "I speak different but that's also German").

In spite of specific cases, all bilingualism is subject to the interference of identity and cultural features in the use of the respective languages in contact.

In the context of bilingualism, there is no way to dissociate the linguistic phenomenon from the languages in contact and the psychological phenomenon from the identities and cultures in contact. All linguistic production is a production of culture; therefore, every state of bilingualism is a state of cultural bilingualism.

The conditions that affect linguistic performance in situations of cultural bilingualism are linked to the subject's identity as a user of languages and to the social conditions of use. Among the definitions of bilingualism, it is noted that it takes it as the ability to employ different languages in accordance with the context of use and production conditions. This definition of pragmatic nature is of particular interest to us here, because it points to the fact that bilingualism is a psychological state whose nature is established in the subject's relationship with the systems of expression and the conditions of use, therefore also of a sociolinguistic order. In this sociopsycholinguistic dynamic, the subjectivation of the rights to identity, culture and language acts decisively. Private subjects of subjectivation tend to seek to rescue it by legitimizing traits familiar to their identity. An example of this is the case analyzed in Fritzen (2008), *op. cit.*, where the speaker seeks to frame his dialect in a legitimized grammatical system ("Ich spreche andersaber das ist auch Deutsch"). Similarly, the relationship between bilingualism and identity is also found in codeshare situations such as that analyzed in Mota (2008), referring to children and young Brazilian children of immigrants in the United States, among whom the selection of the use of Portuguese or English alternates between the desire to belong to the local public space and the desire to preserve, or not, the memory of a cultural and linguistic link, in the majority of times aggregated exclusively to the parental relationship and to certain spaces of brazilianess, such as churches and small cultural centers.

The development of stable bilingualism in a diglossic way, in which the two languages assume complementary social roles, is symbolically manifested as a reflection of a process of integration between two national identities. The mother tongue has come to represent not only a primordial symbolic value of ethnic ties, but also a pragmatic component of the formation of situational identities from one's own interests. The act of linguistic choice reinforces identity affiliation; the individual enjoys the advantages of being recognized as a member of a given group (MOTA, 2008).

Cultural bilingualism, given its link with processes of subjectivation of rights and identity construction, lends itself to clarify facts observed in the results of the research presented here previously, regarding the learning and use of the written

language by Portuguese speakers of Brazil. It is also, essentially, what Mario de Andrade deals with in his *Gramatiquinha do Português*.

## 5 LANGUAGES AND CULTURES IN CONTACT BETWEEN MOVEMENTS OF SUBJECTIVITY

Brazilian Portuguese is a grammatical system that is relatively independent of European Portuguese since the foundation of the first social bases of the then colony. We should point out that, yes, European Portuguese is undoubtedly the structural basis of the Brazilian national language, but the legacy that bequeaths us is that of a language in the process of creation, marked by the dynamics of the complex process of linguistic drift that occurred since Antiquity at the end of the Middle Ages. It can be said that, long before it took shape, Portuguese in a certain way had already existed in the character of a people that had come to be constituted from the confluence of cultures and languages in contact in Iberia. The history of Portuguese (here, based on Machado, 1945 and Buesco, 1978) follows the history of that stretch to the west of the Iberian Peninsula, which was populated by countless cultures and languages, from the early Celts to the Greeks, Arabs and Romans. The people there have developed a language rooted in a culture of rapprochement and integration, whether by trade or political or cultural domination. The character of this language, still to be consolidated at the dawn of Modernity, will be the basis of the Portuguese that would develop here.

The Iberian character, though, was up to the Brazilians - from an early age, mixed together by miscegenation - to add to the language that was developed here other characters that came from the cultures that intermingled and woven the local society. The colonial culture that had imposed itself on the emerging peoples of the Americas arose, however, from other sources, which developed in the course of European Modernity, from which the colonists would only share the discourses of oppression and depreciation.

[...] the discourses produced about languages in the colonial period are not neutral, but constitutive of a paradigm of modernity, rooted in a Christian and/or Enlightenment perspective of reading and understanding the world. Such a paradigm constitutes a colonial matrix of power (coloniality) of exploitation and control of lands, peoples and languages, which came to be named and described in detail. [...] Such discursivization, in turn, invisibilized the trajectories and experiences of existing peoples and cultures, making them the target of colonizing and modernizing practices, such as Christianization, folklorization, scientification and schooling, each with its own specificity. (SEVERO, 2016).

European colonization in the Americas, while instigating the development of the peoples who now inhabit the continent, denied them subjectivation and identity. Even the mixed language that was developing here was forbidden to them. However, as Severo (2016) points out,

[...] the colonial process cannot be seen as a unilateral key to the imposition of ideals, values, behaviors, and beliefs. It is a complex process that involved the tense encounter between different cultures and worldviews. Such an encounter produced refined forms of resistance and transgression on the part of local peoples.

Among the most striking forms of resistance, the nationalization of general languages in Brazil (cf. LAGORIO; FREIRE, 2014) marked for several centuries the speech of everyday Brazil, to which would be added more resistance speech from the languages of the black communities enslaved in the country. Based on daily speech and the diversity of cultural and linguistic factors in the various regions of the country, Brazilian itself constitutes its own identity and a language that, in the diversity of its speech, marks its unity. Brazilian Portuguese is the language of national unity, much more recognized as an instrument of resistance, than as a system of homogeneous speech. The fusion between the identity and language of this people is explained because the entry of peoples into the history of Brazil, through colonization or enslavement, provokes fusion between cultures, as pointed out in:

The Africans who came here transferred not only brought their workforce, but also transported their cultures, of which languages are an important expression, although little considered in the studies that investigate the contribution or participation of enslaved Africans in the constitution of Brazilian nationality. (CUNHA; PETTER, 2015. p. 22).

The national language of Brazil is legitimized in the daily life of the whole country, keeping, however, the reservations and feelings of inferiority that the process of European colonization had imprinted in the identity of its people. Consequently, since its political independence, in the 19th century, the national public authority ordered the compilation of the official Portuguese of Brazil - its written language, as it had occurred in European nations in the 16th century - on the same basis of the grammatization process, having the European language as its matrix. To the written Brazilian Portuguese, only the indigenous and African lexical additions were bequeathed from the national language; no record is made of the morphosyntactic singularities that differentiate Brazilian and European



Portuguese. This official language, first of the Kingdom and then of the Brazilian Republic, became part of the hygienist instruments of “whitening” the people, aiming to erase the traces of the colonized savage that one wished to exclude from the national memory.

The Brazilian experience of coexistence between the daily national language and the official language derived from written Brazilian Portuguese is analogous to that of other ex-colonial nations. Among them, those whose national language is admittedly different from the official Portuguese help us to better understand the sociolinguistic phenomenon in question.

Even today, 26 years after achieving independence from Portugal, the Cape Verdean population continues to experience in their daily lives this interaction, sometimes conflictual, between the Creole and Portuguese languages. As I was able to verify several times during my field research in Cape Verde, between 1998 and 1999, the use of these two languages is frequently permeated by questions of authority and resistance, identity and social distance. Despite the constant presence of Creole in the activities that unfold in the day-to-day life of this population, Portuguese remains occupying a prominent place as the official language of the Republic of Cape Verde. [...] The situation described indicates the creation of two conflicting camps: the national language (i.e. Creole) and the official language (Portuguese) (DIAS, 2002).

The relationship between oral Brazilian Portuguese and written Brazilian Portuguese is the same as that between Creole and Portuguese in Cape Verde. They are languages that have been established and used in different circumstances. In Brazil, the written language was built under the influence of the nationalism inherent to Romanticism in force in the nineteenth century, a fact that led it to be treated with the population as the transgender language and forged in Brazilian lands, free of European influence and yoke. However, in spite of the scientific rather than political stamp that had been imposed in its grammatization (cf. ORLANDI, 2000), written Portuguese did not escape the idealism and Eurocentrism impregnated in all the other icons of the Brazilian nation, especially as far as morphosyntactic specificities are concerned.

And so it was that Brazil started to live with two languages in a situation of contact: the oral language, the Portuguese of Brazil and the national language, and the written language, the official language. It is worth saying, however, that this linguistic contact continues until today marked by strong relationships of inequality and social disputes. Among the oral Portuguese spoken in Brazil,

some approach and identify culturally with the official written language. Others, however, mostly, besides not approaching from a morphosyntactic point of view, still less identify with the Eurocentric scientific culture underlying the official language.

## 6 CLOSING REMARKS

Cultural diversity, which is an inherent trait in Brazilian society and the national language, does not figure either in the structure, nor in culture, that govern written Portuguese. We shall conclude, then, that for a large part of the Brazilian people, learning and the use of alphabetic writing are spaces of cultural bilingualism. And we should also postulate that the recurring interference of oral traits on the form of writing produced by pupils of basic education in Brazil is related to the tradition of a people that is established in a movement of cultural resistance and clamor for subjectivation. This is what can be seen from the results of the study on the development of the mastery of written language among secondary school pupils presented here.

To conclude, I reiterate that the appropriation of writing and its uses is a process of integration between cultures that are not homogeneous and subjects that, above all, seek the subjectivation of fundamental rights to identity, culture and languages that give them the full right to citizenship: their own and writing. Let us follow in the footsteps of Mário de Andrade, the Brazilian linguistic visionary, when he tells us "[...] many people, even my friends, have been saying that I wanted to finance Dante and create the Brazilian language. Thank God I'm not as ignorant or as vain. My unique intention was to give my collaboration to a practical movement of necessary important liberation" (apud PINTO, 1990, p. 50).

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## **HUMAN RIGHTS: 200 years of advances and setbacks in Brazilian citizenship**

There are countless challenges facing Brazil in the field of human rights. Since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, we have seen advances and setbacks in the protection of individual freedoms and equal access to minimum living conditions, such as housing, work and food. In addition to the social issues of citizenship that involve the protection of human rights, we see challenges from the theoretical point of view in combining effectiveness in harmony with new theories that challenge the moral assumptions that underpin those rights. In this sense, the understanding of Human Rights should be not only extended theoretically, but invested in multidisciplinary research that broadens the possibilities of its effectiveness and possible methodologies for investigating the real demands of marginalized groups. In this respect, we have in this forum three articles that aim to problematize current issues that continue as challenges to the guarantee of rights in Brazil.

The first article by Fernanda Duarte, Rafael Iorio and Ronaldo Lucas presents the debate between constitutionalism and the independence of Brazil from a juridical-historical perspective, highlighting the difficulties of the colonial regime's outcome for Brazilian society. The second article, developed by Lara Denise Góes da Costa and Paulo M. D'Ávila Filho, presents the tension between particularism and universalism that underlies the moral debate with regard to the fundamentals of human rights and how we can advance in Brazil without the theoretical controversies overcoming the social demands of minorities. Finally, the article, signed by Ana Luiza da Gama e Souza, presents via socioeconomic analysis the challenges of food security in Brazil in the face of the massive use of pesticides and agrochemicals, as well as at a global level the difficulties of regulation in Brazil in view of the global corporate mega-mergers that characterize the universe of the development of seed biotechnology that we import.

Lara Denise Góes da Costa  
Guest Editor

**“FREEDOM HAS ALREADY DAWNED ON THE HORIZON OF BRAZIL”: brief considerations on legal equality, the Brazilian Independence Movement and the Constitution of 1824**

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**ABSTRACT**

From a brief bibliographical review, this text discusses the relationship between the Brazilian Independence movement and the Constitution of 1824. It draws attention to the context of the constitutional debates of the time and highlights the treatment that legal equality has received in the Constitution.

**Keywords:** Imperial Constitution; formal equality; citizenship.

*“JÁ RAIOU A LIBERDADE NO HORIZONTE DO BRASIL”: breves considerações sobre igualdade jurídica, o Movimento de Independência Brasileira e a Constituição de 1824*

**RESUMO**

*A partir de uma breve revisão bibliográfica, este texto discute a relação entre o movimento de Independência do Brasil e a Constituição de 1824. Chama atenção para o contexto dos debates constitucionalistas de então e destaca o tratamento que a igualdade jurídica recebeu na Constituição.*

*Palavras-chave: Constituição Imperial; igualdade formal, cidadania.*

*“YA HAS LEVANTADO LA LIBERTAD EN EL HORIZONTE DE BRASIL”: breves consideraciones acerca de la igualdad legal, el Movimiento de Independencia de Brasil y la Constitución de 1824*

**RESUMEN**

*A partir de una breve revisión bibliográfica, este texto discute la relación entre el Movimiento de Independencia de Brasil y la Constitución de 1824. Señala a la*

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*atención el contexto de los debates constitucionales de esa época y pone de relieve el trato que recibió la igualdad jurídica en la Constitución.*

*Palabras clave: Constitución Imperial; igualdad formal, ciudadanía.*

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The Brazilian independence reflects the European historical context of a wider movement, linked to a general crisis that some authors understand to be that of the “Old Colonial System”, which reflected European economic, political and social structures at the time, namely mercantilism and the Old Regime. Thus, the European crisis linked to Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula had a profound impact on Brazil’s political status, as the Portuguese Court was forced to “internalize” itself in Brazilian colonial territory (NOVAIS, 1986).

In fact, from this point began a process of independence that passed, on the one hand, the economic impulse mediated by the Opening of Ports with the arrival of the Royal Family in Rio de Janeiro, in 1808 and, on the other, by the political conflict between the Portuguese liberals and Brazilian liberals that emerged from the measures taken by the Portuguese Cortes, in the wake of the Oporto Revolution, mainly by the idea of the reestablishment of the colonial pact ruptured with the arrival of the Royal Family. These recolonizing purposes accentuated the tensions between the metropolis and the colony. However, the movement for independence, which was composed of the dominant stratum of Brazilian society, distrusted the popular masses as a revolutionary tool towards the political emancipation of Portugal. The Prince Regent, Pedro, was the figure who captained the monarchical solution that avoided a revolution from the bottom up, eventually promoted by popular mobilization. This solution made possible the union of several groups around the prince in Rio de Janeiro.

## **2 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE**

In that process, even before Independence, in June 1822, D. Pedro decreed the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which became practically a declaration of independence. But, formally the Proclamation of Independence only came after the Portuguese Cortes took extreme measures in the final days of August of that year, reducing, for example, the role of the prince to a temporary delegate of the Court. The prince, on a trip to São Paulo, also became aware that Portugal had intentions of sending troops to Brazil. Between the possibility of obeying the Courts or promoting the political break with the metropolis, D. Pedro proclaimed independence and became the Emperor of Brazil (COSTA, 1998).



Thus, it is the proclamation of Independence that makes possible, in the normative plan, the formal rupture necessary for the advent of the Constitution of 1824, inaugurating, in this way, the Brazilian legal order, molded in the wake of the modern constitutionalist movement that has references to three important documents: the Virginia Declaration of 1776, the Declaration of Independence of the United States and the Universal Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights<sup>1</sup>.

The occurrence of these declarations ends up becoming a true doctrine that spreads in the constitutional formation of the West, mainly from the nineteenth century and underpins political power in the ideal of liberalism. And with the emergence of constitutionalism in the Western world, one can then point out its significant aspects that permeated and influenced the Brazilian<sup>2</sup> legal and political landscape, thus systematized, by Wehling (1994):

1. The vision of the Baron of Montesquieu, fruit of his work *Of the Spirit of Laws*. It was the most widespread version of constitutionalism and was based on the principle of the division and balance of the functions of power - executive, legislative and judicial.

2. The conception of Benjamin Constant, fruit of his work *Constitutional Political Principles*. This current was elaborated with fulcrum on a theory of individual guarantees of inalienable and interrogable Fundamental Rights - personal freedom, religious freedom, private property, and freedom of the press - that would limit the general will and sovereignty of the king or a parliament. As stated by Wehling (1994, p.12): "This current also found adherents in Brazil especially among those who defended the constitutional monarchy, equidistant from absolutism and the

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1 As normative milestones, we have the Virginia Declaration which recognizes the right to equal rights, the right to liberty, and popular sovereignty. The United States Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all human beings should be considered equal, as they were endowed with inalienable rights. And the Universal Declaration of Human and Citizen's Rights enshrines the existence of natural, inalienable and sacred human rights.

2 By the way, see Wehling (1994, p. 11): "The second half of the 18th century corresponds, in the Euro-American world, to irreversible structural changes. Phenomenon that social philosophers and scientists of different specialties and theoretical benchmarks analyze under the concepts of industrial revolution, agrarian and demographic revolution, illustration, crisis of the state society, affirmation of idealism and overcoming of metaphysics, definition of the Newtonian scientific paradigm or constitutionalism and reveal the complex network of relationships existing in these societies, in which it seemed, at least by the standards of the Old Regime, to have accelerated history, demanding from their contemporaries a vast program of social reform. Constitutionalism, from this perspective, is only one angle of the question. However, a privileged angle, given the overall aspirations: nothing less than, in the light of the philosophical foundations and epistemological criteria of rationalism, to try to give order to chaos, in order to understand phenomena, and to act upon them, in such a way as to define the best form of government and the best directed social organization."

republic". This was the line responsible for the creation of the fourth power, known as the Moderator. This would have the function of balancing the others - a distinctive trait of the Charter of 1824.

3. The Prussian strand that associates constitutionalism with the rule of law. See Wehling (1994, p.12): "By this interpretation, everyone, from the king to the least significant subject, were elements of the state, submitting equally to the law; the citizen was guaranteed his legal freedom, with general laws from which particular subjective rights emanated."

For Wehling (1994), the first two strands - Montesquieu and Constant - combined seem to better reflect Brazilian constitutionalism in that period, as well as its sources. Indeed, what is similar in all three is the premise that the Constitution would be responsible for structuring social objectives and organizing the political and legal institutions of society, and that it is therefore a question of social engineering. In other words, one finds the ideal of organizing mechanical social reform by law - as developed by the Constitution of 1824.

However, the great problem of the analysis of these aspects in national constitutionalism is in the adaptation of the proposed social organization to the Brazilian social reality that, unlike many countries in Europe, still had in its real factors of power the desires of the Old Regime<sup>3</sup> (WEHLING, 1994). There was a constitutionalism in which slavery, absolute power, a state that was not secular, were accepted, as we will discuss later.

Granted in 1824<sup>4</sup>, from the arbitrary dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly, the Brazilian Imperial Constitution was the institutional victory, in the period of the birth of the Brazilian empire, of the centralization preached by the conservatives (group of the emperor and José Bonifácio) over the federative yearning represented by the group of Gonçalves Ledo, which defended the representative constitutional monarchy, in which Parliament would be supreme, there would be the freedom of expression and initiative and wide autonomy of the provinces.

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3 For Wehling (1994, p.18): "On the eve of independence, thirty years after the Minas Conjunction and the beginning of the French revolution, the attempt was repeated in Brazil to convene the Courts, by the norms of the Old Regime, as had happened in France with the Estates General and in Spain with the Courts of Cádiz. [...]"

4 It is recognized that this Political Charter of 1824 was inspired by the French Constitution of 1814 and according to Chacon (1987, p. 69): "The Constitution of France had seventy-six articles; before one hundred seventy-nine of the Brazilian of 1824, inaugurating the local habit and the neighbors in long analytical, detailed constitutions, wanting everything to exhaust as if they were adjective laws, therefore, soon aging, instead of synthetic constitutions, long lived because declaratory of principles, more adaptable to the changes of time, in the measure of their grandeur, not only of their size, essential difference".

It was a document that, if on the one hand consecrated centralism, directing all political power to the moderating power<sup>5 6</sup>, on the other hand, in its article 179<sup>7</sup>, listed a series of rights and guarantees that marked the adoption of a proposal among us, until then unprecedented, of formal recognition of rights that positively recognize freedom in face of the “constitution” of the State<sup>8</sup>, incorporating a new European *jus natural* conception of the rights of man that translated into the constitutionalization of barriers to the oppression of the State in face of individuals<sup>9</sup>. In particular, we draw attention especially to the treatment that legal equality received, and here we would like to bring three peculiar aspects to the egalitarian ideal that, between us, as we have already written on other occasions, also implies inequalities, on the legal plane.

- 5 The association of two powers - Moderator and Executive - in the hands of the same person, the Emperor, brought fear to the liberal political circles of being living an absolutist monarchy disguised as constitutional.
- 6 “In short, the Moderating Power, which was included in the Constitution, opposed both Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers and Constant’s doctrine of the neutral or judicial power of the other powers. The Moderating Power of the Charter of the Empire is literally the constitutionalization of absolutism, if that were possible. At that point, Tobias Barreto was absolutely right to hide it. Article 101 established the competence of the Emperor, as holder of that power, and it was incumbent upon him a constitutional bundle of nine tasks, thus determined: to appoint senators, to convene an extraordinary general assembly at intervals of legislative sessions, to sanction the decrees and resolutions of the provincial councils, to prolong or postpone the general assembly and to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, as well as to make the free appointment and dismissal of ministers of state, to suspend magistrates in certain cases, to pardon or mitigate penalties and to grant amnesty in cases of urgency.” (BONAVIDES, 1987, p. 9-10).
- 7 Among them, we highlight: legality (item I); freedom of thought and the press (item IV); religious freedom (item V); inviolability of the home (item VII); legal imprisonment (item VIII); independence of the judiciary (item XII); formal equality (item XIII); privileges abolished (item XIV); cruel penalties abolished (item XIX); property (item XXII); abolished trade corporations (item XXV); - right to precaution (item XXIV); copyright (item XXVI); inviolability of correspondence (item XXVII); acquired right (item XXVIII); right of petition (item XXX); public aid (item XXXI); and free primary education (item XXXII).
- 8 Torres (2001, p.255) teaches that: “The rights of liberty exhibit the status negativus, which means the power of self-determination of the individual, freedom of action or of omission without any constraint on the part of the State”.
- 9 In short, this landscape is expressed by Zimmermann (2002, p. 215): “in this way, fundamental rights are now embodied in constitutional documents, so that they are recognized by society and accepted as revealing the rights inherent to human nature itself. These letters, solemn and universalist, postulated human protection as the essential purpose of all political society, seeking to ensure equal rights and recognize the need for individual freedom as well as the right to resist various forms of social oppression. Since then, the declarations of rights represent the noblest part of the Constitutions, directing the State towards the guarantee of certain fundamental principles, which would thus be revealed as natural attributes of the human person, immutable and established by God so that we were all free and equal in rights. The first of these rights would be the right to life, a clear prerequisite for the enjoyment of others.”

First, it is true that there was adherence to the idea of formal equality, however, this equality was mediated by a notion of merit, thus voiced in the constitutional text “The Law will be equal for all, whether it protects or punishes, it will reward you in proportion to the merits of each one” (BRAZIL, 1824) - which refers to the possibility of particularizations, since merit is a subjective condition of each, making generalizations unfeasible.

Second, in spite of adherence to liberal inspirations, legal regimes that were unequal among Brazilians were established or maintained, as is the case of restrictions on broad voting and the maintenance of privileges in the public service. In the case of voting, the Charter adopted the censorial vote, and also excluded from voting the servants and religious, the women, the slaves, the Indians and the children who lived in the company of their parents, that is, economically dependent. As regards the public service, Section XIV states that:

Every citizen can be admitted to the Civil, Political, or Military Public Offices, without any difference, other than their talents, and virtues, but later the maintenance of the “essential privileges” and “entirely linked to the Offices, for public utility” was assured. (BRASIL, 1824).

Thirdly, it should also be mentioned that although the Constitution of 1824, in the cited article 179, had created a whole protective scope for Brazilian citizens, slavery already implanted in Brazil since the colonial era, was maintained, reiterating the exclusion of a segment of the population from enjoying these rights and guarantees. Slaves, in fact, found themselves subject to a double legal regime. From the civilist perspective, they were considered things, that is, property of someone, but in the criminal dimension, they were subject to criminal subjection.

### **3 CLOSING REMARKS**

In an unusual and curious way within the history of Brazilian constitutionalism, there is still an approximation with the idea of social rights, anticipating the Charter, in this aspect, to the socialist movement inspiring the ideals of social Fundamental Rights, also called by the doctrine of 2nd dimension rights, that is, those who demand an action of the State, a positive do in the sense of meeting the minimum needs of citizens. In this sense, we have the devices that, in the Constitution of 1824, dealt with public health, free education and establishment of Universities, namely: public aid (art. 179, XXXI), free primary education (art. 179, XXXII) and Universities and Colleges (art. 179, XXXIII).

Finally, if with the Independence and its ensuing Constitution, some novelties were introduced in the legal order of the country that then emerged, distinguishing itself in particular from the old Portuguese regime, from the perspective of social

relations, the positioning of these rights did not imply significant ruptures that could establish in fact a new and renewed society, based on premises of equality and full citizenship. Did the Independence and its Constitutional Charter inaugurate itself in this way as well, as ambiguous and contradictory concepts as distinctive marks of Brazilian juridical culture that have been perpetuated up until today?

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## BRAZIL, TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORY: between particularisms and universalisms

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### ABSTRACT

The article presents the tension between particularism and universalism that underlies the moral debate with respect to the fundamentals of Human Rights and how we can advance in Brazil without the theoretical controversies overcoming the cultural demands and the differences of values and social practices. In this sense, the article presents new possibilities for understanding cultural values integrated with the normative dimension of human rights.

**Keywords:** Universal Rights; culture; relativism.

*BRASIL, DUZENTOS ANOS DE HISTÓRIA: entre particularismos e universalismos*

### RESUMO

*O artigo apresenta a tensão entre particularismo e universalismo que subjaz o debate moral no que diz respeito aos fundamentos dos Direitos Humanos e como podemos avançar no Brasil sem que as controvérsias teóricas se sobrepujem às demandas culturais e às diferenças de valores e práticas sociais. Neste sentido, o artigo apresenta novas possibilidades de compreensão de valores culturais integrados à dimensão normativa dos Direitos Humanos.*

*Palavras-chave: Direitos Universais; cultura; relativismo.*

*BRASIL, VEINTE AÑOS DE HISTORIA: Entre particularidades y universos*

### RESUMEN

*El artículo presenta la tensión entre la particularidad y el universalismo que subyace al debate moral respecto a los fundamentos de los derechos humanos y cómo podemos avanzar en Brasil sin controversias teóricas que superen demandas culturales y las diferencias en valores y prácticas sociales. A este respecto, el artículo presenta nuevas posibilidades para comprender los valores culturales que se integran con la dimensión normativa de los derechos humanos.*

*Palabras clave: Derechos universales; cultura; relativismo.*

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the 19th century marked a period as a result of the transformations of the three hundred years of colonial administration in Brazil. Not only the regime of subordination, but various changes occur in the sense of renewing, with advances and setbacks, Brazilian society. From autonomy vis-à-vis the Portuguese metropolis to economic dependence on the British industrial center, Brazil's modernization and insertion had the historical inconvenience of the slave trade, a form of production inherent to the survival of the economic system of the time and a reason for humiliation in the face of the English pressure for its abolition.

The basic relationship of the slave-masters system, produced for almost three centuries, and the subsequent economic reforms of this system, did not constitute great social advances, on the contrary, this relationship will perpetuate itself differently with new nuances throughout the administrative structure and all the foundations of future independence. Until the 20th century, the idea of civilization and, in its broad sense - moral, political and cultural - originating from European countries, above all France, exposed the incoherent demand for moralized human behavior of others (non-Europeans) in the face of the "civilized slavers" of the northern hemisphere. Such moral and political hypocrisy has come to the fore in recent decades, especially with the deconstructionist theories of Afro-diasporic and decolonial thought, which seeks in its entirety to "unmask" the assertions of "universal partial European and include in the agenda new voices previously unheard". (COSTA, L.D. G. da, 2022).

In these two hundred years of Brazil's independence we have witnessed this renewed development and "decentralization" of the human and social sciences about the diversity of the countries of the southern and eastern hemisphere in the face of the formal moral universalism of the west. This movement produces an increasingly complex field of studies and theoretical framework for dealing with the theme of human rights and their paths and obstacles in Brazil.

One of the great challenges of contemporary political theory, in this sense, would be to produce legitimate foundations for political propositions which are intended to promote universalization in the face of the fact of political and cultural pluralism in contexts of valuing democratic procedures and that of cultural diversity. In a way, the problem goes back to an ancestral debate between particularisms and universalisms.

Universities and individuals are a recurring topic among philosophers and social scientists. Anthropologists have long been particularly concerned about these issues, focusing on understanding culture as a general attribute of humanity and cultures as multiple existences of such an attribute. The fact is that, for a long time, philosophers, political scientists and anthropologists have been opposing universalisms and particularisms. The perspective of this text is to give a positive

response to the dilemma seeking to present a foundation of propositive legitimacy that articulates the valuation of diversity without losing sight of a universalist or universalizable perspective. How to find grounds for legitimacy for a prescriptive suggestion about values? The idea of a political or public conception of values can lend itself to this effort.

## **2 UNIVERSALISM AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY**

To suggest a set of good practices or good policies means to establish a relationship between practices, policies, values and desirable ends. The interplay between these terms, universal and particular, is, in itself, a huge challenge. The challenge is to make political choices amid cultural diversity.

When we set desirable goals, general goals to be achieved, and choose certain policy actions to achieve them, we no longer consider alternative courses of action. On the one hand, whenever we deal with politics, acting or choosing certain types of political action, we are inevitably affirming some preference, that is, when we make this or that choice we choose something over another possibility. On the other hand, when we come across the universe of social values and practices, we are given a significant cultural diversity that human beings have been and are capable of producing.

Understanding culture as a set of practices, values, beliefs, and customs, peoples and communities have distinct cultural standards. We are accustomed to considering the different customs of peoples and nations, but it is rarer to consider that different communities within the same country, even though they live under the same political and legal institutions, are also marked by different social, political or cultural identities such as regional, territorial, professional, ethnic, generations, gender and sexual orientation, among others.

If cultural diversity is a heritage of humanity to be praised and valued, as is biological diversity in nature, the challenge would be how to choose desirable policies and ends, articulated with desirable social practice and values, without incurring the exclusion of the various possibilities of facing cultural values and practices. The dilemma is how to affirm preferences and at the same time maintain a positive perspective in the face of cultural diversity. In the case of this article, the question is how to be propositive about values given the diversity of possibilities of cultural perspectives on desirable values and practices. This is one of the possible confrontations between the political and cultural dimension of human experience. This challenging dilemma is fraught with pitfalls that can often be found, but which a pluralistic perspective in favor of democratization should avoid.

The first is that we should not consider our understanding of the world as an immutable universal, equally applicable to all peoples and communities. Even though life and love, for example, seem to us to be universalizable “values”, they



are not considered or experienced in the same way by cultures. We should not therefore view our proposals fundamentally, based on essences, as if they were the only possible one. Apart from epistemological or ontological objections, when we act in this way there is no room for dialog around any proposition. Such a framework obstructs the possibility of valuing the experience of others and feeds pernicious expectations of political and cultural domination, since it justifies all sorts of arbitrary impositions.

A second pitfall diametrically opposed to this is that we make the opposite mistake, not being prescriptive in any way because of the preservation of cultural diversity. Along these lines, in the effort to preserve the “multicultural” character of human experience, we end up only describing cultural diversity, thus contributing to the idea of an immutable or “zoological” preservation of cultures. It so happens that cultures are products of cultural contact, or of what the specialists call “cultural contagion” or “interculturality”. “Interculturality” implies that the different are what they are in bargaining relationships, conflicts and mutual loans. In the contact between different cultures, they are transformed, changing their values, practices and customs. Cultures are creations of human interaction, they are alive, in a constant process of mutation: cultures are thus, by definition, hybrids.

A child who contemplated the image of an Indian in the museum, with his headdresses and feathers considered “typical”, would not recognize an indigenous leadership dressed in clothes peculiar to the urban man of the Brazilian capitals discussing his rights in Brasilia, for example. She would not understand that between one image and the other the quoted phenomenon of “interculturality” occurred. I would not understand that the museum has preserved a kind of photography that helps us to know a certain cultural moment, not an essence. While it can be argued that cultural contacts can be profoundly unequal, in which one culture can impose itself on another, this does not eliminate the fact that there is always some exchange that transforms them, albeit in an unequal way.

It is by confronting cultural perspectives, the values and practices that they affirm and profess, that cultural change takes place. Even if we sustain the legitimacy of cultural diversity, we cannot shy away from affirming propositions, ends or good policies, otherwise we will incur insidious inaction and/or the illusion of the “tipping over” (immutable preservation) of cultures.

The third trap is often set in motion as a way of overcoming the problems posed by the first two, but this one does not solve either. It consists in the belief that we can use a supposedly neutral, neutral or impartial view of intervention in the social sphere. It means believing that your statement is no longer a point of view, that is, the view from one point, like all others, but a perspective that hovers above them. But, if all the social statements, propositions and practices are products of

cultures, immersed, therefore, in their respective universes of beliefs and values, a cultural product, with a context of creation, historical and geographical, would not in any way authorize to believe that my gaze is detached from my cultural universe, by partial definition.

This is the transposition of Weberian's proposition of the necessary "axiological neutrality" of the social sciences into the domain of human choices regarding a desirable social order. In other words, science will only be able to clarify the evaluative choices of men knowing that their adoption and defense depend before will and faith. Science is not empowered to command decision-making regarding purposes and values. Science may perhaps indicate to the social agent what it can do, perhaps what it intends to do, but in no case what it should do. Likewise, because of the categorical separation between being and duty, between the judgments of fact and the judgments of value, science is forbidden the possibility of justifying normatively any imperative. The ends and values are not imposed by virtue of scientific truths, but within the framework of ceaseless struggles, political confrontation, cultural contact and even by means of force.

It is not common for us to ask this question since, by habit, we naturalize our beliefs, as if they correspond to things as they are, and others think in a strange way. In cultural contact the estrangement can be mutual. This becomes easier to understand if we are able to put ourselves in the place of the "others". So every statement, or proposition, of good policies will always be a particular perspective, a point of view. If it is true, however, that cultural transformation processes occur in contact or in the confrontation, exchange or dialog between different belief systems and values, then there is no harm in admitting the partial character of this proposal and prescriptively offering the public dialog a path that, it is believed, must be followed.

In order to avoid these three pitfalls: not from visions based on immutable essences; not to be limited to the mere description of the plurality of the world that leads us to inaction; and to assume the partial character of its perspective, is that this text proposes to base the choice of good practices and good policies on a political or public conception of values.

### **3 HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL OR PUBLIC CONCEPTION OF VALUES**

The expression 'public values', strictly speaking, is almost a pleonasm. In a sense, all values are public, in the sense of collectively shared, as are morals and language. Strictly speaking, there is no idea of a personal language. Language is an intersubjective, socially produced construction. In order for there to be communication it is necessary that we share the meanings of words in what we can call "language in use", despite their vernacular meaning. Even if it is possible for the subject to affirm personal values, individuals are bearers of intersubjectively constructed moral values.

Although the values are public by definition, it is necessary to distinguish the approach that this text takes from two other possible understandings of the issue. One of them derives from the perspective dealt with above. This way of looking at values corresponds to the anthropological perspective that refers to cultural values as referred to belief systems and meaning. It would also be possible to consider public values as those that are in some way associated with the set of laws and constitutional norms or principles that govern a given society. Both in one possibility and another, these values exert significant moral constraint on those who share them.

The perspective here is different. It is a question of presenting a political or public conception of values. The term “political conception of values” is intended to differentiate the proposition of this article from other ways of viewing values stemming from fundamentalist or metaphysical underpinnings, anchored in some idea of epistemological truth or comprehensive philosophical ontologies. The conception is political not because it is related to some partisan perspective, but because it is the fruit of agreement. So if on the one hand it is possible to identify a certain inspiration in John Rawls (2000) in his theory of justice, the proposition innovates in the direction of a dialogical, reconstructive agreement (HABERMAS, 1997). The meaning of the term “politics” in the expression is the idea of agreement; human artifact, precarious arrangement, contingent artifice, as mutable, renegotiable, or in other words, normatively open to dialog.

Presenting a political conception of values means facing up to the problems involved in the adoption of directives necessary for the pragmatic establishment of public policies. On the other hand, it is possible, at the same time, to redouble the care in not falling into the temptation of a race for absolute fundamentals. It is a question of, starting from the heterogeneous and diverse nature that involves human societies, resuming the definition of what could arise as a precarious and dialogical social and political agreement. This is because, understood as a cultural and political artifact, a political or public conception of values must be constantly open to discussion, thus based on a flexible format and permeable to those resulting from dialog.

As attempts at agreements that uphold a political conception of public values or values, we can list the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If we take the origin of the Declaration of Human Rights on the historical plane, we see that the French declaration of August 26, 1789, described by some as the act of constituting a people, precedes the Constitution to be approved and clearly marks the resistance to the oppressive way of life that had been deposed with the Revolution.

The French declaration, however, was preceded by the declarations of rights, the so-called Bills of Rights (BOBBIO, 2004), of some American colonies against the

English Metropolis. When attention is turned to the issue of gradual recognition of civil, political and social rights, it is possible to highlight the historical specificity and malleability of the precepts of the first declarations. Declarations of rights can be interpreted as historically agreed instruments in the most diverse forms and national trajectories. His dated perspective corroborates the perspective offered here for a political conception of values.

It is a historical product, a human artifact, the fruit of specific agreements, historically determined and which are transformed in time as they become the subject of public debate, constituting excellent examples of the anchoring of principles related to desirable values. Its advantage over all other anchoring or foundations of values is its precarious, provisional character, fruit of contingent political agreement and subject to change. Even if arguments based on alleged universal European values are repeatedly mobilized, in practice they have been working to expand their content and as a starting point for public debate. Agreements are not necessarily between symmetrical social and political actors, even though this is a mirage desired by recurrent social fabrication. The asymmetries, however, do not invalidate a process of exchange, even though it is unequal.

This kind of perspective is in line with what has been called “cosmopolitics” (RIBEIRO, 2008). The idea of “cosmopolitics” implies the effort to regiment discourse that aims at the same time universalist, because supposedly universalizable, therefore propositive, and global, while respecting cultural diversity, constituting the mainstay of multilateral bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies. In light of the praise of diversity it is still possible to deliver an affirmative political discourse of unity around principles for a good life, or values of life.

The perspective of “cosmopolitics” aims to deal successfully, through procedure, with the recurring tension between hybridism and fundamentalism, between particularism and universalism. The “cosmopolitics” is formed by global discourses, by the ideology of tolerance, understanding, inclusion and coexistence:

Cosmopolitanism is a Western notion that epitomizes the need that social agents have to conceive of a larger political and cultural entity. Cosmopolitanism presupposes a positive attitude in the face of difference, a desire to build broad alliances and peaceful and egalitarian communities [...] generating universalist solidarity. (RIBEIRO, 2008, p. 212.

Thus, what is preserved is the conjunction of constituting me as a propositional political subject, whose respect for diversity lies not in its zoological preservation, but in the democratic and potentially inclusive character of the propositions.

Democratic because it recognizes debate and dialog as a means of expanding these public values. Inclusive, because it is open to the addition of new agendas as a function of the expansion of the public sphere produced by the acceptance of new discursivities, subjectivities that bring demands.

New subjectivities considered legitimate interlocutors in the public world produce new political agendas that can be incorporated into the fundamental values, because they are not fixed, universal a priori, but flexible and products of the political action of the parties involved in the interaction, albeit potentially asymmetric. This flexibility stems from the refusal to fundamentalism by the choice of recognizing dialog and interculturality as legitimate phenomena and desirable procedures. In this sense, a political conception of desirable values is basically a conception that advocates the democratization of the public space and an inclusive dimension of justice.

In Brazil, because of its history, one of the most unequal countries in the world, deeply hierarchical and oligarchic, this perspective encounters many difficulties. Notions like valuing the public world, symmetrical legitimacy, egalitarianism and freedom find soil that is not very fertile to thrive on. In these two hundred years of Brazil's independence, our quest for the universalization of rights and procedures will not take place without conflict and strong resistance.

But what are human rights really? What "human rights" do we think of when we refer to or defend these rights? Are there categories of "rights" that would be universal, or would it be necessary to define them locally, based on the social, political, historical, economic and social configurations of each culture? And what guarantees, or struggles/resistances for human rights, would we need to mobilize? What is its scope, and what is the relationship between human rights and other categories, such as political participation or socio-economic equality? (DA GAMA E SOUZA; GÓES; VELOSO, 2019)

In the 1970s, human rights research was fundamentally legal-normative research, centered on the creation and interpretation of international human rights norms and standards, and on the creation of international bodies focused on monitoring the obligations of states. At that stage, the method used was basically interpretative, in the sense of leveraging, expanding and deepening these norms and standards.

From the 1980s, the right to development entered the international agenda with the Declaration on the right to development (1986) and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (1993), and this new phase extended the field of human rights research to the empirical study of development, with human rights as the normative foundation for development as an investigative interest. From this perspective, research in the field of human rights opens the first door to interdisciplinarity and to new analytical and methodological questions. The field of human rights and development stirs up local/contextual

debate and relativism vs. universalism, in a dispute between moral justifications for human rights, in this case under the aegis of universal principles which come to be criticized in the face of their lack of effectiveness or reach (DA GAMA E SOUZA; GÓES; VELOSO, 2019).

At the same time, the advance of “globalizations” via the neoliberal market and its consequences for the deepening of inequalities strengthens the perspective of unequal access and unequal recognition between different countries and cultures, especially those of the global South. In this sense, the very idea of “human rights” has undergone discussions that generally present three issues/questions: 1. Rights for who? 2. Why do we need them? 3. What is its scope and implementation limits?

#### **4 CLOSING REMARKS**

Since the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, there has been much debate about the shortcomings in the effectiveness of human rights and how it could extend or extend its reach to peoples/cultures that although not Western ones would be under its normative aegis, since what would be human would be in some sense shared or common. However, as Hannah Arendt, Benhabib, Amartya Sen and others have shown, the concept of human being to which these thinkers refer would not be precise or ontologically possible to delimit as a common minimum, given the diversity of cultural practices that would possess particular normative meanings, and in this sense, the otherness desired by the West in the sense of “including” the other would be impossible due to intolerance with certain cultural practices held to be “uncivilized”, “savage”, “primitive”, “archaic”, “cruel” or radical. Thus, the United Nations (UN) document still postulates a series of characteristics, values and supposed human needs that, although presented as universal, would be strongly shaped by Western and modern values.

In this way, there would be an antinomy of values in the approach to human rights, in which while Western states would ensure individual freedom through individualistic values, they would also ensure collectivist equality among citizens through access for the most disadvantaged to minimum conditions of integration in social life, which would reflect supra-individual values of solidarity. But to do so, the cultural question would not enter into the debate. Today, the debate has shifted to a more poignant economic issue, in particular that of access to minimum living conditions, including the right to live under one’s own local culture and derive one’s livelihood from it.

From this perspective, we see that economic inclusion or exclusion via the Western neoliberal market would portray a reductionist ideology as to cultural complexity, since certain social exclusions and dependencies as to the economic

system would make minority cultures incapable of perceiving the everyday sense of already naturalized inequalities, which in itself would already reflect the lack of particular recognition by the system.

If Western moral values, political culture, and customs are closely related to the socioeconomic structure from which we have become to a certain extent dependent, how can one separate the universal normative from the economic or cultural values from the universal normative that would allow access to recognition? Perhaps, we can point the way to recognition as redistribution and vice versa under the Hegelian understanding that if all particularities make up the universal whole, all that is cultural would inevitably be human and indivisible.

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## THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL: risks and challenges of mega-mergers in the agri-food sector for food safety in Brazil

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### ABSTRACT

Brazil is the global leader in the consumption of pesticides for agricultural production, a practice that has a profound impact on the environment. This reality is the fruit of a set of local and global socioeconomic factors, among them the tendency to the very high concentration of the food production market. This article seeks to make a counterpoint between the global dynamics of market concentration of inputs (seeds and pesticides) and their impacts on food safety and regulatory advances and setbacks in Brazil.

**Keywords:** Food security; Human rights; regulation.

*O GLOBAL E O LOCAL: riscos e desafios das megafusões no setor agroalimentar para a segurança alimentar no Brasil*

### RESUMO

*O Brasil é o líder global no consumo de pesticidas para a produção agrícola, prática que impacta profundamente o meio ambiente. Esta realidade é fruto de um conjunto de fatores socioeconômicos locais e globais, dentre eles a tendência à altíssima concentração do mercado de produção de alimentos. Este artigo busca fazer um contraponto entre as dinâmicas globais de concentração do mercado de insumos (sementes e pesticidas) e seus impactos para a segurança alimentar e os avanços e retrocessos regulatórios no Brasil.*

*Palavras-chave: Segurança alimentar; Direitos Humanos; regulamentação.*

*GLOBAL Y EL LUGAR: Los riesgos y desafíos de las megafusiones en el sector agroalimentario para la seguridad alimentaria en Brasil*

### RESUMEN

*Brasil es el líder mundial en el consumo de pesticidas para la producción agrícola, una práctica que impacta profundamente el medio ambiente. Esto es el resultado de una serie de factores socioeconómicos locales y mundiales, incluida la tendencia a una concentración muy alta del mercado de la producción de alimentos. Este*

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*artículo busca hacer un contrapunto entre la dinámica global de la concentración del mercado de alimentos (semillas y pesticidas) y sus impactos en la seguridad alimentaria y los avances y retrocesos regulatorios en Brasil.*

*Palabras clave: Seguridad alimentaria; Derechos humanos; regulación.*

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The consumption of pesticides is a global and local problem. Around the world, pesticides cause about 200,000 deaths from acute poisoning per year, the vast majority of which occur in developing countries (UNITED NATIONS, 2017), including Brazil, where it is a public health issue. Brazil is one of the world leaders in the consumption of pesticides: in 2017 alone, 377,196 tons of active ingredients were marketed in Brazil, and in 2018, there were 549,280.44 tons.

The country has countless cases of acute contamination, much of it through direct contact due to occupational exposure, food intake, and environmental contamination. Pesticides are made up of chemicals - active ingredients - and that is the danger to human life. In this context of severe food insecurity, it is necessary to map and assess some of the factors that have led to this context in the last decade. In this text we will make a counterpoint between the global dynamics of the concentration of the market of inputs (seeds and pesticides) and the impacts on food safety, and the advances and regulatory setbacks in Brazil.

## **2 GLOBAL: MEGA-MERGERS AND THE RISKS TO FOOD SAFETY**

Industrial agriculture and food systems have been structured in such a way as to allow for the accumulation of value by a limited number of agents, who have their economic and political power strengthened and therefore have greater capacity to exercise governance. This economic field, created by the companies themselves, according to the volume and structure of the capital they own, has determined the structure of the field and the state of its influence in the sector. The greater its capital - variable according to the history of the field, the level of development and concentration and according to the particularity of the product - the greater is its power to maintain the configuration of the field / sector.

Concentration can mean one company (monopoly) or few companies (oligopoly) controlling the market. There have been waves of concentration since the late 1980s, but nowadays most markets are oligopolies and this enormous economic power and also political power - by the influence it exerts on the decision-making of the state, as we have shown above in the case of Brazil - substantially impacts human rights, mainly in the countries of the global south, where the political discourse of economic development seems to lead to indiscriminate incentive to investment and then to laxity and weakness in the regulation of companies.

Concentration has been a feature of the agro-chemical-food sector since the late 20th century. 2015 was the year of mega-acquisitions and mergers (M&A), globally connecting all nodes in the supply chain, leading to an unprecedented consolidation of the agro-chemical and food market. The concentration indicator assesses market competitiveness by estimating the total market share of a given number of companies, in relation to the total market size. If four companies control more than 40% of the market, this concentration creates barriers to entry for new companies or players, i.e. when most companies have competitive advantages over new entrants due to their dominant position.

This process of concentration also demands structural change, and in this context new biotechnologies, data technologies and financialization are powerful vectors, according to the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems 2017 (IPES FOOD, 2017). In the vertical direction of concentration or consolidation, agrochemical companies are acquiring seed companies, opening up new paths for crop development. Agricultural input companies are diversifying and moving towards hostile strategies to integrate their activities.

New biotechnologies have been of fundamental importance in consolidating the agro-biochemical-technological food market, bringing together seed and chemistry. According to the IPES (2017), the largest contract for fusion and acquisition in the last two years was between the chemical and seed industries, which has a strong impact on human rights in Brazil, due to the impacts on food, health and the environment. Bayer's mega-merger with Monsanto has restricted the agrochemicals and seeds sector to just 3 companies with control over 70 percent of pesticides and over 60 percent to the seed industries, which can dramatically reconfigure the \$100 billion sector.

On September 14, 2016, Bayer and Monsanto signed the definitive merger agreement, with the commitment to maintain a strong presence in the seed business, genetic traits - and crop protection, combining Monsanto's leadership in seeds and traits with Bayer's broad crop protection product line through a range of indications and crops across all major geographies around the world. The result of the merger for the producers would be a set of combined solutions in seeds and Traits, digital agriculture and crop protection.

In this process was completed the purchase for \$9 billion of important assets from Bayer to BASF, on account of the requirements of antitrust laws. In addition to 4,500 new employees, entire divisions of projects, research and new technologies in herbicides, seed treatment and digital agriculture including the acquisition of Bayer's global plant seed business, operating primarily under the Nunhems® brand. This proposal for a giant food market is an incalculable risk to human rights if it is not accompanied by strong local and global regulation, as it leads to a loss of competitiveness and, consequently, a loss of interest in truly sustainable agricultural biotechnologies. The merger was completed in 2018, after its approval by the specialized agencies.

### **3 THE LOCAL: THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION OF PESTICIDE USE IN BRAZIL**

These global dynamics of concentration in the market of agricultural inputs directly impact on local - and global - regulatory issues, and in this direction the legislative saga in Brazil is not recent and begins with bill 6299/2002 (BRASIL, 2022b) that amends Articles 3 and 9 of Law 7.802/1989 (BRASIL, 2022b) on prior registration of agrochemicals, allowing registration by similarity.

PL 6299/2002 (BRASIL, 2022b) were joined other projects, such as PL nº 2.495, 2000 (BRASIL, 2022c), authored by congressperson Fernando Coruja, which also proposes the simplification of registration procedures, in the case of agrochemicals or similar to another already registered. PL nº 3.125, of 2000 (BRASIL, 2000), authored by Congressman Luís Carlos Heinze, proposes that the registration of agrochemicals for use in the agricultural, environmental or health areas be the exclusive responsibility of the respective Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, without the obligatory participation of the others, limiting the power of the States to request tests for a registered product. On the other hand, PL nº 6.189, of 2005, authored by congressperson Kátia Abreu, which also follows the path of weakening regulation, makes the simplified registration of equivalent or generic agrochemicals the exclusive competence of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply.

All six bills, according to the justification of the Chamber, would have the purpose of filling a gap existing in Law No. 7802, of 1989 (BRASIL, 1989) on equivalent plant protection products — also known as “generics”, in analogy to generic medicines, governed by Law No. 9787, of 1999 (BRASIL, 1999) —, proposing that they be established specific and simplified procedures for the registration of these products.

Cesar Halum’s bill No. 4,166, DE 2012 (BRASIL, 2012), for its part, determines the use of the term “agrochemicals”, instead of “agrototoxic”, on the grounds that the adoption of a generic terminology would provide national companies with conditions to compete with the large multinationals in the sector.

In 2016, the Brazilian government announced a new policy for agribusiness - Bill No. 4933 of 2016 (BRASIL, 2016) -, presenting as an “unbureaucratized and modernized” model for agriculture, called the Agro + Program. The new model was created by the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA- Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento), Blairo Maggi. As part of this new policy, the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA- Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária) published, on January 11, 2016, Service Guideline No. 6, which establishes the simplification of the toxicological evaluation procedure to amend, include or exclude manufacturers of technical products, reducing the role of ANVISA and the Brazilian Institute for the Environment (IBAMA- Instituto

Brasileiro de Meio Ambiente), claiming the need to ensure a faster registration of contaminants.

In 2019, further change in the registration procedure for pesticides. For the approval of the registration the pesticide must pass through the evaluation of three organs of the federal government, which are, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the National Agency for Sanitary Vigilance (ANVISA). Ibama is carrying out an environmental dossier, assessing the potential polluter of the product. The Map has the function of evaluating efficiency and potential for use in agriculture, by means of an agronomic dossier. And finally, Anvisa carries out the toxicological dossier, assessing how toxic the product is for the population and under what conditions its use is safe.

On February 9, 2022, the Chamber of Deputies approved by 301 votes to 150, with amendments, the bill 6299/02 (BRASIL, 2022b) initiative of the Senate and so the bill returned to this Chamber. The changes came in the form of the deputy substitutive Luiz Nishimori and can be summarized as follows: 1) the term “agrotóxico” is replaced by “pesticide”, but when used in forests and in water environments, the agrochemicals come to be called “products of environmental control”, and their registration will fall to the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), of the Ministry of the Environment; 2) the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment and the Ministry of Health, through the National Agency for Sanitary Surveillance (ANVISA), continue to issue an opinion for the registration or change procedures of the but only the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment will be able to apply the penalties and audit companies and research institutes<sup>1</sup>. Supporters of the bill applauded the victory on the grounds that the bill will modernize agriculture and guarantee more competitiveness for the Brazilian market.

Criticism of this project by some sections of society is mixed and contentious. The bill is called the poison PL, because it will make it easier and more flexible to register new pesticides, meaning that products that are dangerous to health and the environment will no longer be considered extremely toxic. Certainly the project will not bring benefits to the farmer, since it will not imply a reduction in costs, but in fostering the large corporations of the sector. According to an article published on the website of the Brazilian Association of Collective Health (ABRASCO- Associação Brasileira de Saúde Coletiva);

[...] the text establishes unrealistic deadlines for forcing the approval of poisons, conferring a temporary registration for every product that is not analyzed in the shortest period of two

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1 Agência Câmara de Notícias.

years - provided that the poison is recognized by at least three countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Brazil is not part. (ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE SAÚDE COLETIVA; ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE AGROECOLOGIA, 2018).

And the icing on the cake: the change from “agrototoxic” to “pesticide”. According to the coordinator of the Healthy and Sustainable Food Program of the Consumer Defense Institute (IDEC, 2018), there is a project under way in the Chamber of Deputies that represents serious setbacks to health and the environment, by relaxing the current Law on agrochemicals. This statement is confirmed:

What we need is a law that eliminates food pesticides. The approval of this bill demonstrates that Brazil is following the opposite path to that indicated by international research and conferences that show the need for reducing the use of agrochemicals, with stricter regulations and monitoring, protecting people and natural resources. (CAROSELLA; JAIME; ABRAMOVAY, 2022)

In this sense, Senator Rogério Carvalho (PT/CE) presented on March 09th Bill 494/2022 (BRASIL, 2022a) that obliges the companies that produce pesticides to renew the registration of these substances every 10 years, with the participation of health and environmental bodies, thus proposing a turnaround in what has been designed from PL 6299/2002 (BRASIL, 2022b). This dramatic picture is largely the result of the strong agri-food market lobby in the country. The Agribusiness Atlas shows that this lobby in Brazil is institutionalized, functioning in the National Congress through the Parliamentary Front of Agriculture and Livestock, considered the most organized face of the rural caucus in the country. The policies in the Brazilian food market dictated by the Front are financed by the private sector, through the think tank called Instituto Pensar Agro (IPA- Instituto Pensar Agro).

#### **4 CLOSING REMARK**

The scenario that was sought to be understood shows that the policy for using pesticides as a means of guaranteeing health, the environment and safety in Brazil has only been losing ground. The current policy of the Brazilian government has been favorable to the deregulation of pesticide control. As of early 2019, there were approximately 13,300 pesticide registrations and a further 479 registrations have been made. Of this annual total, 448 are generic active ingredients, with 79 products classified as highly dangerous to the environment and 6 as extremely toxic,

as reported in the Pesticide and Phytosanitary Management System of the MAPA. According to the MAPA information system, by April 2020, another 183 records have been released, including Atectra and Basf's Provisia 50 EC, the Bravonil Top and Syngenta's Avicta 500FS, all classified as high toxicity.

The indiscriminate use of pesticides in Brazil is a public health issue and this reality of food insecurity is a consequence of a set of global and local factors. At a global level, the imbrication of biochemical technologies and seeds in the production of food, a fundamental capital in the power relations between companies in the sector in the quest for market control, and, the very high concentration, which brings about a loss of competitiveness and consequently a loss of interest in the development of truly sustainable technologies — which do not impact people's health and the environment — are preponderant in the increase of the level of food insecurity. Added to this is the difficulty of implementing adequate and efficient regulatory instruments globally that can align corporate strategies and operations with human rights.

At the local level, Brazil's traditional agro-export economic policy, which focuses on large monocultures, is a decisive factor in the taking of political decisions, in the sense that a really adequate regulation is implemented, which establishes clear limits to the use of pesticides in agriculture. Despite the obstacles and legislative disputes that prevent Brazil from moving towards a more sustainable agriculture, especially one that restricts pesticide use, there is a tendency in the private sector to incorporate human rights into its production chains in order to reconcile economic interest with social impacts, even though this trend is not observed in food practices. Guaranteeing food security in Brazil, which goes beyond quantitative access to food, but also includes food quality, depends on adequate and effective global and local regulations, on the leading role of companies in the sector in investing in innovative and sustainable agricultural technologies, on the political participation of civil society in legislative debates and in monitoring corporate practices.

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## THE PATH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENSE IN BRAZIL

Over the last two hundred years, the Brazilian public administration has been changing, going basically through three models: patrimonialism, during the period of the Empire and the early years of the Republic, where the main characteristic was the permeability between the public and the private, when the State was an extension of the power of the king and the nobility and, later, the rural aristocracy; the bureaucratic, which would remain until the 90s, based on Max Weber's ideas of rationality, legitimacy and legal-authority, where the professionalization of the public servant was sought, through meritocracy, impersonality in the treatment of the *res publica* and the formalization of rules and procedures; and managerial, which sought the use of private sector management tools in the public sector, with diminished state apparatus, efficiency of processes, cost reduction and quality in the provision of services, with a focus on results and, with this, develop a managerial culture in public administration.

This forum intends to bring an overview of this trajectory, being divided into three parts: in the first, Frederico Lustosa da Costa shows, through history, narratives and representations of the state and social apparatus, the trajectory of Brazilian public administration in the early years of its formation, especially during the colonial period, the United Kingdom and independent Brazil. In the second part, Paulo Roberto Motta presents an overview of contemporary management and how the progress of globalization and connectivity has produced a new era of interdependence and instantaneity. Lifestyles and work resemble and interconnect in a universal, instantaneous and ubiquitous way, bringing new challenges to public management, in particular to leadership, which starts to be based less on capacity and personal styles and more on inter relational competence. In the third part, Jacintho Maia Neto contextualizes management in the defense sector, presenting its peculiarities and how it started to incorporate concepts of business and public policies management, such as: governance, compliance, accountability, integrity, transparency and management practices that provide a more effective and efficient performance of the sector, mainly in the functions of planning, organization, leadership and control.

Jacintho Maia Neto  
Guest Editor

## STATE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT BRAZIL\*

Frederico Lustosa da Costa\*\*

Brazil, the seat of the monarchy, is the ancestor of Brazil's Empire.

Roberto Macedo

### ABSTRACT

The celebrations for the 200th anniversary of the Independence of Brazil have not had the same prominence as the centenary and sesquicentennial commemorations, celebrated with great splendor. The few events scheduled for the year 2022 did not intend to highlight the history of the construction of the national State and the formation of the Brazilian public administration and to contribute to the institutional historiography. This article constitutes a small contribution in this sense, offering a very brief overview of the transformations that the Brazilian State and public administration underwent in the early years of its formation, demarcating the phases of administration of the colony, of a member country of the United Kingdom (Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves) and of the independent Brazil.

**Keywords:** State; administration; administrative history; bicentennial of the Independence of Brazil

### ESTADO E ADMINISTRAÇÃO PÚBLICA NA HISTÓRIA DO BRASIL INDEPENDENTE

#### RESUMO

*As comemorações pela passagem dos 200 anos da Independência do Brasil não têm tido o mesmo destaque das efemérides do centenário e do sesquicentenário, celebradas com grande pompa. Os poucos eventos programados para o ano de 2022 não procuraram destacar a história da construção do Estado nacional e da formação da administração pública brasileira e contribuir para a historiografia institucional. Este artigo constituiu uma pequena contribuição nesse sentido, oferecendo um brevíssimo panorama das transformações por que passaram o Estado e a administração pública brasileira nos anos iniciais de sua formação, demarcando as fases de administração da colônia, de um país membro do Reino Unido (Portugal, Brasil, Algarves) e do Brasil independente.*

*Palavras-chave: Estado; administração; história administrativa; bicentenário da independência do Brasil.*

\* This article takes up, in a briefer way, arguments presented in Lustosa da Costa (2008).

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## ESTADO Y ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA EN LA HISTORIA DEL BRASIL INDEPENDIENTE

### RESUMEN

*Las celebraciones por el 200 aniversario de la Independencia de Brasil no han tenido la misma prominencia que las efeméridas del centenario y el Sesquicentenario, celebradas con gran pompa. Los pocos actos programados para el año 2022 no intentaron destacar la historia de la construcción del Estado nacional y de la formación de la administración pública brasileña y contribuir a la historiografía institucional. Este artículo constituyó una pequeña contribución en este sentido, ofreciendo una visión extremadamente breve de las transformaciones que el Estado y la administración pública brasileña habían experimentado en los primeros años de su formación, distinguiendo entre las etapas de administración de la colonia, de un país que es miembro del Reino Unido (Portugal, Brasil, Algarve) y del Brasil independiente.*

*Palabras clave: Estado; administración; historia administrativa; bicentenario de la independencia de Brasil.*

### 1 INTRODUCTION

At a good moment, the Escola Superior de Guerra decided to publish a special edition of its magazine, to mark the 200th anniversary of the independence of Brazil. In these dark times, the initiatives of teaching and research institutions and historians to organize events and publications that put the constitution of the sovereign nation and its political society at the forefront have been rare. Even the official celebrations are practically restricted to an exhibition about the Centenary of Independence at the National Historical Museum<sup>1</sup>, from May to December 2022, to a larger seminar promoted by the Chamber of Deputies<sup>2</sup>, at the end of June, and to the reopening of the Ipiranga Museum (São Paulo Museum of the University of São Paulo), in September.

All the ephemerides show controversy as to the chronology and the accuracy of the facts, but always provide useful reflections on the country's history and its contemporary reality. In 1922, there were larger celebrations, beginning with the grandiose International Exhibition of the Centenary of Independence, which changed the physiognomy of Rio de Janeiro (MOTTA, 1992) and was attended by 20 heads of state. Furthermore, although without any direct link with this national date, the Week of Modern Art, with all its contradictions, is a landmark in the affirmation of Brazilianness, of the emergence of a syncretic culture born of modernist "anthropophagy".

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1 (NATIONAL HISTORICAL MUSEUM, 2022)

2 (BRASIL, 2022)



In 1972, the military government made a point of highlighting the ephemeris of the sesquicentennial, in jingoistic tones, with exhibitions, sports tournaments, events, publications, jingles, songs and advertisements widely aired, commemorations that culminated with the transfer of the remains of Emperor Dom Pedro I and Empress consort Dona Leopoldina to the mausoleum of the Ipiranga Museum. From the point of view of intellectual and, above all, historiographic production, the period also left important records, starting with the 17 volumes of the Library of the Sesquicentennial, published by the Federal Government in partnership with the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB) (SOSNOSKY, 2013). In the following years, the two celebrations left behind a vast bibliography about the festivals and about independence itself.

In 2008, during the commemoration of the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro, there was an attempt to anticipate the discussion about the formation of the national State and the re-equipment of the colonial administration for the constitution of an apparatus capable of affirming sovereignty and imposing itself as legitimate authority over the immense Brazilian territory (LUSTOSA DA COSTA, 2008; LUSTOSA DA COSTA; O'DONNELL, MENDES, 2009; LUSTOSA DA COSTA, ZAMOT, 2010).

These last initiatives constituted an embryo of a small movement to rescue the tradition of historical studies in the field of public administration, leading to the holding of other events, the editing of new publications, and the establishment of thematic seminars and permanent themes in events such as the National Meeting of ANAPAD (ENANPAD), the National Meeting of Government and Public Administration (ENAPG, also of ANAPAD), and the Brazilian Meeting of Public Administration (EBAP) (LUSTOSA DA COSTA; MARINHO LUSTOSA DA COSTA, 2016).

This text adds a small brick to this construction and contributes so that such an important date in the history of Brazil, the bicentenary of Independence, does not go unnoticed. It represents a two-phase historical record. First, it is a small note about the great transformations that happened in the public administration in those tumultuous moments that mark the passage from the modest colonial oversight - distant, precarious and almost impotent - to the apparatus of a national State, first Portuguese, and then Brazilian, closer to the administered objects, controllable and, supposedly, more effective. Second, it constitutes the resumption of the project of a new history of Brazilian public administration, incorporating new themes to those proposed in previous initiatives (LUSTOSA DA COSTA, 2010).

Thus, this work presents, in the following chapter, a brief description of the colonial administration; a discussion on the constitution of the state apparatus constituted from the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro; and, still, in the same part, the main changes introduced in the administration of the new Empire during the first reign are briefly recorded.

The final considerations summarize the findings highlighted and bring new research perspectives in the field of public administration history.

## **2 THREE MOMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL STATE**

This part of the text briefly exposes how the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro and the differentiation of the colonial administration allowed the legitimation of a local economic elite - the national “bourgeoisie” (FERNANDES, 1976), the emergence of an enlarged public space in the former colony - the “public opinion” (LUSTOSA, 2000) and the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic-patrimonial elite (CÂNDIDO, 2017), favoring the constitution of the administrative apparatus that prompted the formation of a national state in the tropics and strengthening the presence of public power, the luso-brazilian sovereignty and the embodiment of the national bureaucratic apparatus.

### **2.1 COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION**

Notwithstanding the importance of the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 for the construction of the National State, it cannot be said that nothing existed in the country in terms of institutional and administrative apparatus. There was a broad, complex and ramified administration in Brazil. In spite of the wide range of attributions and the great number of positions and instances, the administration of the colony differed little internally from the functional point of view (PRADO JÚNIOR, 1979). There was a tangle of ordinances, charges, attributions, circumscriptions, particular dispositions and extraordinary missions that did not present uniformity in terms of division of labor and hierarchy. In this legislative morass, functions were instituted in one place that did not exist in others; competencies were conferred to a servant when they already belonged to others; direct subordination subverted hierarchy and undermined authority.

The colonial administration was organized into four levels - the metropolitan institutions (Portuguese Crown), the central administration (General Government), the regional administration (captaincies) and the local administration (chambers of cities and towns). This structure had at its top, at the metropolitan level, the Overseas Council, subordinate to the Secretary of State for the Affairs of the Navy and Overseas Territories, which dealt with almost all aspects of the life of the colonies, leaving the Bureau of Conscience and Orders in charge of ecclesiastical affairs.

In its territorial organization, Brazil was divided into captaincies, which constituted the largest administrative units of the Colony. Its territory was divided into comarcas and these comprised terms based in the cities or towns. The terms were formed by parishes that coincided with the parishes of the ecclesiastical circumscription. Finally, the parishes were divided into neighborhoods, whose jurisdiction was quite imprecise (PRADO JÚNIOR, 1979, p. 306).

In 1549, with the failure of the private administration of most hereditary captaincies, the Portuguese Crown assumed direct control and was concerned

with instituting a central administration to deal with the pressing issues of defense against the attacks of the invaders and the more bellicose Indians. This was how the General Government was constituted, with its headquarters in Bahia, and, from 1773, already in Rio de Janeiro, was to be constituted as the viceroyalty. The viceroy had greater prominence over the other governors, but his power was limited. The greatest authority of the captaincy was the governor or captain-general or even captain-major. In Rio de Janeiro, the governor was also called viceroy. The captaincies were divided into general<sup>3</sup> and subaltern<sup>4</sup>. The governors of the former exercised similar powers to the viceroy, some even claiming treatment as viceroy. The governor's authority was primarily military, but his jurisdiction encompassed the entire administration.

Arno and Maria José Wehling (1999) resumed the historical synthesis of Caio Prado Júnior to point out as the main characteristics of colonial administration until centralization, the absence of differentiation (of functions), mimicry, the profusion and minuteness of norms, formalism and sluggishness. In spite of a certain anachronism of these categorizations, the authors recognize that these "dysfunctions" resulted, to a large extent, from the transplantation to the Colony of existing institutions in the Metropolis and the vacuum of authority (and obedience) in the immense "Brazilian" territory.

But in the course of three centuries since the *discovery* of Brazil, there has been a gradual process of rationalization of the colonial government. From the eighteenth century, in the Pombalina administration, it was seen to replace, little by little, the paternalist empiricism of traditional absolutism with the rationalism typical of enlightened despotism. This change was mainly expressed in the working methods and processes that gave way to the emergence of an incipient bureaucracy.

## 2.2 BRAZIL, SEAT OF THE MONARCHY

If, until 1808, there existed in Brazil and, above all, in the headquarters of the General Government (viceroyalty) a relatively well equipped colonial administration, it was the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro and, later, the formation of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve, with the installation of its headquarters in the former colony, that made the constitution of a new national state irreversible. A whole bureaucratic apparatus, transplanted from Lisbon or formed here in parallel with the old metropolitan administration, had to be structured for sovereignty to assert itself, the State to be constituted

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3 Bahia, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Pará, Maranhão, Goiás and Mato Grosso.

4 São José do Rio Negro, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Espírito Santo, Rio Grande de São Pedro and Santa Catarina. The captaincies of Ceará and Paraíba became autonomous in 1799 and of Rio Grande de São Pedro in 1802.

and projected onto the territory, and the government to be able to take decisions, dictate policies and act.

Many historians believe that the move of the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil took place in a painstaking manner. Indeed, until the last moment, the Prince Regent hesitated to leave in the face of the remote possibility of the French accepting another bribe. It was only decided when General Junot's troops were already on Portuguese soil, at the gates of Lisbon. The mess presented in some of the reports of the departure for the long crossing is not consistent with the necessary planning that the unprecedented change of a court to another continent should deserve (WILCKEN, 2005, p. 35-38). As Calógeras (1980) assured:

The entire administrative collection was on board: archives, documents and government papers, and so arranged that upon landing in Rio de Janeiro, no shortage or special difficulty was felt, and the aim of directing the monarchy continued on the New Continent as normally as if the regent had been in Lisbon (p. 59).

D João VI arrived in Rio de Janeiro with a government made up of only three ministers - that of the Kingdom or of the Kingdom, whose holder also acted as an assistant minister to the Cabinet Order and as President of the Royal Treasury; that of the War and Foreigners (or of the War and Foreign Affairs) and of the Navy (or of the Navy Affairs) and of the Overseas Dominions. I mean, three ministers for six portfolios.

The metropolitan inversion required the constitution of a number of organisms that existed in the former seat of the Kingdom, some of which were not as necessary as others that were urgently established here. The government that was constituted here was organized according to the Almanac of Lisbon, offering space for the creation of offices and honors for so many who had agreed to move to Rio de Janeiro in the service of His Royal Highness. From the outset, the Paço Desembargo, the Council of the Treasury (and the Royal Treasury) and the Board of Trade, Agriculture, Factories and Navigation of Brazil were created, and, according to Hipólito da Costa, the country needed "a council of mines, an inspection to open roads, an editorial map, an examination of the navigation of the rivers" (VINHOSA, 1984, p. 167).

But the Government was soon willing to create other useful and necessary institutions, such as the Navy Academy and the Academy of Artillery and Fortifications, the Military Archive, the Royal Typography and the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*, the Powder Factory, the Botanical Garden and the Royal Museum, the National Library, the Royal School of Sciences, Arts and Crafts and the Academy of Belas Artes, the Banco do Brasil and the iron-works of Ipanema. In a short time, many institutional, legal and administrative organizations and innovations were

emerging that had a wide impact on the economic, social, political and cultural life of Brazil. They are creations of every order - laws, cities, industries, roads, buildings, laws, taxes, chains, festivals and customs that came to be introduced into the daily life of the former Colony.

The transfer of the Court and, later, the elevation of Brazil to the integral part of the United Kingdom of Portugal constituted the bases of the national State, with all the apparatus necessary for the affirmation of sovereignty and the functioning of self-government. The elevation to the status of court of a transcontinental empire made the new Brazilian administration, now duly equipped, the expression of the power of a national State that could never again be constituted a mere subsidiary of a Metropolis from abroad. That is what has happened.

### 2.3 INDEPENDENT BRAZILIAN ADMINISTRATION

The collapse of Napoleon I caused the geopolitical reorganization of Europe and a change in the profile of the monarchies of the Continent. With the agitations of the liberals in Porto, D. João VI had to return to Portugal and reassume political control of the Metropolis in 1821. The Crown Prince remained in Brazil, as regent of this part of the Kingdom, ruling with all administrative apparatus installed by the King. With the departure of the former holders, D Pedro I appointed his own ministry. The Ministry of the Kingdom absorbed the Foreign Affairs portfolio which was previously attached to the War Secretariat portfolio. With greater political authority in the country, the Prince Regent placed himself at the center of the local political disputes and in the counterpoint of the interests of the Metropolis.

The proposals under discussion in the Portuguese Courts pointed to the resumption of Brazil's colonial condition and to the demand for the return of the Crown Prince to Lisbon, which ended up putting him in opposition to the interests of the Metropolis, being the mobilization of the local population and the carrying out of a sequence of important political acts that culminated with Independence, a little more than a year after the departure of King John VI. After receiving a letter from Dona Leopoldina informing him of the meeting of the Council of State that she had presided over, Dom Pedro I proclaimed Independence on the banks of the Ipiranga River on September 7, 1822. He instituted the government of Brazil, using the administrative apparatus of the regency of the United Kingdom that broke up. This was followed by a series of events related to the (political) constitution of the government, the confrontation of the resistance to Independence, the convocation, installation, action and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the granting of the Constitution of 1824.

Dissolved the Constituent Assembly, the independent ruler of Brazil created a Council of State and commissioned him to draft the Charter he bestowed on the

country on March 25, 1824. In spite of the vice of origin, it was a liberal charter, better than the project that was under discussion in the Constituent Assembly. Quite detailed, the Constitution was up to date with emerging democratic principles. Brazil's first constitution maintained the Monarchy, the House of Orleans and Bragança dynasty and D. Pedro I as Emperor and perpetual defender of Brazil. It was a centralized unitary state whose territory was divided into provinces, which replaced the former captaincies.

There were four political powers - legislative, moderating, executive and judicial. Each province was headed by a President appointed by the Emperor, who took office before the Chamber of his capital. In each of them there was also a general council, whose members were elected together with the national representation. The monarch exercised moderating power, with the support of the Council of State, an advisory body, and, at the same time, the executive power, aided by his ministers of state. Legislative power was exercised by the General Assembly, formed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Empire. Judicial power was exercised by the judges of law and the magistrates of peace, for conciliation attempts prior to any trial. In the capital of the Empire and in the Provinces there was a Supreme Court of Justice, composed of learned judges drawn from the Relations. The organization of the municipalities did not change significantly, with the Chambers having the same role as they had in the Colony.

### **3 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

This short account of the transformations that the administration and the nascent state underwent in the former Portuguese colony in South America over a period of less than 15 years illustrates the need and importance of deepening the study of Brazil's institutional history.

Indeed, it is almost impossible to understand the role of the modern State and its most recent changes without trying to reconstruct the processes of formation and historical differentiation of the political institutions, the legal order and the administrative apparatus that embody it. This reconstruction involves not only the recognition of facts, processes, actors and structures, but also the redemption of historical narratives, analyzes and systematizations that, by valuing or neglecting certain aspects of reality, build our collective representations.

It is a question of producing a new history of public administration supported by conceptual and methodological bases that take into account the advances of contemporary historiography, overcoming once and for all the weaknesses of the history "événementielle", so to speak, oriented to the account of acts and facts of "great men" (LUSTOSA DA COSTA; LUSTOSA DA COSTA, 2016).

Some progress in this direction has already been achieved, as pointed out in the introduction to this article. But the celebration of the two hundred years of

Brazil's independence is an opportunity that cannot be neglected. Let the events that are still being carried out and publications like this one contribute to enrich the field of historical studies in the area of public administration and the bibliography of the Brazilian State.

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## THE AGE OF INSTANTANEITY AND CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT

Paulo Roberto Motta\*

### ABSTRACT

Instantaneity arises from the central idea that, in a more globalized and connected world, the speed of the changes has impacted people's lives and the environment of organizations, requiring a growing capacity for adaptability and continuous reconstruction of work and employment. In this context, this article presents reflections on this reality and how it impacts the administrative life of organizations and reconfigures their relationship with their workforce.

**Keywords:** Instantaneity; management; connectivity; bicentennial of the Independence of Brazil.

### A ERA DA INSTANTANEIDADE E A GESTÃO CONTEMPORÂNEA

#### RESUMO

*A instantaneidade surge da ideia central de que, em um mundo mais globalizado e conectado, a velocidade das mudanças tem impactado a vida das pessoas e a ambiência das organizações, exigindo uma crescente capacidade de adaptabilidade e de contínua reconstrução do trabalho e do emprego. Nesse contexto, esse artigo apresenta reflexões sobre essa realidade e de como ela impacta a vida administrativa das organizações e reconfigura a sua relação com sua força de trabalho.*

*Palavras-chave: instantaneidade; gestão; conectividade; bicentenário da Independência do Brasil.*

### LA ERA DE LA INMEDIACIÓN Y LA GESTIÓN CONTEMPORÁNEA

#### RESUMEN

*La inestabilidad se debe a la idea central de que, en un mundo más globalizado y conectado, la velocidad del cambio ha repercutido en la vida de las personas y en el ambiente de las organizaciones, lo que requiere una capacidad cada vez mayor de adaptación y la reconstrucción continua del trabajo y el empleo. En este contexto, este artículo presenta reflexiones sobre esta realidad y cómo impacta en la vida administrativa de las organizaciones y reconfigura su relación con sus trabajadores.*

*Palabras clave: inestabilidad; gestión; conectividad; dos bicentenarios de la independencia de Brasil.*

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## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The progress of globalization and connectivity has produced a new era of interdependence and instantaneity. The insertion of information and communication technology in work and in the ways of life has led not only to the interconnection of productive arrangements, but also to social networks with universal, instantaneous and ubiquitous connectivity. Today, there seems to be a reality recreated, at every moment. Communications take place in worlds transformed by the times of sending and receiving.

This article aims to offer an interpretative look at the administrative reality of the contemporary world centered on the instantaneity of events and organizational reactions. The search for explanations and more interpretative thinking about the individual and collective meanings of the current changes are valued here. There is also a practical intention with regard to the usefulness and effectiveness of administrative models.

In today's instantaneity and complexity, there is more data and facts to encompass the variety of the world. Therefore, there is more difficulty for empirical generalizations, since the occurrences of fewer obvious things induce the curious minds of managers and collaborators in their attempts at new interpretations about administrative reality.

Offering new perspectives exposes options of thought, valuing the specificities of analysis themes and thus encouraging the practical world to develop new models of intervention.

This article focuses on two of the most important themes in this age of instantaneity: the new practices of thinking and reformulating strategic intentions and the reconstruction of work organization.

## **2 THINK AND REFORMULATE STRATEGIC INTENTIONS IN TIMELINESS**

Today, the environment created by digitalization is already understood as the natural environment of work and represents, in this 21st century, the most universal and rapid revolution in history, significantly affecting work and human life. Revolutions progress by the insertion of new knowledge, skills and administrative skills. The daily breaks and advances make evident the fragility of the most sophisticated instruments of planning, policy formulation and work organization.

Uncertainties, innovations and constant adaptations have always been the hallmark of modern organizational management. However, we can distinguish, in the current era, the instantaneity brought about by the ultra-rapid arrival of the future in a universally interconnected world. In responding to the challenges of complexity and instantaneity, large companies, as well as public institutions, increasingly restructure their work processes, model themselves in networks and

with more intensive interactions. Networks impact social relations, creating a sense of interaction and dependence for more efficient performance (MOTTA, 2017).

The advance in communicative forms is contemplated - enlarged to a larger universe and exercised simultaneously for more than one interlocutor. Today, staying connected to another external link means less undue distraction and more respect for the network, watchfulness for novelty and willingness to act and collaborate.

You see the online interlocutor, newly meddled in communication, as just as or more important than the main one - in person or virtual. The recentness of the information is perceived as a factor of relevance, since it may be out of date with the information presented in the agenda of the original discussion itself. Staying connected and prioritizing virtual instantaneity conveys a sense of security. In principle, there is no logical reason nor an appropriate time to disconnect. Disconnecting gives the notion of a loss of parameters, of disregard for new requests and of disregard for novelties.

Due to the overload of information, employees read more headlines, subheadings and some paragraphs to appropriate a view of the context, without, however, there being any deepening. For some, this practice allows only primary connections, avoids domination of a theme and signifies an intellectual decay (CARR, 2010). For others, of a more optimistic view, it portrays the human mind advancing in laterality. Even on the basis of vague knowledge and superficial analyzes, by exercising more connections between knowledge, people manage to produce greater creativity (PALFREY; GASSER, 2010).

Unlike a computer - built to store immense quantities of data -, the human mind has more flexibility: it keeps few details of each situation and extracts only the information useful for guiding solutions and decisions. In the age of instantaneity, intelligence does not reside in the mind of the person, but in the collective mind or in the social capital of each. To function better, employees need to take advantage of the knowledge stored in the environment, in computers and, above all, in the minds of others (SLOMAN; FERNBACH, 2017).

Contemporary expertise has somewhat changed its nature to accentuate the appreciation of the connections between data and knowledge. Computers store the detailed information, but experts can produce more valuable interpretations of the data (SLOMAN; FERNBACH, 2017). Access and technological learning are not a problem, but to think of being in it all solutions yes. For contemporary management, it is important to value people, their values and their interactions, and not only the technological instruments. There is a danger that new work technologies will overshadow people. Behind the screens, software and the voices of artificial intelligence, there are collaborators with dreams, expectations and immense capacity for discernment.

In spite of progress, the collection and analysis of data, increasingly automated, has not yet eliminated the need for the creative perspectives of

human minds. Artificial intelligence has advanced and focused on placing robots for collecting, storing and processing electronic data, but it is still subordinate to humans and guided by them. Humans develop the most creative interpretations and interconnections. It is also assumed that significant parts of these activities will not be replaced by robots.

As a new opportunity not only for interaction but also for creation, the environment of instantaneity emerges in contradiction to the real world. It idealizes, imagines and proposes new methods of action and problem-solving. In this new environment, the rapidity of digital technology shapes the behaviors of all: the nature and quantity of information determine the choices and the solution of the problems (VAN KNIPPENBERG *et al.*, 2015).

Awareness about the need for rapid attention to demands summons and naturally unites the available skills and competencies. For this reason, in contemporary organizations there seem to be simultaneous demonstrations about the value of individual assertiveness and collective solidarity. The search for rapidity in strategic responses facilitates a double attention: the recognition of the individuality of each collaborator for the team and the organization, as well as the recognition of the group effort for the collective construction of specific responses. The union is built by considering diversity of independent thoughts and behavior as a richness and not as an obstacle. Solidarity awareness invokes the participation of all - directly or indirectly - not only to improve responsiveness, but also to generate enthusiasm and commitment in the accomplishment of tasks.

The era of instantaneity, therefore, by its provocations of demands and of rapid responses, imposes the need for revision of forms of decision and action, above all, in the strategic formulations, as well as in the restructuring of the work processes. Time and experience, knowledge and intuition, chance and rationality, logic and logic, order and chaos, visions and expectations are always present concerns in the models of strategic decisions and public policies.

Contemporary strategic formulation seems increasingly to be a way of transcending reality in order to face the future. It needs to be thought out, imagined and dreamed to justify itself and to design new actions. Thus, paradoxically, "data" is sought about a non-existent reality - the future. Non-existent "data" do not confirm future paths or present data, which, due to rapid obsolescence, become improper for basing forecasts and projections about the future.

In the age of instantaneity, the strategic decision-making process takes place in the midst of environmental variations produced by demands and expectations of rapid service. On the one hand, it needs logic, predictability and tangibility as ways to master relevant factors. On the other, it seeks the vigor, immediacy and convictions of intuitive emotions to achieve the speed of response.

In isolation, despite being positive, the resources of logic and illogic prove to be insufficient. Systematic rational analyzes help the logical construction of

strategic decisions. Logical, globalist and anticipatory thinking about reality teaches interdependencies, antecedents and side effects of strategic actions. It provokes a confrontation of ideas, arguments and justifications of why certain things are done and others are not, besides generating an awareness of risks and uncertainties.

By rekindling intuition, one creates the value of illogic. By its immediacy and by dispensing with analysis, intuitive emotion contradicts passive postures of waiting for events to position themselves before them. Intuitive quickness brings the vigor of energy and emotional illogic to provide convictions and swift responses to the provocations of the contemporary world.

When making judgments about reality, managers and collaborators throw their values, emotions, and perceptions into the analysis and decision making process. Once considered undue and contrary to rationality, illogical interferences are seen today as natural and inherent to the human being - inalienable and even positive, for the vigor and speed they grant to planning.

Intuitive emotion encourages immediate intervention almost as a proaction, in reference to reality. However, it reduces awareness of risk and uncertainty, and makes participation and understanding of choice impossible. It is worth remembering that every intervention in reality means a discovery and, therefore, a continuous learning about difficulties, mistakes in forecasting and the needs for adaptations to the evolution of events.

In a demanding world of immediate responses, the contemporary strategic track means the continuous and rapid reconstruction of a strategic vision - incomplete or imperfect - that corrects itself with learning along the way. For a long time, stable bureaucratic ordination has served as an organizational model for facing the challenges of the modern world. When disorder appeared, structural changes restored order and stability.

By analogy with the natural sciences, one can see that the existing structures break down and do not naturally seek rebalancing. Attempt to reconstruct by models of order and stability is useless, since innovations are produced by qualitative changes, non-linear interactions or discontinuous transformational interactions (PRIGOGINE; STENGERS, 1984; PRIGOGINE; ALLEN, 1984).

The constant search for new models of rebalancing and the adaptation of organizations to the provocations of the environment led to the belief about the impossibility of an ordered or linear conception of the strategic process and about the constant changes in systemic relations (GLEICK, 2006).

Indeed, the age of instantaneity has brought the greatest concern with the effervescent complexity or variation of the interdependencies of organizational systems (MCMILLAN, 2008; ALLEN *et al.*, 2011; JACKSON, 2019), including for strategic decision in public organization (KIEL, 1989; 1993).

The perspective of instantaneity and complexity advanced to reveal surprise, unpredictability, risk and uncertainty as products of nonlinear dynamics, inherent

in organizational systems. The perspective of the administrative universe was introduced as naturally unpredictable. Because it is an interconnected system, small changes in a subsystem can produce large transformations in very distant subsystems. Therefore, it is worth noting, in the strategic formulations, that subsystems with an ordered appearance may suffer damaging and unexpected effects due to the difficulty of recognizing small ruptures in distant locations.

The greatest concern with uncertainty came with its correlate, risk. In this sense, it was understood that every strategic decision does not escape risk and uncertainty. Although some reliable information is available, it is always incomplete (risky) and unreliable (uncertain).

Thus, the greatest concern with the complexity or variation of the interdependencies of organizational systems was reinforced (MCMILLAN, 2008; ALLEN *et al.*, 2011; JACKSON, 2019), including for strategic decisions in public organization (KIEL, 1989; 1993).

Nowadays, managers and employees learn about their forecasts as subject to unpredictable changes and fluctuations. It is impossible both to ignore them and to know them. There will always be the unexpected, like the succession of aperiodic events. The age of instantaneity teaches: nothing is long-lived and every adaptation is ephemeral. Therefore, the incessant search becomes the common standard.

Thus, despite the increasing rigor of the methods of planning, analysts and managers are still surprised by contradictory perceptions of proposals and conclusions, arbitrary choices about the nature of the data and feelings of vulnerability about the responsiveness. The contemporary world enhances the difficulty, but also the possibility of strategic analyzes. In the age of instantaneity, the strategic perspective advanced both in thinking and deciding about the future and in the ways of relating to society. Emphasis on sensitivity to external demands, support and pressures is redoubled as the primary factor of organizational progress.

In the rapidity of instantaneity, reactive expression appears as more frequent, but also as easier and more realistic than any proactive analysis. In responding to the provocations of spontaneity, reactive analyzes mean both discovering and reinventing. The reactive mind is both analytical and spontaneous, and thus imaginative and creative.

Today, people progress through everyday social interactions. The intensity of communication has subjected people to the diversity of narratives and perspectives. Learning from social experience and adaptation to a virtual context of immense discontinuity, with frequent updates, produce dynamic and variable individual attributes (BURR, 2015).

Thus, in the age of instantaneity, identity is characterized by revealing, at the same time, the uniqueness of a person, as well as his social visibility and his dynamic way of integrating himself into an organization. In the virtual organization, leaders and collaborators interact on social networks in a calculated and referenced manner,

taking advantage of the perspectives of others, to value their own opinions and achievements. Thus, they impregnate themselves with feelings of independence, pride and self-esteem and act with more competence and confidence in the construction of a new reality.

### **3 RECONSTRUCTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT**

The traditional view of the work links employees to the exercise of certain tasks in which they learn standardized ways of responding to demands and submitting to regulated behaviors. The greatest possible impersonality is sought in the decision-making process, in the guidelines to the targets and in the common vision of the future. Work is specialized and divided; collaborative teams are created and unique loyalties to the team and organizational mission are developed. These forms, inspired by the Weberian bureaucracy, gained ground and served better in times of greater regularity, slowness and pressure to standardize organizational actions. Individual opportunities for unique and creative responses were hindered, as contributors felt incentives to passivity.

In modern evolution, organizations have been losing classic formalities such as structural divisionism and focus on formal work processes and employment.

On the other hand, they gain more effective formats to adapt to their surroundings, such as valuing teams, social platforms, and the collection of knowledge and skills. We highlight the interdependencies between teams characterized by collaborative, participatory styles, strategic alliances, and strong awareness about the need for coordination. The age of instantaneity is distinguished by an environment of great opportunities, but also of ruptures and uncertainties. To do so, organizations need to show an intense environmental sensitivity to make use of external possibilities, a compulsion for novelty and agility in all their work processes.

The era of instantaneity has already revealed tendencies for linking people more to work and less to organizations, making forecasts of an increase in these types of relationships of the productive world and a rapid transformation in the concept of work and employment. Currently, models are being sought that are more in tune with technology and the impositions of modern society, centered on the deconstruction of functions and the re-interconnection of tasks. The modern contributor tends to be more autonomous, directly linked to multiple platforms, and responsive to diverse demands. Their loyalties are directed more to the team itself and even to the social context and less to the organization itself, favoring pride for the well-done work and achievements of the group (JESUTHASAN, 2022).

In addition, in the midst of the ephemerality of functions, people seek new meanings of work, striving to establish a unique personal identity in the construction of reality. Thus, they are inclined to the initiative, creativity and expressiveness of

the self. The link more with work and less with the organization tends to value skills and competencies that are hidden and unused (JESUTHASAN, 2022).

The intense and constant communication leaves more perceptible information and knowledge stored in the minds of collaborators and arouses another vision of reality. Thus, they favor the understanding of individual experiences, tasks and values that underpin daily labor. It expands the space to consider diversity, reduce differences and increase harmony in decisions and actions. Social platforms open the frontiers of communication to the variety of thoughts and to the generation of new ideas. People's understanding grows as new visions and reinterpretations of reality become known. Social and work networks bring collaborators closer together, providing them with a fuller insight into the usual and unusual.

By welcoming and enjoying the availability of information and virtual communication, collaborators independently develop new perspectives on their tasks, their jobs and the organization of society. Therefore, it seems more appropriate, in the age of instantaneity, to unleash the creative and concrete potential that exists in people, favoring attention to unusual practices.

Thus, not only does daily life become more efficient and hopeful, but it also leads employees to rethink their own tasks and to visualize new ways of relationship and distribution of information. In addition, it is also useful to value *insights*, that is, instantaneous and sudden manifestations, products of knowledge hidden in the human mind. It is a unique moment of instant insight, enlightenment, and intuition, which reveals human wit to learn quickly through intuitive understanding.

Reconstruction means adapting, redefining and reinventing work and, after significant changes in interaction with others and with the advance of technology, glimpsing new opportunities and technological potentialities. The search for the creative expression of the self reveals the need of the human being to be a singular and original participant in the construction of reality.

Currently, with a greater attention to the virtual, unconstructed tasks are combined with others in unusual forms of complementation and collaboration (JESUTHASAN, 2022). In a world where the future is fast approaching the present and where there is little time to define and solve problems, all possibilities for strategic reflection are essential for referencing and speeding up decisions.

As productive organizations, the work will continue to be reinvented well in the light of constant and rapid technological and social transformation. It can no longer be predicted that the mere existence of jobs with well-defined functions and hierarchies will survive innovations that alter work tasks and relationships. Innovations are under way and will reach the productive world and the habits of life.

Many companies have learned to respond successfully and quickly to new demands for greater agility and value aggregation in their work processes (YEUNG; ULRICH, 2019). Most public organizations have adapted to and even reinvented their work processes, as the majority created before the digital age shows.



## 4 CLOSING REMARKS

Currently, managers and employees have become accustomed to the occurrences, projections and surprises of the changes. They live with the idea of innovation. They imagine and see the daily improvement of artificial intelligence as well as electronic communication tools and the breadth of digital platforms.

Even when idealized, cultural and social changes are slower. In the age of instantaneity, the main innovations are brought about by technologies. Because they are located less in society and more in technology, changes are inevitable (KELLY, 2017). In the new world of instantaneity, every day work becomes more automated. Human intelligence and skill lose space, and learning is increasingly virtual. Social dimensions receive more attention, such as community targeting and less monetary rewards (JESUTHASAN, 2022).

In the strategic sense, it is also worth following technological evolution attentively, referencing itself in the instantaneity and in the modernization and improvement of the work processes. The focus of the work tends to be more towards skills and competencies and artificial intelligence. Like products, personal routines and human work interactions also tend to become obsolete.

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## DEFENSE MANAGEMENT\*

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### ABSTRACT

The complexity of the military apparatus and its effective management are the central themes of this work, which has as a background the new demands of Defense, whether they originate from the centrality of war and its new dimensions, such as space and cybernetics, or those arising from demands of society such as support in the area of public security, assistance in natural disasters, support for major events and in combating endemics/pandemics such as dengue and COVID-19. Based on concepts from the area of management, in particular strategic management, the research presents *Defense Management* and some propositions that allow to seek greater efficiency and effectiveness of the Defense sector in the face of its new demands.

**Keywords:** Defense Management; Strategic Management; Armed Forces.

### A GESTÃO DA DEFESA

#### RESUMO

*A complexidade do aparato militar e a sua efetiva gestão são os temas centrais desse trabalho, que tem como pano de fundo as novas demandas da Defesa, sejam as oriundas da centralidade da guerra e de suas novas dimensões, tais como a espacial e a cibernética, ou as decorrentes de demandas da sociedade como o apoio na área de segurança pública, o auxílio nas catástrofes naturais, o apoio aos grandes eventos e no combate a endemias/pandemias como a dengue e a Covid-19. Com base em conceitos da área de gestão, em especial da gestão estratégica, a pesquisa apresenta a *Defense Management* e algumas proposições que permitam buscar uma maior eficiência e eficácia do setor de Defesa perante as suas novas demandas.*

*Palavras-chave:* Gestão da Defesa; Gestão Estratégica; Forças Armadas.

### ADMINISTRACIÓN DE DEFENSA

#### RESUMEN

*La complejidad del aparato militar y su gestión eficaz son los temas centrales de este trabajo, que tiene como telón de fondo las nuevas exigencias de la Defensa, ya sea que procedan de la centralidad de la guerra y de sus nuevas dimensiones,*

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\* This article takes up arguments initially set out in Maia Neto (2020).

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como el espacio y la cibernética, o de las demandas de la sociedad, como el apoyo en el ámbito de la seguridad pública, la asistencia en desastres naturales, el apoyo a grandes acontecimientos y la lucha contra las epidemias, como el dengue y la Covid-19. Sobre la base de los conceptos de la esfera de la gestión, en particular la gestión estratégica, la investigación presenta la gestión de la defensa y algunas propuestas que permitirán buscar una mayor eficiencia y eficacia del sector de la defensa frente a sus nuevas exigencias.

*Palabras clave: Gestión de la Defensa; Gestión Estratégica; Fuerzas Armadas.*

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The insertion of Defense as an object of study began to occur, initially in the context of Strategic Studies, more intensively in the American and European academic communities after World War II, reflecting the political context of the time. At that moment, there was a need to understand the new era that was being heralded with the use of nuclear artifacts, and what new power relations it would bring between countries. In administrative terms, how would the reconstruction - mainly - of European countries take place, how would the large masses of veterans react when returning to their countries after almost six years of war and what social and economic impact would they produce in their communities. Regarding the structures, the former ministries of war would be renamed Ministries of Defense, such as the U.S. Department of Defense in 1948. In Brazil, initially, academic research in Defense was very centered on civil-military relations, on civilian control over the military. In the theme of the period of military government (1964-1985), few researches were aimed at a more focused vision in the management environment and dealing with themes related to studies on the efficiency and effectiveness of the military apparatus, which will be considered, in this work, as a 2nd wave of Defense Studies.

This paper presents this perspective of the 2nd wave from the perspective of management in the context of Defense, starting with a conceptual basis on strategic management that allows the reader a more comprehensive view of management, allowing a conceptual broadening that will be essential for the understanding of Defense Management. Next, the new directions that the Defense sector has been following are presented, whether to meet the demands of society, of the new dimensions and typologies of war, as well as of international bodies. Subsequently, *Defense Management* and its peculiarities are revealed, ending with some propositions for a more effective management of Defense.

## 2 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

The “managerial” strand of the Defense Studies seeks to understand how the management of the defense sector occurs, be it the dynamics of its strategic

planning from the highest level to the implementation of the strategic plans of the Forces, the use of resources or the relations of this planning with the budget of the Union. Within this scope, strategic management presents itself as a tool that allows a more holistic view of the various management demands in an interdisciplinary and multifaceted environment like Defense.

According to Wright, Kroll and Parnell (2000), Strategic Management had its origins in the 1950s as Strategic Management, when the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation sponsored research into the curriculum of American business schools. A summary of the research was presented in the Gordon-Howell report (GORDON; HOWELL, 1959), which recommended that business teaching encompass a wider range of subjects, integrating knowledge of other disciplines, in particular “accounting, finance, marketing, administration and economics” (IBIDEM, p. 28), in addition to presenting students with real-world situations that involved the integration of diverse areas of companies and sought integrative solutions for their various functional areas. The proposals in the report have been adopted by various American universities and business schools, giving rise to a new discipline called business policy.

Over time, new subjects were introduced, such as social responsibility, ethics, analyzes of mission, objectives, formulation, implementation and control of strategies. However, different from the context of strategic planning at the time, the possible impacts of the political, legislative and economic environments on the implementation of the strategies were analyzed. With this expanded scope, the discipline changed its name to Strategic Management (CERTO; PETER, 1993; WRIGHT; KROLL; PARNELL, 2000).

Later, a new terminology would be used by Harry Igor Ansoff (1965) when presenting the concept of strategic management that embodied the perspective of organizational architecture, which was based on Chandler’s (1962) studies three years earlier, demonstrating the relationship of dependency between organizational structure and an organization’s goals and strategies.

The 70s would be marked by the rise of strategic planning, based on formal and rational planning, guided by objectives, strategies, programs and budgets, as defined by Mintzberg (2004). However, strategic planning and its systematic formulation and implementation of strategies failed to meet the growing demands arising from an environment of “hostilities and rapid changes” as Motta (2007, p.108) defined the knowledge-era environment. It was necessary to expand planning to all sectors of the organization, involving all levels of management (strategic, tactical and operational) to produce quick and effective responses to this new environment. It was no longer possible to remain with a static, immutable, self-centered planning to achieve goals that, in the face of environmental changes, have become unattainable or unnecessary for the organization (MINTZBERG, 2006).

In this context, strategic management (re)emerges, as a new paradigm of management, which would, in the objective definition of Mintzberg (1994), be “a

dynamic, systematic and cyclical process of analysis, selection and implementation” of strategies.

According to Toft (1989), strategic management is an “advanced and coherent form of strategic thinking, trying to extend the strategic vision across all units of the organization, encompassing the entire administrative system”. The issue of strategic vision is essential in this new management modeling, previously the managers saw the formulation of strategies in a separate way for each level and sector of the organization, and its implementation done in a gradual and phased manner at different moments. Currently, inserted in an environment of constant and rapid changes, the phases of formulation and implementation of strategies are interconnected and concomitant, without relevant time differences, which makes the implementation of the organization’s strategic vision focus on the constant search for results, with the objective of properly taking advantage of the opportunities of this new environment and to carry out course corrections in the planning, in time not to impact the achievement of the objectives (MAIA NETO, 2020).

As a way of making a short synopsis of the path taken by the planning up to the strategic management, the following table is followed:

**Chart 1 - The path of strategic management**

	Strategic Formulation	Strategic Planning	Strategic Administration	Strategic Management
Decade	1950	1960	1970	1980 =>
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Annual budget</li> <li>- Quantitative</li> <li>- Short term</li> <li>- Projection of long-term trends limited to the objectives or nature of the business</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Defines the direction of the company</li> <li>- Analysis of external environmental changes</li> <li>- Analysis of resources</li> <li>- Long-term implementation in an integrated way</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Administrative decisions</li> <li>- Focus on analysis and long-term implementation</li> <li>- Integrates knowledge from other disciplines</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Systemic Thinking</li> <li>- Integration between planning and control and evaluation</li> <li>- Change management</li> <li>- Organizational learning</li> <li>- Pursuit of organizational efficiency and effectiveness</li> </ul>
Deficiencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Does not commit to long-term forecasts in a systematic way</li> <li>- Does not predict environmental changes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deficiency in the implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Does not develop a systemic approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lack of tighter integration with Organizational Change models</li> </ul>
Main Theories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Classical Theory of Management</li> <li>- Theory of Management by objectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theory of Organizations</li> <li>- Theory of Contingency</li> <li>- General Theory of the Systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theory of Organizations</li> <li>- Theory of Industrial Organization</li> <li>- Theory of Contingency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theory of Organizations</li> <li>- Theory of Contingency</li> <li>- Theory of Complexity</li> </ul>

**Source:** Adapted from MOTTA (2007), ESTRADA; ALMEIDA (2007) and MAIA NETO (2020).

Just as planning and management have been changing over time to adapt to changes, we will see how this new environment has impacted Defense with new internal and external demands.

### **3 NEW ERA IN DEFENSE**

Over time, wars have changed, bringing new challenges to the Armed Forces of all countries. The three classical dimensions of the battlefield - land, naval and air - can no longer cover all facets of conflict. They were supplemented by the spatial dimension, cyberspace, networked environment and an almost infinite capacity for storing information that allows the connection of the real battlefield with the virtual. The enemy is no longer just the one materialized on the battlefield, representing a country or an alliance; it can be a political, religious or terrorist faction.

In the Brazilian case, other demands are also emerging from Brazilian society, whether in the area of public security, in helping natural disasters, in supporting major events or in specific demands such as endemics and pandemics, such as dengue fever and COVID-19. The impact that these challenges have generated on the Armed Forces, especially in their structuring, preparation and employment, has come to demand a more efficient and effective management of the military apparatus with a view to meeting the demands of society and the interests of the country.

Highly hierarchical environments, such as the military, also need to generate and absorb knowledge for their survival, particularly in times of diffuse environments and rapid change. According to Mintzberg (2004), the time for the elaboration of a planning or strategy formulation with its consequent implementation has decreased and has often been extinguished, requiring the planner to take joint action at all three levels of the organization (strategic, operational and tactical).

Leaner, specialized and better equipped military structures have become not only an operational requirement of the new asymmetric battlefield environment, but a requirement of society that needs ever-increasing investments in other sectors such as education, health and transportation (MAIA NETO, 2019). The Defense Sector needs to understand this new context, restructuring itself and becoming dual. Dual in the sense of operating efficiently in both the internal and the external environment, the same military organization will need to be able to meet the demands of these two environments.

In this context, the Brazilian Armed Forces are experiencing a managerial paradox, they need to equip the same military organization with what is most current to act in the external environment, directing their actions towards

external defense, to UN missions or in the ambit of regional cooperation, and, at the same time, to act in the internal environment, characterized by the demands that society imposes on them, such as the assistance to natural disasters, support to major events, acting in a police environment (combating transnational and environmental crimes, for example) and in operations for the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO).

The managerial paradox is characterized by the fact that it demands efficiency and effectiveness in two different environments, and that, as new demands arise in the area of security and defense and start to demand greater qualification and specificity from the members of the Armed Forces, becoming efficient and effective requires defining priorities.

Acting dually means overcoming the current paradigm that everyone should receive everything. There is no debate on the concept that all military personnel should or should not be capable of acting both internally and externally, but on their ability to manage structures and mechanisms that can cater to these two environments rationally and effectively.

It is in this sense that the management of the Defense sector is different from other sectors, specific and highly differentiated demands demand distinct resources, but coordinated, so that each military organization (OM) receives the investment in material, equipment and armaments in accordance with its environment of priority action. This management also involves defining which OMs should or should not participate in a given environment and defining what capabilities the Armed Forces should possess for each one (internal or external). The definition of these capabilities will determine the acquisition of the necessary material, equipment and type of weaponry (lethal or non-lethal).

Managing resources in the Defense area means understanding that Defense is a public good and as such, the organizations that make it up must report on its management in a transparent manner, both to society and to the control bodies, ensuring that the resources (financing, personnel, equipment, facilities, etc.) destined to their organizations are used efficiently and effectively, contributing to the achievement of the National Defense Objectives and Strategies materialized in the Defense documents (PND and END). It is in this context that Defense Management emerges.

#### **4 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT**

Over the last fifty years, this notion of the public good has imposed itself in the area of Defense and, as a result, its management has gone on to incorporate concepts of the management of companies and of public policies,



such as governance, compliance, accountability, integrity, transparency and managerial practices that would provide a more effective and efficient performance of the sector, mainly in the functions of planning, organization, leadership and control.

According to Ratchev (2009, p. 24) the idea of management as “a process of planning, organizing and provisioning personnel, directing and controlling activities within an organization in a systematic way in order to achieve a specific common goal”, based on four pillars: planning, organization and personnel, direction and leadership, and monitoring and control; also applies to the Defense environment.

In this sense, planning would be “the selection and sequential order of the tasks necessary to achieve the desired organizational goal”, while organization and personnel “are the assessment and coordination of roles, tasks and duties to be performed by the personnel and the distribution of the resources necessary to achieve a desired goal within a specific period of time”, such as the process of recruitment, selection, training, placement and development of personnel. Direction and leadership would be “the process of motivating, leading and influencing the team on the path to achieving the common goal” and, finally, monitoring and control would aim to “ensure that all units are moving toward the goal in a coordinated way”, evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of plans and decisions and correcting them when necessary (RATCHEV, 2009, p. 24 and 25).

As far as defense is concerned, being seen as an institutional process, according to Bucur-Marcu, Fluri and Tagarev (2009, p.5), “defense management lies between the formulation of defense policy and the effective command and control of the military forces.” This approach includes areas such as “defense resource management, personnel management, procurement management” for example. The authors emphasize that, in the implementation phase of defense policy, it is likely that the inherent uncertainties [and risks] will require greater flexibility and subsequent decisions, as well as unexpected problems that may arise, that will require their identification and the search for appropriate solutions, which were not initially foreseen.

As can be seen, Defense Management encompasses everything from the process of formulating the national defense policy and strategy, to its implementation in the context of the Armed Forces, to the command and control of these Forces, addressing the management of resources, personnel, acquisitions and everything that makes possible an effective and efficient management of the defense forces. The table below lists these ideas of Defense policy formulation, strategic planning, and defense management, in the context of managing a Ministry of Defense:

**Chart 2 - Management and the different organizational levels of Defense**

Level	Policy	Planning	Management
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Defense National Policy</li> <li>- Defense National Strategy</li> <li>- Defense Strategic Conception</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Guidelines for Defense strategic planning</li> <li>- Strategic capabilities plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- how to implement policies and strategic plans</li> <li>- identify and solve strategic problems</li> </ul>
Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military Strategy</li> <li>- Executive Policies (e.g.: personnel, acquisitions, public relations, etc.)</li> <li>- Joint Operations Doctrine</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operational plans</li> <li>- Capacity development program</li> <li>- Acquisitions program</li> <li>- Training program</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- how to implement operational policies, strategies and doctrines</li> <li>- identify and solve operational problems</li> </ul>
Current (Tactical)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Terms of reference</li> <li>- Mission of the organization</li> <li>- Standard Operating Procedures</li> <li>- Description of the positions/functions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Working plans</li> <li>- Exercise plans</li> <li>- Operations plans (campaign)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- how to implement organizational policies and current plans</li> <li>- identify and solve current problems</li> </ul>

**Source:** Adapted from Bucur-Marcu, Fluri and Tagarev (2009).

Thus, Defense Management would be politically based on the National Defense Policy (PDN-Política de Defesa Nacional), where are the Fundamentals (with important definitions such as National Power, National Security and Defense), an analysis of the national and international environment, the Defense Policy Design and the eight National Defense Objectives (OND- Objetivos Nacionais de Defesa) (BRASIL, 2020) and, the National Defense Strategy (END-Estratégia Nacional de Defesa), which presents the Strategic Defense Design, the National Defense Capabilities and the actions and strategies that should be implemented by the Ministry of Defense and the Singular Forces (BRASIL, 2020).

From the Defense planning process, based on these two documents of the highest level, two axes are taking place, one led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and the other by the Special Planning Advisor. The EMCFA will elaborate the Military Defense Policy and Strategy and the ASPLAN Defense Policy and Sector Strategy. These last two, according to the Strategic Sectorial Planning (PES-Planejamento Estratégico Setorial), “will guide the formulation of the Strategic Defense Plan (PED-Plano Estratégico de Defesa)” (BRASIL, 2019), considered the final product of the PES and that is constituted by the strategic plans of the Forces and the organs of the MD. The figure below consolidates these ideas:

**Figure 1 - Overview of the Ministry of Defense’s strategic planning**



Source: THE AUTHOR, 2022

The absorption of the fundamentals that govern the management of defense, such as performance, constant and integrated analyzes of the new environment in which the military acts, the interaction of the strategic levels, making possible the formation of emerging strategies, passes through the understanding that this does not interfere in the hierarchy, but consolidates it, as well as the adoption of new dynamics that make it possible to take decisions in the face of constant changes.

The concerns that the general public sector has with differentiated management approaches are also felt in the military environment, however, just as several public organizations have implemented new management models to cope with changes in their internal and external environments, it is believed that the new demands for security and defense already require greater efficiency and effectiveness of the military apparatus, with the consequent conceptual revision of military management, for a defense management.

However, defense management is not an end in itself, but leads to other propositions, such as (MAIA NETO, 2020):

- knowledge can be generated at any level of the organization, the hierarchy does not prevent one from being able to hear, give initiative and implement proposals from the various hierarchical levels of the military organization - in reality these actions consolidate leadership;

- in the public sector, including the military environment, the structures of organizations are governed by a legal framework, which does not allow for complex and rapid changes, but it is considered possible, with medium- and long-term actions legally formalize the alteration of these structures, making them more flexible and capable of absorbing or extinguishing certain component parts; moreover, new structures can be created temporarily, without the need for new legislation at the federal level;

- the impact of technologies on the battlefield has already changed the way of “making war”, as has happened in operations under the aegis of the UN, in public calamities, in endemics (and pandemics), in the context of the *constabulary function* or the administrative routine, are challenges that the military manager can overcome in the context of defense management;

- the internal and external collaboration must be sought to meet the new demands, only the determination of orders, does not mean the implementation of projects; the collaboration of the members of the organization, of society and of the three levels of government, demonstrates the capacity for negotiation, initiative and fulfillment of missions that must be peculiar to this new strategic soldier; and

- integrate with other state actors in the integration of the state into the international arena, i.e. in support of foreign policy. This insertion places defense management in front of new environments that can generate a direct impact on national security and defense actions, defining new strategies for the organizational context, both in the external and in the internal environment.

## 5 CLOSING REMARKS

Within this context, it can be seen that Defense Management pervades the concepts of management, allocating itself in the environment of Defense, having inputs, among others, the demands of society, the environment of the dimensions of war and the demands of international bodies, such as the UN and the OAS. These demands need to be materialized in the highest-level Defense documents (PND and END) so that they are translated into the Defense and Forces strategic planning and, as a result, can generate outputs, which provide for the achievement of the National Defense Objectives and greater effectiveness of the Defense structures.

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