

The **OMNIDEF ANALYSIS** is a monthly publication with analyses* about themes addressed in the previous month of **OMNIDEF** and identified as the most relevant for the National Defense context.

Highlights

DEFENSE PUBLIC POLICIES

- Defense management
- The Contest Campaign and the Armed Forces employment in public order

BRAZIL'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

- Two Chapters and a Middle of the Crisis in Venezuela: Migration, External Ingerence and the Question of Guyana

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DEFENSE PUBLIC POLICIES

ANALYSIS 1

Defense management

Author: *Jacinto Maia Neto*

On July 22, 2020, while the world and the country are experiencing the social and economic uncertainties resulting from the COVID 19 pandemic, defense management cannot stop. On that day, the Minister of Defense, in compliance with Complementary Law 136 of June 10, 2010, handed the President of the Senate the four-year update of the [Brazilian defense documents](#), the National Defense Policy (NDP), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Defense White Paper (NDWP).


The current defense documents preserve in their essence the previous objectives and guidelines, especially the NDP, considered a state policy, going beyond the temporality of governments, as stated by the Minister of Defense, Fernando Azevedo, when delivering the documents for consideration by the National Congress.

The maintenance of National Defense Capabilities (NDC), terminology initially inserted in the NDS 2016 and preserved in the current documents, and which "are implemented through the coordinated and synergistic participation of government agencies and, where appropriate, private entities oriented towards defense and security in its broadest sense", places defense management at the highest level of national strategic planning, i.e. in the inter-ministerial context.

The pandemic has shown managers at all levels how changes in the external environment profoundly impact the management of countries and organizations, requiring at all organizational levels rapid and appropriate responses to the new environment. Highly hierarchical environments, such as the military, also need to generate and absorb knowledge for their survival, especially in times of diffuse and rapid change. The time to develop a planning or strategy formulation with its consequent implementation has shortened and often been extinguished, requiring the planner to take joint action at all three levels of the organization.

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Leaner, specialized and better equipped military structures have become not only an operational requirement of the new asymmetric environment of the battlefield, but a requirement of society that needs increasing investments in other sectors such as education, health and transportation.

Defense must seek to understand this new environment, structure itself and become dual. Dual in the sense of acting efficiently in the internal and external environment, understand that the environments are different and that the same troop acting in both environments may be effective, but will not be efficient.


Currently, the Brazilian Armed Forces are experiencing a managerial paradox, they need to equip the same military organization with what is most current for the internal environment, characterized by the demands that society imposes on it, such as aid to natural disasters, pandemics/endemics such as COVID 19 and dengue, support for major events, acting in Operations for Guaranteeing Law and Order (Op GLO) and, at the same time, to equip themselves to act in an external environment, markedly in UN missions or regional cooperation.

The managerial paradox is characterized by requiring efficiency and effectiveness in two distinct environments, and as new demands arise in the area of security and defense and begin to demand greater qualification and specificity from the members of the Armed Forces, becoming efficient and effective requires defining priorities.

Investing dually means going beyond the current paradigm that everyone should receive everything, there is no debate on the concept that all military personnel should or should not be able to act both in the internal and external environment, there is no talk of training the combatant, this is a current need, the preparation and employment of the military needs to be dual. What is proposed is that the investment shall be specific for each type of environment, that each OM receive the investment in material, equipment and armament in accordance with their priority environment.

[Continues]





Defining which OMs should or should not participate in a certain environment, involves defining which are the capabilities that the Armed Forces should have for each one (internal or external). The definition of these capabilities is that it will determine the acquisition of material, equipment and lethal or non-lethal weaponry.

However, it is not only a question of defining which OM will act in a certain environment, but also of defining which ones will have specific investments and in accordance with their environment. Preparation and employment may remain dual, but investment is not enough for this operational duality.

Military managers are facing new challenges, which will require new managerial capabilities. The classical conception of military strategy sometimes restricted to the battlefield and the alignment of military objectives with the objectives of war, defined by the political power, no longer meets the new military management.

The adaptation of management tools, such as strategic planning, no longer allows us to understand this environment full of uncertainty and "rapid change". The dysfunctions of the bureaucracy, such as excessive formalism, overvaluation of regulations and hierarchization of the decision-making process, besides impacting the public administration, also affect the military administration.

Military management deals with the security and defense of the state, with demands that impact both society and the state, internally and externally. From this perspective, the search for efficiency and effectiveness by these organizations must be a constant concern of public power and not only of the military.

This work sought to bring to the debate the different characteristics of military management, its difficulties in continuing effectively in this new environment and in acting in a differentiated and effective manner in response to the new security and defense demands of society and the State.

News published by OMNIDEF

G1 – 16/07/2020

Em documento, Ministério da Defesa vê risco de crises e tensões no 'entorno estratégico' do Brasil

O ministério da Defesa elaborou um documento no qual aponta a possibilidade de crises e tensões no chamado "entorno estratégico" do Brasil, que abrange América do Sul, Antártica e Oceano Atlântico até a costa ocidental da África. Esta é a terceira atualização de um conjunto de documentos, composto por "Política Nacional de Defesa", "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa" e o intitulado "Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional"

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
Infodefensa – 11/07/2020

Operación Covid-19: la FAB da el equivalente a ocho vueltas al mundo con sus KC-390, C-105 y C-130

La guerra contra el coronavirus cumple tres meses en Brasil. La pandemia exigió una acción inmediata de las Fuerzas Armadas de Brasil para contener la propagación de la contaminación y apoyar a la población en varias partes del territorio nacional en los últimos tres meses. El ministro de Defensa, Fernando Azevedo, ofreció una muestra de la importancia del despliegue efectuado al explicar que, durante estos tres meses, "la Fuerza Aérea Brasileña".

For complete news, [CLICK HERE](#)





DEFENSE PUBLIC POLICIES

ANALYSIS 2

The Contest Campaign and the Armed Forces employment in public order

Author: Eduardo Rizzatti Salomão

Co-author: Ricardo Alfredo de Assis Fayal

Appreciating the current debate on the use of the Armed Forces in Operations to Guarantee Law and Order (GLO), the intense and recurrent performance of the Brazilian Army stands out, with the apex of the federal intervention in the management of Public Security in Rio de Janeiro in 2018. In this context, the employment of military organizations in GLO is perceived by many analysts as atypical and viewed with reservations but recognized by various opinion leaders as necessary to meet extraordinary situations. To enhance this issue a graph showing the time spent in these operations in Brazil in the period 1989-2017 was inserted below.




Source: Ricardo Fayal's Master's Dissertation (2019/UFF).

If the engagement of military organizations in operations of a similar nature to police activity is viewed today with fear, it is recognized that this expedient has been widely used throughout Brazilian history to solve political crises and public order problems. Among the memories of this employment is the Contestado Campaign (1912-1916). Faced with the worsening of conflicts of political origin, permeating personal disputes between local potentates, legal clashes in favor of defining the territorial limits between the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina, and the religious aspirations of a movement that was awaiting the advent of the S. Sebastião war, one of the most expressive revolts of the First Republic erupted.

[Continues]





Observing what happened in Contestado, in contrast with the current situation regarding public security policy, may suggest anachronism. However, the tools of comparative history make it possible to confront two distant events in space and time, respecting the proper concepts to each period, in benefit of the survey of hypotheses on the results of the employment of military organizations in tasks strange to their primary destination.

The immediate origin of the conflict, christened by the national historiography of Contestado War, goes back to the denunciation, surrounded by contradictions, that in the locality of Taquaruçu, in Santa Catarina, a pro-restoration movement of the monarchy was organized. Abandoned Taquaruçu, the subsequent repression that sparked the battle of Irani in October 1912 and the unfolding of events involved the Army in operations until then headed by the public security forces of the southern states. In February 1914, a new camp in Taquaruçu was subjected to intense bombing and machine gun fire. This second episode, whose death toll included children, the elderly, and non-combatant women, echoed in the surrounding towns, stimulating the outbreak of a feeling of latent indignation and marking the emergence of several hotbeds of rebellion.

The reports of growing crimes of abigeato, murder, looting and invasion of property, computed in the rebels' account, motivated requests for federal government intervention. The massive presence of the army became a demand on the part of local authorities and foreign companies that operated logging and land colonization.


From the expeditions sent to Contestado, the operations of greater amplitude and duration were under the command of General Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho. Battalions and regiments were gathered from several states of the federation. In this campaign, the use of war aviation in Brazil was inaugurated. Besides the Army, troops of state security forces and civilians were mobilized in weapons called by colonel-farmers members of the National Guard.

Hangars in Contestado



In the background, an entourage led by General Setembrino de Carvalho and the pilots Lieutenant Ricardo Kirk and Italian Ernesto Darioli. Union of Vitoria-PR, 1915. Source: author's collection. Authorship attributed to Claro Gustavo Jansson.






The rebellion was considered to have been stifled in the last months of 1915. The military campaign was demobilized in 1916, accounting for thousands of lives. The region was left with the legacy of a time of suffering, favouring, for years, an attitude of distrust of the local inhabitants towards the powers of the Republic.

What can be extract from the Contestado's experience for the current Armed Forces employment policy in public security? By consulting contemporary publications on the conflict, including the work of [Demerval Peixoto](#) (1920), voices are discordant with the military solution to crises rocked by political and social problems. In Congress, deputies expressed their opposition to the application of federal troops in the Contestado, a role considered inappropriate and favorable to the claims of local representatives, as registered by [Maurício de Lacerda](#) (1914).

[The Federal Constitution of 1891](#) provided for the use of the Army and the Navy in maintaining compliance with laws within the territory, to the discouragement of opponents of such application. The editorial of the magazine [The national defense](#) (1913), compared Contestado to the "English campaign of Canudos" and in commenting on the decision to use the Army against nationals, recognized that, in order to fulfill the mission, the actions would take on clear characteristics of war operations to reduce the compatriots to the condition of enemies. In his work [Soldiers of the Homeland](#) (2004), the historian Frank McCann acknowledged that Contestado remained for years as one of the important elements of the Army's institutional memory, and the memory of the death of compatriots brought discomfort, as Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott [suggests](#).

The nation's military forces have as their primary mission to apply so-called legitimate violence against threats to the existence of the sovereign state, including the prerogative to apply the force necessary for the physical elimination of the enemy, very important aspect of Hobbesian thinking. In this arrangement, the role of the military forces is not consistent with the task of force applied to the maintenance of social order and legality within the state territory, where the exercise of police power is applied for the purpose of catching criminals and bringing them to justice, and therefore not enemies of the state. The use of the Armed Forces in public order/security is now recognized as an exceptionality. Against this backdrop, new threats to the sovereign state have emerged, promoting the adoption of a vision attuned to the U.S. [hemispheric security agenda](#), as in the case of countries such as [Mexico](#) (which handed over public security to the military) and Colombia.





In Brazil, the employment of military personnel in police actions does not point to a lasting solution, being a palliative resource. This does not mean ignoring the competence of several actors in this activity and the due use of state agents in activities of interest to society. However, as a result, the trajectory towards strengthening the militarization of public security persists, contrary to models more attuned to the exercise of citizenship, a subject discussed by researchers such as Jorge Zaverucha (1999).

Among the unintended consequences, the Army's employment in police actions open up the possibility of "policing" military organizations aimed at defending national sovereignty. This perspective does not favor the function of the State to guarantee the sovereignty necessary for society to be able to prosper and achieve its objectives, free from the risks of external aggression and political pressures and limitations to its full development and progress.

From the above, it is believed that it is necessary to intensify the debate on the alternatives to prepare the removal of the Armed Forces from employment in actions of a similar nature to police. As a proposal, there is the conversion of the National Security Force into a robust intermediary guard fully trained to act at the borders and in dealing with public order crises. In South America, examples of the National Gendarmería in Argentina and the Carabineros in Chile are emerging. The Union's budget slice clashes and the Armed Forces' commitment to employment in the GLO will be challenges to be faced in the name of a public security policy that preserves the main mission of the Brazilian military. The Contestado Campaign is a reminder of the consequences of the use of military power against the civilian population.

News published by OMNIDEF

Defesanet – 15/07/2020

Exercício de campanha adestra Força de ProntidãoAeroterrestre para neutralizar ação de forças inimigas

No dia 5 de julho, a Força de Prontidão Aeroterrestre(FORPRON Aet), oriunda da Brigada de Infantaria Páraquedista (Bda Inf Pqdt), realizou o AprontoOperacional para o exercício de campanha, no escopoda certificação no Sistema de Prontidão Operacionalda Força Terrestre. O treinamento ocorreu entre 6 e10 de julho, no Campo de Instrução de Gericinó. É umexercício de simulação viva, contando com uma forçaavaliada e uma força oponente.

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
Ministério da Defesa – 24/07/2020

Forças Armadas intensificam fiscalização em riospara o combate de delitos na Amazônia

Militares das Forças Armadas envolvidos na OperaçãoVerde Brasil 2 cumpriram por meio do ComandoConjunto Amazônia (CCJA), inspeções navais,abrangendo cidades dos estados do Amazonas,Roraima, Rondônia e Acre. As atuações ocorreram, naquinta-feira (23), por meio do Navio-Patrolha Fluvial(NPaFlu) Pedro Teixeira e de embarcações dascapitanias pertencentes ao 9º Distrito Naval. Integrouainda a ação agentes da Fundação Nacional do Índio.

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BRAZIL'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

ANALYSIS 3

Two Chapters and a Middle of the Crisis in Venezuela: Migration, External Ingerence and the Question of Guyana

Author: *Mariana Alves da Cunha Kalil*

Introduction

The 3rd of August 2020 dawned with an official note from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the result of the same year's March elections in Guyana. The imbroglio of the Guyanese presidential election is presented here as another chapter of the Venezuela's crisis.

Chapter 1: The refugee Crisis

In 2015, the crisis of Venezuelan refugees began. This crisis can be understood from Venezuela's inflation data, superimposed on the data of violence in the country's cities.


The following data are from the IMF: between 1999 and 2013, average inflation in the country stood at 23.29%, with a minimum of 12.53% in 2001 and a maximum of 40.64% in 2013. From 2012 to 2013, inflation rose from 21.07% to 40.64%. The average inflation between 2013 and 2020, in turn, jumped to 12,313.96%, with the first major leap being made between 2014 and 2015, when inflation rose from 62.17% to 121.74%. The second big jump occurred between 2017 and 2018, when the rate went from 438.12% to 65,374.08%.

The period from 2014 to 2015 reveals the first major loss of purchasing power within the Venezuela since the Chávez administration. Also in that period, Venezuela had the highest number of cities in its history in the ranking of the world's most violent cities, according to data from the Consejo de Seguridad, Paz y Justicia, which maps murder rates in cities worldwide.

No wonder that, in 2015, the process of mass emigration from Venezuela began, especially to countries like Colombia and Peru, but also Brazil, the United States, Spain, Ecuador, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Currently, between 4 and 5 million Venezuelans are outside the country, which is equivalent to about 15% of the population.

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Chapter 2: The International Community Involvement


In 2013, after Hugo Chávez's death, Nicolás Maduro was elected to preside over Venezuela. In 2019, after questioning the credibility of Maduro's re-election, countries of the Americas began to recognize the government of Juan Guaidó, then president of the National Assembly, as the legitimate representative of Venezuelans. Mexico, Uruguay and France began to advocate for dialogue between the two authorities. Guyana and Suriname remained neutral. Bolivia and Cuba maintained their recognition of the Maduro government, as well as Turkey, Russia and China.

On April 1, 2020, the United States sent to Venezuela an Expanded Antinarcotics Operation, counting on the Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force and an Assistance Security Forces Company. Symbolically, the operation marks the United States' military position on the fringes of its territory where Russia, since 2018, has a military presence associated with the Maduro government. From joint naval exercises in the Caribbean to sending TU-160 fighters to Venezuela, Moscow seeks to provide stability to the government of Maduro also with the S-300 system, the dispatch of private forces to Maduro's personal security and its entourage, the Wagner Group, in addition to partnerships with PDVSA for the regime's subsistence.

Objectively, the Antinarcotics Expanded Operations marks the conciliation in United States between the Department of Justice and the Secretariat of Defense. The Operation, which coincided with the listing of Maduro as a drug trafficker in process in New York, aims to intercept shipments of drugs drained from Venezuela to warehouses in Central America and the Caribbean with final destination in the United States. In September 2019, a surgical counter-narcotics operation had been carried out by a U.S. Coast Guard ship, deployed from the coast of Florida to the coast of Colombia to intercept a submarine carrying tons of cocaine from Colombia, a country that has concentrated record drug production in recent years, despite the success of Plan Colombia and the Washington-Bogotá partnership in ending the Medellín and Cali cartels and dissolving the FARC.

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Chapter 2 1/2: The Question of Guyana


In 2017, the U.S. company Exxon announced it had found promising offshore oil reserves in Guyana. Soon after, Venezuela resumed its claims for 2/3 of the neighboring country's territory, including the portion where the reserves are located. In February 2020, amid new presidential elections in the country, the company announced a new discovery that places Guyana among the world's largest oil producers. Granger, president since 2015, has been accused of underpricing the value of the reserves, offering advantages to Exxon. At the same time, the opposing party, the Progressive Party, was accused of having hired Cambridge Analytica generating disinformation throughout the 2020 elections.

Granger's strategy towards Venezuela was one of appeasement. He sought greater rapprochement with Russia, celebrating professional exchanges and reiterating his appreciation for the Russian government's support with issues related to Guyanese debts. Against this backdrop, the United States pressed for recognition of the Progressive Party's victory, including sanctions against government leaders who would be hampering the transition of power.

With CARICOM and the OAS acting as observers in the recount of votes, 2 August 2020 marked the end of a dispute that had lasted since 2 March of the same year. After five months, therefore, the new Guyanese government is accused by the previous one of being the result of external interference for regime change within Guyana due to the policy of appeasement that the previous one exerted towards Venezuela and Russia. The Progressive Party had used anti-corruption rhetoric to elect itself even in traditional strongholds of the ruling party, like Region 4.

[Continues]





Conclusion

The crisis in Venezuela has several chapters from which 2.5 have been extracted for this contribution. It should be noted that the crisis has the potential to spread throughout the Latin American region, including through interference in domestic affairs by extraregional powers. It is therefore important to observe the movement of extraregional actors, especially Russia and the United States, in the face of the domestic electoral dynamics of Latin American countries in order to increase their capacity to predict geopolitics in the Americas in the 21st century.

News published by OMNIDEF

Infodefensa – 09/07/2020

Venezuela activa un nuevo destacamento de la Guardia Nacional en la región de Guayana

La Guardia Nacional de Venezuela, cuarto componente militar de la Fuerza Armada Nacional, activó el Destacamento de Comandos Rurales N° 628 con sede en El Callao, estado Bolívar, en la región de la Guayana venezolana. La unidad activada es orgánica del Comando de Zona para el Orden Interno No 62, con jurisdicción en el territorio de ese estado ubicado al sur del país. La nueva unidad de Tropas de Acción Rápida, que ha quedado bajo el mando del mayor Mario Israel Abreu

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
Infobae – 17/07/2020

Colombia repudió la retención “arbitraria” de tres nacionales en Venezuela

Tres colombianos están retenidos en Venezuela tras ser interceptados por militares cuando llevaban “ayuda humanitaria” a una zona fronteriza, denunciaron este jueves autoridades de Colombia; pero Caracas sostiene que el incidente responde a sospechas de “contrabando de combustible”. Los colombianos permanecen en “retención arbitraria” desde el miércoles, dijo a la AFP el servicio de prensa del ministerio de Exteriores colombiano, que pidió su liberación.

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