



# PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR EVTOLS AND HELICOPTERS

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BHEST

BRAZILIAN HELICOPTER SAFETY  
TEAM

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Subject: Operational Risk



# SUMMARY

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# ABOUT US



# BHEST

Brazilian Helicopter  
Safety Team

The Brazilian Helicopter Safety Team - BHEST is a committee composed of representatives from civil aviation service providers and other entities with the capacity to propose and promote improvements in safety of activities involving helicopters. It includes professionals dedicated to enhancing the safety of Brazilian civil aviation.

As detailed in the Working Group Members, professionals from the industry and other organizations and companies linked to the sector actively participated in the group, by invitation of BHEST.

## OUR GOAL

**To provide regulators and the industry with an assessment of hazards and risks associated with helicopter and eVTOL operations, with the goal of contributing to new regulations and Safety Management.**



# INTRODUÇÃO

eVTOLs are electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft that, in Brazil, will be certified under RBAC 21.17(b). These aircraft will mostly transport passengers over short distances, characterizing Urban Air Mobility (UAM), with an average range of 100 km (62 mi), and Regional Air Mobility (RAM), with a range of 300 km (186 mi).

The introduction of these new elements in aviation comes with different aircraft configurations and the use of lithium-ion batteries in their initial phase, requiring appropriate infrastructure for flight operations, passenger processing, battery charging, and emergency response specific to this type of electric aircraft.

The entry into service of these aircraft will result in significant changes to airspace control structures, new rules for infrastructure development and operations, and will generate new operational risks. It has prompted the need for the study to identify potential hazards and risks associated with eVTOL operations, thereby contributing to the enhancement of safety related to this new mode of air transportation.

As a document intended to explore safety threats for helicopter and eVTOL operations — and to provide recommendations to stakeholders across the three main areas (aircraft / airspace / infrastructure) — the topic is presented here for context. However, it is not intended to comprehensively explore the specific characteristics of these new vehicles, as the target audience is presumed to have prior knowledge of the subject, and these aircraft are still undergoing development and certification. Further details can be found in the reference documents listed in the final section (References, page 13).



# Helicopter Operations

## Helicopter operations landscape

Helicopter operations exhibit higher accident rates per flight hour when compared to fixed-wing aircraft, primarily due to the nature of the missions conducted: short-duration flights that frequently involve the most critical phases of flight — vertical takeoffs and landings in proximity to obstacles and within densely populated areas. The inherent operational profile of helicopters typically results in shorter flight durations, as opposed to fixed-wing operations, which generally involve longer and more stable cruise segments. Given this distinction, it is essential to emphasize that, despite the relatively short duration of helicopter flights, continuous vigilance and a proactive safety culture remain imperative to support the ongoing enhancement of accident prevention within the rotary-wing aviation sector.

### Type of Helicopter Operation:

- Short missions
- Close to obstacles
- Densely populated areas



There are numerous aspects inherent to the design and operation of helicopters that make this a new and significant challenge. From an aerodynamic standpoint, a helicopter begins its flight while still on the ground, as the rotor blades are already spinning at full speed, creating the potential for collisions with objects or personnel. The design itself presents substantial challenges due to the nature of the aircraft, which involves a high number of moving parts, significant vibration, excessive noise, and a consistently demanding power-to-weight ratio. Engineers are constantly striving to utilize lighter and stronger materials capable of withstanding greater and repetitive loads, making component and crew fatigue a constant and critical concern.

From an operational perspective, Igor Ivanovich Sikorsky — a pioneer in the invention and commercialization of helicopters — once said: “If you are in danger anywhere in the world, an airplane can fly over and drop flowers, but a helicopter can land and save your life.” This unique capability justifies the continued relevance of helicopters and supports a large global market for this type of aircraft. However, it also places them in operational environments rich in hazards. Flying at low altitudes and operating or landing vertically, helicopters often operate near obstacles and in densely populated areas, where hazards may include power lines, nearby structures, kites, wires, cables, birds, and, more recently, drones.

In its ongoing commitment to enhancing operational safety in helicopter operations, the Brazilian Helicopter Safety Team (BHEST) established a working group to identify the hazards and risks associated with helicopter operations. The findings are intended to support BHEST's own strategic actions and may also be shared with the broader public. This effort soon expanded to encompass the operational aspects of eVTOLs, due to the high degree of similarity in vertical operations and technological challenges shared between the two types of aircraft.

Given the operational similarities between helicopters and eVTOLs, there is a need for specific studies aimed at preventing aviation accidents within the same airspace segment (low altitude). It is also essential to thoroughly examine the infrastructure requirements specific to eVTOLs, as it is evident that much of the current helicopter infrastructure will not be suitable for eVTOL operations without significant adaptations — particularly in areas such as battery charging systems and emergency response protocols.

# Overview of the AAM Ecosystem (eVTOLs and Drones)

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is composed of electric, hybrid, or sustainably fueled aircraft that incorporate new technologies in their operations — such as eVTOLs, drones, autonomous aircraft, hydrogen-powered vehicles, among others.

The primary use case for eVTOLs (which are the focus of this study) is the regular transport of passengers, with manufacturers, operators, and market studies forecasting a significant increase in both urban and interurban air traffic.

To enable these upcoming operations and their unique characteristics, the development of a supporting ecosystem — commonly referred to as the AAM ecosystem — will be essential. The new ecosystem includes the adaptation or implementation of infrastructure through the creation of vertipads/vertiports. These facilities must be capable of accommodating eVTOLs of various configurations and sizes, providing charging systems for electric aircraft as well as safety and emergency systems appropriate to the vehicles, with adequate signage and operational protocols.

In addition to infrastructure, new systems such as UATM (Urban Air Traffic Management) will be necessary to support operations. These systems are currently being developed in parallel with ongoing discussions regarding future navigation rules for eVTOL operations.



# AAM

The introduction of these new vehicles also requires highly trained professionals in emerging technologies — both for flight crews during the initial phase, when autonomous passenger flights will not yet be authorized, and for ground support teams, where applicable. It will demand detailed and specialized training covering operations, maintenance, and air traffic management.

By bringing together experienced professionals in regulation, helicopter operations, operational safety, and the manufacturing and operation of eVTOLs, the present study aims to identify hazards and risks, and to recommend risk mitigation actions, resulting in a non-exhaustive list that is expected to evolve and improve in future editions.

## PAVE Methodology

### Methodology description

Through the study and discussion of documents produced by industry and regulators — such as Concepts of Operations, Implementation Plans, Safety Alerts, and others — operational analyses were carried out, and potential hazards were identified using the PAVE framework as a guiding structure. The PAVE model outlines four key areas for identifying flight-related risks. These factors are categorized as follows:

A vertical blue line on the left side of the page, with four red text labels to its right: PILOT, AIRCRAFT, ENVIRONMENT, and EXTERNAL FACTORS.

**P**ILOT

**A**IRCRAFT

ENV**V**IRONMENT

**E**XTERNAL FACTORS





## Pilot

Identification of issues that may affect pilot performance, such as competence (knowledge, skills, and attitude), experience, fatigue, pressure, stress, illness, and other personal or psychological factors.



## Aircraft

Assessment of the aircraft's readiness for flight, including: airworthiness, weight and balance, maintenance program, fuel and range, equipment, and other operational conditions.



## Environment

Evaluation of weather conditions, terrain, airspace, and surrounding obstacles such as towers, as well as factors like night operations.



## External Pressures

Pressure from the owner or operator, passengers, family, flight schedules, and other external influences.

# Hazard and Risk Identification Using the PAVE Method

## Identification

The list of identified hazards and risks is published alongside this document in a spreadsheet, which facilitates visualization, as shown in the example below.

This document considers only operations with an onboard pilot, as ANAC has not yet authorized operations with passengers and remote pilots.

Below are some examples of what you will find in the analysis included with this report.

## PILOT

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-001	Pilot	Both	Inadequate training	Incorrect decision-making	- Updated training programs for pilots and mechanics (RBAC 61, 65, IS 145.010)

## AIRCRAFT

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-015	Aircraft	Both	Fuel contamination	Engine failure due to adulterated fuel	- Fuel testing (applicable to hybrid aircraft) - Reliable suppliers and clear protocols

## ENVIRONMENT

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-031	enVironment	Both	Low visibility / adverse weather / night conditions	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Understanding METAR</li> <li>- Checking METAR, TAF, and reliable weather information</li> <li>- Clear operational limits for IFR or MVFR conditions</li> <li>- Training for marginal conditions and instrument flight systems, if applicable</li> </ul>

## EXTERNAL PRESSURES

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-036	External Pressures	Both	Failure in management or supervision	Inadequate planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal audits and inspections (LOSA)</li> <li>- Timely consultation of NOTAMs</li> <li>- Awareness of operational risks and establishment of Safety Management System (SMS)</li> </ul>

# CONCLUSION

Operational safety is continuously striving for improvement and risk mitigation to achieve acceptable levels of safety. The maintenance of groups such as CASTs is essential, promoting discussions between industry and regulators, bringing stakeholders closer together, and developing support materials made available to the public to be used in pursuit of increasingly safer aviation.

Bringing together various sectors of the rotary-wing aviation industry, the discussions resulted in a list of the main threats and possible mitigations, which can be considered in the creation of new regulations, improvement of existing rules, development of training programs, and programs related to human factors, among other operational safety actions in aviation. However, the list of hazards and risks presented here should not be considered exhaustive, as the group involved focused on the most relevant points of attention. The list may be updated and improved in the future whenever deemed necessary and feasible.

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4. Annex 14 Vol 2, ICAO.
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9. Doc 9137 Part 7, ICAO.
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11. Engineering Brief #105 Vertiport Design, FAA.
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14. IS 153.107-001A, Anac.
15. Manual de Orientações de Infraestrutura de Helipontos, Anac.
16. MCA 3-6 MANUAL DE INVESTIGAÇÃO DO SIPAER. Fatores contribuintes. 2017. Decea.
17. PAVE Checklist, FAA.
18. Portaria Decea N° 77/DGCEA, Decea.
19. RBAC 117, Anac.
20. RBAC 120, Anac
21. RBAC 155, Anac.
22. Resolução 234, Anac.
23. Vertiport Prototype Technical Specifications, EASA.

# Working Group Members

- 1.Fernanda Siniscalchi – Advanced Air Mobility Institute – AAMI, GRU Airport and Working Group Coordinator
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- 6.Gilvan Barros – Pilot and former president of BHEST
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- 12.Vinicius Fernandes - GOL Linhas Aéreas



# Annex I – Hazards and Risks Library

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-001	Pilot	Both	Inadequate training	Poor decision-making	Updated Training Program for pilots and mechanics (RBAC 61, 65, IS 145.010) Recent and recurrent experience
PAVE-002	Pilot	Both	Being under the influence of performance-reducing substances (alcohol and/or drugs, medications)	Poor decision-making	Fatigue and Well-being Programs
PAVE-003	Pilot	Both	Poor physical or mental health condition	Poor decision-making	Nutrition and proper hydration
PAVE-004	Pilot	Both	Fatigue or excessive workload	Poor decision-making	Updated Fatigue Management Program for eVTOL operations (RBAC 117) Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring philosophy Adoption of Workday Limits (Brazilian Aeronaut Law nº 13.475/2017)
PAVE-005	Pilot	Both	Being under stress and mental pressure	Poor decision-making	Development of a Stress Management Program
PAVE-006	Pilot	Both	Improper use of automation (configuration mistakes)	Unstable approach (lateral/vertical deviation; excessive or insufficient horizontal speed)	Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring philosophy Knowledge of automation usage
PAVE-007	Pilot	Both	Inadequate planning (weather, fuel, battery charge, weight & balance)	Low fuel level Operating the aircraft beyond its limitations	SOP includes a fuel management section

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-008	Pilot	Both	False and/or misinterpreted sensory impressions	Poor decision-making	Proper nutrition, hydration, sleep, and health care
PAVE-009	Pilot	Both	Inefficient communication	Failures in information exchange between crew members or with air traffic control	Application of ICAO standard phraseology Continuous training in Clear and Concise Communication
PAVE-010	Pilot	Both	Poor Crew Resource Management (CRM)	Problems in coordination and use of available resources in the cockpit and/or operational environment	Extended CRM (E-CRM), including Maintenance Teams, Operational Dispatchers, Air Traffic Controllers (ATC), Ground Operations Teams, and Safety Coordinators of Operators
PAVE-011	Pilot	Both	Poor adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	Deviation from procedures due to complacency, operational pressure, or lack of knowledge	Creation of an Operational Safety Group for eVTOL operations
PAVE-012	Pilot	Both	Generic training (if certification is by aircraft class)	Inadequate or incomplete training Operational failure	Development of specific training tailored to the type of eVTOL Need for pilot adaptation
PAVE-013	Aircraft	Both	Aircraft released in a non-airworthiness condition	Loose cowlings, open oil caps, inoperative equipment, etc.	Use of MEL respecting deadlines Well-executed pre-flight checklist
PAVE-014	Aircraft	Both	Inadequate maintenance	Use of unapproved (non-certified) parts	ANAC-certified maintenance facilities Compliance with manufacturer's maintenance manuals Use of original parts and component traceability

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-015	Aircraft	Both	Fuel contamination	Engine shutdown due to contaminated fuel	Fuel testing (if applicable for hybrid aircraft) Reliable suppliers and clear protocols
PAVE-016	Aircraft	Both	Improper maintenance procedures	Errors or omissions during maintenance leading to critical failures in aircraft components	Manufacturers must define preventive maintenance programs, certified and monitored by aviation authorities
PAVE-017	Aircraft	Both	Material wear and fatigue	Structural fatigue due to continuous and prolonged use	Manufacturers must define detailed periodic inspections to detect and correct wear or damage before they become critical Battery manufacturers must provide information on performance monitoring and support Operators must monitor battery performance
PAVE-018	Aircraft	Both	Design or manufacturing defects	Design issues inherent to the aircraft that may not be detected during development or defects introduced during the manufacturing process	Certification process by ANAC Continuous monitoring and updates of aircraft in operation by manufacturers and operators Occurrence reports and data sharing through CENIPA Continuous updating of standards and regulations by ANAC
PAVE-019	Aircraft	Both	Propulsion system malfunctions	Mechanical or electrical failures leading to power loss or complete engine failure	Manufacturers must define preventive maintenance programs, certified and monitored by aviation authorities
PAVE-020	Aircraft	Both	Instrumentation issues	Incorrect indications or failures in flight instruments that can disorient pilots	Manufacturers must define preventive maintenance programs, certified and monitored by aviation authorities
PAVE-021	Aircraft	Both	Navigation and communication system failures	Failures in electronic systems that support navigation and communication	Manufacturers must define preventive maintenance programs, certified and monitored by aviation authorities

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-022	Aircraft	eVTOL	Approach, boarding, and disembarking with rotors in motion	Injuries to people or animals in the vicinity of the aircraft	Proper signage, ground support, and cabin briefings Control of people and animals approaching the aircraft
PAVE-023	EnVironment	Both	High air traffic / Unfamiliar aerodrome / Surveillance failure	Traffic conflicts / Aircraft collisions	Compliance with ICA100-4 and ICA100-12 visual separation requirements Operational TCAS Coordination with ATC or UAM (Urban Air Mobility) traffic management Digital navigation systems
PAVE-024	EnVironment	Both	Runway/taxiway signage failure	Runway incursion / Runway excursion	Prior assessment of site conditions Standardized signage Pre-flight briefing on lighting and markings
PAVE-025	EnVironment	Both	Presence of wildlife	Bird strike / Bird ingestion	Wildlife control programs Use of repellents and sound systems at vertiports
PAVE-026	EnVironment	Both	Unsuitable terrain for landing	Aircraft rollover / Aircraft skid / Presence of FOD (Foreign Object Debris) / Suspension of solid particles and coating damage	Evaluation of landing sites (e.g., slope landing capability) Procedures for landing and takeoff on inclined surfaces Regular maintenance and inspections, especially of landing gear (skids, wheels) and control systems to prevent failures
PAVE-027	EnVironment	Both	Kites, balloons, or unauthorized drones near the aircraft	Damage caused by FOD or collisions	Obstacle sensing (short-range cameras, radar, or Lidar) Educational campaigns about urban airspace Immediate reporting of obstacle sightings
PAVE-028	EnVironment	Both	Rotor downwash and outwash	Brownout and FOD (lifting of loose objects on the ground) / Suspension of solid particles	Obstacle sensing (short-range cameras, radar, or Lidar) Educational campaigns about urban airspace Immediate reporting of obstacle sightings

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-029	EnVironment	Both	Power lines	Collision with towers and power lines	Prior risk analysis (FRAT), FOD ramp inspection Low altitude route planning using updated charts (eVTOL corridors) Specific anti-collision systems and situational awareness tools (HUD, Synthetic Vision)
PAVE-030	EnVironment	Both	Failure in terrain/obstacle separation / Mountainous terrain	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	Operational radar altimeter and EGPWS Terrain awareness and use of approach charts Route planning considering safety zones
PAVE-031	EnVironment	Both	Low visibility / Adverse weather conditions / Night operations	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	Understanding METAR reports Consultation of METAR, TAF, and reliable weather information Clear operational limits for IFR or MVFR conditions Training for marginal weather operations and instrument flight systems if applicable
PAVE-032	EnVironment	eVTOL	Extreme temperatures (intense heat or cold)	Reduced efficiency of batteries and electrical systems	Prior analysis of expected performance (derating or performance limitations) Battery heating/cooling systems Contingency planning (e.g., nearby alternate landing sites)
PAVE-033	Environment	Both	Deficiencies in safety culture	Complacency / Communication failures	CRM and SRM training required under eVTOL regulations (for both onboard and remote pilots) Use of standard phraseology
PAVE-034	Environment	Both	Deficiencies in organizational culture and climate	Complacency / Communication failures	CRM and SRM training required under eVTOL regulations (for both onboard and remote pilots) Use of standard phraseology
PAVE-035	EnVironment	eVTOL	Poor planning of network and battery charging logistics	Inability to conduct the operation, delays, cancellations	Certified vertiports Continuous status updates on charging systems

ID	PAVE	VEHICLE	THREATS	LEADS TO...	WHAT TO DO TO AVOID
PAVE-036	External Factors	Both	Failure in management or supervision	Inadequate planning	Internal audits and inspections (LOSA) Timely consultation of NOTAMs Awareness of operational risks and implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS)
PAVE-037	External Factors	Both	Failure to comply with procedures	Accident / Loss of life	Proper control of legislation and best practices Clear safety policies and a strong reporting culture Incentives for compliance and positive reinforcement of safety behaviors
PAVE-038	External Factors	Both	Crew pressure to reach the destination	Accident / Loss of life	Crew members have the autonomy to refuse or cancel flights in favor of safety
PAVE-039	External Factors	eVTOL	Infrastructure and certification challenges (vertiports, ground services)	Operational difficulties, delays, and unsafe landings	Route planning considering certified vertiports Clear procedures for ground movements and battery charging Coordination with local air traffic and municipal authorities (dynamic geofencing, altitude, and speed restrictions) Fail-safes and anti-hijacking measures (e.g., return-to-safe-base function, emergency lockdown)
PAVE-040	External Factors	Both	Cybersecurity issues (potential system hacking)	Loss of flight data, remote control hijacking	Robust encryption and network security protocols Protected firmware/system updates Real-time monitoring for unauthorized access
PAVE-041	External Factors	Both	Market pressures (competition, cost reduction)	Safety compromised in pursuit of cost reduction	Corporate governance with defined safety targets Clear separation between financial goals and SMS goals Transparency and stakeholder engagement (pilots, maintainers, regulators)



# Annex II – Reference Links

- 1.PAVE 001 - <https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/integration-powered-lift-pilot-certification-and-operations-miscellaneous-amendments>
- 2.PAVE 002 - RBAC 120 - [https://www.gov.br/anac/pt-br/assuntos/seguranca-operacional/gerenciamento-da-seguranca-operacional/arquivos/chlst-pessoal\\_versao\\_anac\\_v2-1.pdf](https://www.gov.br/anac/pt-br/assuntos/seguranca-operacional/gerenciamento-da-seguranca-operacional/arquivos/chlst-pessoal_versao_anac_v2-1.pdf)
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